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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examines economic impacts of two gasoline regulations designed to 
combat tropospheric ozone pollution. I construct several fixed effects econometric models to 
assess impacts of reformulated gasoline and low volatility gasoline on retail gasoline prices and 
consumer costs. I estimate that reformulated gasoline has had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on real fuel prices of approximately 3.4 to 6.0 cents per gallon. I estimate that 
federal low volatility gasoline has had an insignificant price impact of 0.0 to 0.8 cents per gallon, 
but find that state-level controls more stringent than federal standards may have increased prices 
by over 8.0 cents per gallon. I also find that both reformulated gasoline and low volatility 
gasoline price effects likely vary substantially between cities. I present a framework for 
examining changes in welfare and estimate that over 15 years the reformulated gasoline program 
has cost consumers between $15.1 billion and $39.0 billion.iii 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
  To comply with national air quality legislation, federal and state regulators have enacted 
various controls on the content and attributes of liquid fuels. Since the combustion of motor 
gasoline is a large contributor to the emissions and formation of both criteria and hazardous air 
pollutants,
1 the characteristics of this prized and ubiquitous
2 commodity are highly controlled in 
many localities. Two regulations designed to address the problem of tropospheric ozone 
pollution have had a particularly widespread and longstanding influence on fuel markets and the 
greater national economy: low volatility gasoline and reformulated gasoline. The former 
regulation places an upper limit to the reid vapor pressure of affected motor gasoline during 
summer months to limit the evaporation of volatile organic compounds – precursor pollutants to 
ozone formation. Reformulated gasoline is more stringent fuel regulation that limits the vehicular 
emissions of nitrogen oxides and air toxics, as well as volatile organic compounds. 
Since the late 1980s, hundreds of counties in dozens of states have adopted the use of low 
volatility gasoline during the summer months. Since 1995, over 15 large metropolitan areas have 
required the year-round use of federal reformulated gasoline. In 2009, reformulated gasoline 
represented over one third of all motor gasoline supplied to U.S. markets (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration). 
                                                           
1 “Criteria” air pollutants are the six pollutants (including ozone) for which the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency has determined National Ambient Air Quality Standards. According to EPA: “Hazardous air 
pollutants, also known as toxic air pollutants or air toxics, are those pollutants that cause or may cause cancer or 
other serious health effects, such as reproductive effects or birth defects, or adverse environmental and ecological 
effects” <http://www.epa.gov/ttnatw01/pollsour.html>. 
2 In 2009 alone, U.S. consumers used over 137 billion gallons of motor gasoline (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration). 2 
 
Given these command-and-control air quality regulations, it is important to understand 
their marginal costs, benefits and distributive impacts in order to achieve equitable and 
economically efficient pollution abatement at least cost. While a few studies have attempted to 
quantify the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act as a whole, little work has focused 
specifically on individual fuel-based regulations. Research which has examined low volatility 
and reformulated gasoline programs has often exhibited a shortage of price and regulatory data 
(including limited frequency of observations, coarse spatial granularity, and short timeframes of 
observation) and overly complicated and subjective statistical models. Most research which has 
estimated cent per gallon price impacts of fuel regulations provides no welfare or cost-benefit 
calculations. 
  This thesis is an attempt to address a few of these failures. My work draws heavily from 
past economic analyses focused on the impacts of gasoline regulations on fuel prices. It both 
corroborates earlier findings using straightforward methodology and builds upon previous work 
by using enhanced data and by analyzing a few measures of costs and benefits. By strengthening 
the analysis and discussion of motor fuel controls, I hope to inform better policy making and 
encourage more comprehensive analysis of environmental regulatory programs. 
A main focus of this study is to determine more accurately the effect that low volatility 
and reformulated gasoline regulations have had on retail gasoline prices in the United States 
from 1992 until the present. First and foremost, this research attempts to answer the question of 
whether these regulations have had any impacts at all on real retail gasoline prices. If so, are 
these impacts measurable at credible level of statistical significance? The paper also estimates 
the magnitude and direction of these impacts and whether they vary across time and space. It 
also attempts to answer the question of whether or not ethanol blending has had a significant 3 
 
impact on gasoline prices. While other literature has focused on distinguishing the precise 
underlying causes of price changes due to regulation, this research takes a broader view by 
measuring the average price impacts of regulation with less regard to the potential economic 
mechanisms (such as market power and geographic segmentation) driving these changes. The 
secondary emphasis of this study is to conduct a basic analysis of changes in consumer costs and 
to qualitatively assess the cost-effectiveness of fuel-based regulatory programs. 
My work primarily consists of several multivariate statistical models which are used to 
determine both average and localized price effects of fuel regulations. These models utilize a 
fixed effects panel structure with over 18 years of regulatory data and weekly retail gasoline 
prices. They find that the reformulated gasoline program has raised real consumer prices in 
regulated areas by an average of 3.4 to 6.0 cents per gallon. The models find an insignificant 
price impact of average low volatility gasoline of between 0.0 and 0.8 cents per gallon, but 
suggest that state-level controls more stringent than federal standards may increase prices by 
over 8.0 cents per gallon. 
Additionally, in the Discussion chapter, I present a conceptual welfare framework for 
evaluating aggregate economic impacts of these fuel regulations. I develop a simple model which 
uses my estimated price effects as parameters to calculate changes in consumer costs – one 
important component of the welfare framework. This allows for some basic insights concerning 
the overall economic cost-effectiveness of the reformulated gasoline program. I find that 
reformulated gasoline regulations have cumulatively raised consumer costs by anywhere from 
$15.1 billion to $39.0 billion over the more than 15 years of program implementation. Based on 
EPA’s value of a statistical life and non-monetized health benefits data, I tentatively conclude 
that the reformulated gasoline program has increased the nation’s net economic welfare. 4 
 
While I do not explicitly model or assess low volatility gasoline for cost and welfare 
impacts, I suggest that this program could potentially have neutral or even negative welfare 
implications. A recent study has suggested that most low volatility gasoline is ineffective at 
reducing ambient ozone concentrations in regulated areas (Auffhammer and Kellogg). If this 
finding is accurate, traditional volatility regulation as a means to control ozone may impose high 
costs to society with few economic benefits. If the Environmental Protection Agency finalizes its 
proposed rulemaking (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “NAAQS 2010” 2938-3052) to 
reduce the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for 8-hour ozone from 0.075 ppm to a level 
between 0.06 and 0.07 ppm, many additional counties will fall into non-attainment designation. 
Since volatility and other fuel-based controls are relatively simple, politically favorable, and 
perceivably inexpensive to implement (compared to costly stationary source retrofits), state and 
federal regulators may vastly expand the range of these regulations in attempt to reduce ozone in 
newly non-compliant counties. The concern that this action may increase costs without 
conferring benefits adds to the existing imperative for solid research regarding the economic 
impacts of specific fuel-based regulations. 5 
 
CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 
  This chapter presents an introduction to the problem of ozone pollution and the means by 
which policymakers have attempted to reduce its ambient concentration through the regulation of 
motor fuels. After a discussion of the science and problem of tropospheric ozone, I briefly 
discuss the production and supply chain of motor gasoline. The bulk of the chapter discusses the 
history of air quality controls, with a particular emphasis on the mitigation of vehicle-originated 
ozone pollution through the use of regulated gasoline. 
 
Ozone Pollution 
  Tropospheric “ground-level” ozone – also known as “smog” – is a federally regulated air 
pollutant that is created by the sunlight-driven chemical reaction of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Although chemically identical to the higher-altitude 
stratospheric ozone that defends the earth from ultra-violet radiation, ozone at ground-level has 
effects that are far from protective. Numerous scientific studies have linked ozone exposure to 
human health and environmental problems, including permanent lung damage and the reduction 
of forest growth and crop yields (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “Ground-Level 
Ozone”). Ozone precursor pollutants are largely generated by industrial emissions, chemical 
solvents, natural biological sources and motor vehicle exhaust. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) estimated that on-road vehicle use contributed to over 35% of NOx and 25% of 
VOC emissions nationwide in 2005, making automobiles the #1 and #2 sources of these 
respective ozone precursors (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “Air Emission Sources”). 
Classified by EPA as a criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA), ozone has a long 6 
 
history of regulation by EPA and the states. While multiple regulations apply to both stationary 
and mobile emission sources of ozone precursors, some of the most important, ubiquitous and 
potentially costly regulations apply directly to the motor fuel gasoline. 
 
Gasoline: An Overview 
  By far the most common motor fuel used by the American vehicle fleet is gasoline. In 
2009, Americans consumed over 137 billion gallons of the fuel (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration). Gasoline is not a homogenous substance, such as water or ethanol, but is rather 
“a complex mixture of hundreds of hydrocarbons” (Gibbs et al. 31). Almost all modern gasoline 
is composed primarily of petroleum compounds produced from the crude oil refining process, 
however it is technically (although not currently economically) feasible to produce gasoline from 
“coal, shale oil, tar sands and exotic sources like recycled plastics and rubber tires” (Gibbs et al. 
31).  
Modern gasoline production is the result of many interconnected chemical and physical 
refining processes, usually including crude oil distillation, cracking, reforming and alkylation.
3 
The content and characteristics of the end product are determined largely by fuel specification 
demands of motor vehicles and by regulatory requirements. Air quality regulations have affected 
gasoline volatility as well as the fuel’s contents of oxygen, benzene, heavy metals and sulfur. 
Most changes to the characteristics of gasoline occur at the refinery level. For example, volatility 
reductions are achieved during distillation by removal of the lightest molecular elements 
(particularly butanes) of gasoline (Lidderdale “Environmental”). However, gasoline oxygenation 
– which occurs through fuel blending – can happen either at the refinery or at the wholesaler. 
                                                           
3 For a technical discussion of the gasoline production process, refer to Lew Gibbs, et al, Motor Gasolines Technical 
Review Chevron Corporation, 2009). 7 
 
The gasoline supply chain begins upstream at the petroleum refinery and ends 
downstream at the retail supplier, or “gas station.” To describe the political and physical 
geographies of gasoline markets, it is sometimes helpful to use the concept of PADD regions. 
During World War II, the then Petroleum Administration for War divided the United States into 
five regional zones, known as Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts (or PADDs) to 
better facilitate the allocation of oil. A map of domestic petroleum refineries, along with PADDs, 
is provided in Figure 1 (National Petrochemical & Refiners Association). Most American 
petroleum refineries are located in coastal areas where shipping tankers can easily supply 
consistent and large supplies of crude oil. Areas of high refinery concentration include southern 
Texas and Louisiana in the Gulf Coast region; Puget Sound, greater Los Angeles and the Bay 
Area in the West Coast region; and the Delaware River and New York Harbor in the Mid-
Atlantic region. Additionally, there exist inland refineries in the Mid-West and Mountain West 
which receive crude oil via pipeline from coastal regions, Canada or inland domestic sources. A 
rapidly growing supply of crude is shipped from the Alberta oil sands, as well as from North 
Dakota, via pipeline to the Mid-West and Gulf Coast regions. Refineries typically convert crude 
oil inputs into gasoline, jet fuel, and petroleum distillates (e.g. diesel fuel, heating oil, industrial 
lubricants, etc.). Gasoline is typically transported from refiners via pipeline, barge or train, to 
wholesale fuel terminals (known as “racks”) that sell the fuel to numerous smaller retail sellers. 
As of 2008, there were 1,495 rack locations in the United States (Peterson, Chin and Das 1-94). 
The final transportation link from rack to retail gas station occurs by truck. 
 8 
 
History of Air Quality and Motor Fuel Regulations 
  The legislative basis for the majority of gasoline content controls in the United States 
resides with the Clean Air Act of 1970 and its subsequent amendments. While federal air quality 
legislation had existed in some form since the 1950s, the 1970 CAA granted the newly-
established Environmental Protection Agency the powers to define harmful air pollutants, set 
limits to their ambient concentrations, guide state implementation of emission reductions, and 
enforce controls of motor vehicle emissions. Tropospheric ozone pollution has been regulated 
since shortly after passage of the 1970 CAA; however emission reduction programs targeting the 
properties of motor fuels were first implemented only in the late 1980s. Motor fuel regulations 
were greatly expanded with passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) and 
implementation of the federal reformulated gasoline program in 1995. Throughout the 2000s, 
state and federal legislation pertaining to renewable energy and oxygenate additives led to 
additional fuel content regulations. 
  Before the Clean Air Act of 1970 established the basis for a system of enforceable 
national air quality regulations, the “federal government’s role was almost entirely devoted to 
conducting scientific and technical investigations and providing information to the states” 
(Martineau and Novello). The United States Congress first recognized the national importance of 
air quality through passage of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, which allocated federal 
funds for research into the scope and sources of pollution (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency “History”). Additional money for the study of air pollution abatement and the 
development of a national air quality program was provided by the Clean Air Act of 1963. The 
Air Quality Act of 1967 also expanded research activities and established enforcement 
procedures for interstate air pollution transport. 9 
 
  Early on, the federal government identified motor vehicles as a major contributing source 
of air pollution. While Congress did not pass comprehensive air quality legislation until 1970, 
the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965 authorized the establishment of the first 
vehicle emission standards. Standards were codified by the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (a predecessor to EPA) in 1966 and went into effect for vehicle model year 1968 
(Martineau and Novello). Recognizing that the proliferation of many different and state-specific 
vehicle standards could impose unnecessary regulatory burdens to automakers and higher prices 
to consumers, Congress included a federal preemption of law in the 1967 Air Quality Act. Any 
state that had not established its own air quality regulation before March 30, 1966 was prohibited 
from implementing standards different than the federal law.
4 This early concern about the added 
costs of heterogeneous regulation of vehicles is echoed by concern forty years later over the 
heterogeneous regulation of fuels and the proliferation of so-called “boutique fuels” or “special 
gasoline blends.”
5 
  The Clean Air Act of 1970 and its amendments, through establishment of the first 
comprehensive and enforceable national air pollution policy, had major impacts on the regulation 
of both ozone and motor vehicles.  
The 1970 CAA charged the new Environmental Protection Agency to develop a list of air 
pollutants emitted by “numerous or diverse” sources whose atmospheric presence “may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” (Martineau and Novello). After 
                                                           
4 California – the sole state having established air quality control prior to 3/30/66 – successfully petitioned the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to retain its more stringent standards. 
5 Heterogeneous regulation may play a large role in the fuel price increases measured by this thesis research. 
Yacobucci (“Boutique Fuels”) discusses the broad economic impacts of boutique fuel proliferation and recent 
legislative and regulatory measures to “harmonize” fuel types; Brown et al. (pp. 1-19) delves more deeply into the 
relationship between RVP and RFG regulation, market power, geographic segmentation and fuel prices. 10 
 
selection of these “criteria” pollutants, EPA was required to develop both health-based “primary” 
standards and welfare-based “secondary” standards that defined the maximum allowable ambient 
atmospheric concentrations of each pollutant. These “National Ambient Air Quality Standards” 
(NAAQS) provide the basis for most Clean Air Act regulatory programs.
6 EPA identified both 
ozone and its precursor NOx (along with particulate matter, sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide) 
as criteria pollutants, and the Agency developed NAAQS for each through 1971 rulemakings. 
  EPA initially set the ozone standard at an hourly-averaged atmospheric concentration of 
0.08 ppm total photochemical oxidants (of which ozone is just one) not to be exceeded more than 
once per year. Any monitoring district found in violation of this criterion would be deemed in 
non-attainment status according to a six-category
7 classification structure based upon the 
magnitude of the ozone exceedance. EPA revised the primary and secondary ozone NAAQS to 
0.12 ppm in February 1979 and subsequently revised the standards to 8-hour-averaged 
concentrations of 0.08 ppm in 1997.
8 The 0.08 ppm standards (along with EPA’s power to set 
NAAQS) were initially struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals but were later upheld 
by the Supreme Court in 2001. These litigations delayed until April 2004 the effective 
implementation of the revised air quality standards and the required state revisions of county 
attainment levels. In 2008, EPA further reduced the ozone NAAQS to 0.075 ppm (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency “NAAQS” 16435-16514); in January 2010 the Agency issued 
a proposed rulemaking that would reduce the primary 8-hour standard to a level between 0.06 
                                                           
6 A notable exception is the Air Toxics program. 
7 In increasing order of severity: Marginal, Moderate, Serious, Severe I, Severe II, Extreme. 
8 The 1997 rulemaking also eliminated the requirement for annual ozone NAAQS compliance and replaced it with 
the confusing and less-stringent requirement that the three-year average of the fourth highest daily maximum 8-
hour average concentration not exceed the NAAQS standard. 11 
 
ppm and 0.07 ppm. These NAAQS changes may eventually have large impacts on the 
proliferation of fuel-based ozone regulations; however, almost all current fuel programs have 
been predicated upon non-compliance with the 0.12 ppm 1-hour ozone standard. 
  The 1970 Clean Air Act gave EPA the power to define ozone as a criteria pollutant and to 
set its primary and secondary NAAQS; however Congress delegated most of the implementation 
and enforcement of the standards to the states. Under the CAA, states must define which 
counties are in non-attainment and explain how they plan to achieve attainment for the various 
NAAQS through submission of State Implementation Plans (SIPs). EPA must approve the SIPs 
for each state. 
  Federal regulation of motor fuels began when the 1967 Air Quality Act granted the 
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare the power to designate fuel types 
for registration (Martineau and Novello). The 1970 CAA gave EPA the additional authority to 
require health-effects testing prior to fuel registration. Section 211(f) of the CAA required EPA 
to regulate new fuels and fuel additives. The Act prohibits the introduction to commerce of fuels 
and additives which are not "substantially similar" to those used in vehicle certification; 
however, it allows EPA to waive this requirement if a petitioner can show that a new fuel "will 
not cause or contribute to a failure of any emission control device or system…" In the 1970s, 
EPA denied acceptance of certain fuel additives (such as the octane-enhancer “MMT” which 
damaged catalytic converters in automobiles and thus interfered with other pollution control 
programs). However, during this time period EPA allowed the introduction into commerce of 
gasoline blended with up to ten percent ethanol (“E10” fuel). The Agency also initiated a major 
phase down in the amount of lead in gasoline. 12 
 
  EPA first used fuel regulation as a means to achieve ozone NAAQS in 1989 with the 
initial implementation of the federal volatility control program (hereafter referred to as the 
“RVP” program). In this two-phased initiative, EPA mandated the sale of gasoline with reduced 
evaporability (measured by reid vapor pressure – hence “RVP”) during summer months. Because 
evaporating gasoline releases high levels of VOCs (which are precursor compounds to ozone 
formation), reduction of gasoline volatility should in theory reduce the formation of ozone. Since 
gasoline is more volatile in warmer temperatures and at higher elevations, the standards take 
effect only during summer months and tend to be more stringent for non-attainment areas in 
southern states and the Mountain West. 
Phase 1 of the RVP program mandated that the 48 contiguous states (or portions of those 
states) meet specific RVP limits (of 10.5, 9.5 or 9.0 psi) for all gasoline sold by retail outlets 
between June 1 and September 15 beginning in the summer of 1989 (U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency “Volatility Regulations 1989” 11868-11911). To ease the annual transition to 
low-RVP fuel and to ensure retail compliance by June 1, the program mandated that upstream 
suppliers commence production and sales of summertime fuel by May 1. The EPA’s federal 
volatility program allowed a 1.0 psi RVP waiver for gasoline containing approximately 10 
percent ethanol. 
Phase 2 of the program originally tightened state RVP limits to either 9.0 psi or 7.8 psi 
beginning in the summer of 1992 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “Volatility 
Regulations 1992” 23658-23667). However, after passage of the 1990 CAAA and legislative 
codification of the RVP program, EPA revised the 7.8 psi RVP limit to apply only to counties 
then in ozone non-attainment (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “Regulation of Fuels 
1991” 64704-64713). Section 211(c)(4)(C) of the 1990 CAAA allowed states to adopt more 13 
 
stringent controls of fuels or fuel additives than the federal standards, and granted the EPA 
administrator the power to “approve such provision in an implementation plan, or promulgate an 
implementation plan containing such a provision, only if he finds that the State control or 
prohibition is necessary to achieve the national primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard which the plan implements.” 
Since the beginnings of the RVP program in 1989 and 1992, numerous state 
implementation plans have adopted more stringent gasoline volatility controls than the federal 
program mandates. In almost all cases, EPA has deemed fuel volatility controls “necessary” and 
has approved the SIPs. For a county-level table of current state and federal summertime volatility 
limits see EPA’s “Guide on Federal and State Summer RVP Standards for Conventional 
Gasoline Only” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). 
  Taking an especially prescriptive stance towards policy implementation at EPA, in the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments Congress legislated the federal reformulated gasoline (RFG) 
program. RFG legislation, which contained “substantially more statutory text than the entire 
fuels program previously filled” (Martineau and Novello), created one of the most stringent fuel 
content regulations in the world. “Reformulated” gasoline is designed to reduce vehicular 
emissions of air toxics and ozone-forming pollutants. The RFG program does not mandate any 
specific composition or formulation of gasoline, but it requires that certified fuel meet certain 
vehicle emission standards when fuel characteristics are tested by an EPA predictive model. 
Volatility controls are required for RFG only during the summer season as defined by the 
preexisting RVP fuels program (June 1 – September 15 for retailers; May 1 – September 15 for 
upstream, suppliers). Additionally, RFG fuel cannot increase NOx emissions, cannot contain 
heavy metals (unless EPA deems that the metals do not increase toxic emissions), cannot contain 14 
 
more than 1.0% benzene by volume, and must contain at least 2.0% oxygen by weight. The 2005 
Energy Policy Act (EPAct) repealed this final oxygenate blending provision amidst concerns 
over groundwater contamination from fuel oxygenate MTBE and the predicted rapid expansion 
of ethanol blending due to federal renewable fuel mandates (Energy Policy Act of 2005). 
The 1990 CAAA prescribed that nine of the worst ozone-polluted metropolitan areas in 
the United States implement RFG fuel year-round beginning on January 1, 1995. The 
amendments also allowed state governors to opt-into the RFG program any areas that desired to 
join. The RFG program was implemented in two stages, with stricter Phase 2 emission 
regulations for VOCs, toxics and NOx taking effect in year 2000. Since 1995, over 70 counties 
and municipalities have joined the RFG program. A list of the original counties, current opt-in 
counties and opt-out counties can be found on EPA’s “Reformulated Gas: Where You Live” 
webpage (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). As of 2010, RFG gasoline accounted for 
approximately 30% of the nation’s gasoline consumption (Renewable Fuels Association). 
  To achieve NAAQS in carbon monoxide non-attainment areas, EPA established a winter 
season oxygenated fuels program (OXY) in 1992. This program is implemented entirely by the 
states and requires gasoline sold typically between November and February to contain a 
specified oxygen content by weight. Added oxygen helps gasoline burn more efficiently to 
reduce the formation of carbon monoxide caused by incomplete combustion. During the winter 
of 1994-1995, thirty one areas across the country implemented OXY regulations; however as of 
2008 there were only eight areas still implementing the program (U.S. Environmental Protection 
“State Winter Oxy” Agency 1-4). 
  Other motor fuel regulations established by EPA include a detergent additive requirement 
for all gasoline sold after 1995 (to prevent the accumulation of harmful deposits in engines and 15 
 
fuel systems), and a sulfur phase-down program to protect vehicle emission systems. Beginning 
in 2004, most gasoline refiners were required to produce gasoline that met a corporate average 
standard of 120 ppm sulfur and a maximum standard of 300 ppm sulfur. These sulfur standards 
decreased annually until 2007 when the final standards of 30 ppm average and 80 ppm maximum 
took effect (Martineau and Novello). EPA anticipated that the final standards would 
incrementally cost refiners less than two cents per gallon (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
“Tier 2”). 
  During the 2000s throughout much of the country there were major gasoline formulation 
changes that had little to do with air quality regulation. The first major change was in the form of 
numerous state bans on fuel blending with methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), which led to the 
widespread reduction in use of this popular fuel oxygenate. The second major change was the 
vast growth of ethanol-blended gasoline due to the establishment of federal renewable fuel 
standards and other government incentives. 
To comply with RFG and OXY fuel oxygenation requirements, suppliers must add a 
high-oxygen fuel component to an underlying gasoline blendstock. Due to production costs and 
product availability constraints of other potential fuel oxygenates, there have been two 
predominant component fuels used to oxygenate gasoline: MTBE and ethanol. 
Ethanol is a fuel-grade alcohol that is distilled from fermented grain. In the United States, 
ethanol is almost exclusively produced from corn. Due to the economics of transporting corn 
feedstock, most ethanol refineries are located in the Midwestern states (see Figure 2). Ethanol 
has hydrophilic and corrosive chemical properties that make it unfit for shipment by most 
existing petroleum product pipelines. Consequently, more costly trains, trucks and barges 
currently account for almost all ethanol transport (Peterson, Chin and Das 1-94). 16 
 
MTBE, on the other hand, is produced from the synthesis of methanol and isobutylene – 
byproducts of the petroleum refining process. Consequently, production of MTBE typically takes 
place at petroleum refineries. The chemical properties of MTBE allow it to be transported 
through standard pipelines either in pure form or as part of blended gasoline. Because of joint 
production efficiencies and cheaper transportation costs, MTBE has generally been less 
expensive to produce and ship than ethanol. Additionally, MTBE has a lower volatility than 
ethanol and MTBE-blended gasoline has a lower volatility than ethanol-blended gasoline, ceteris 
paribus. 
Since a 1.0 psi RVP waiver for ethanol blending does not apply to RFG fuel, a 
reformulated gasoline blendstock intended for ethanol blending must have a lower baseline vapor 
pressure than a similar blendstock intended for MTBE blending to comply with summertime 
volatility restrictions. Production of lower-RVP blendstock for the purpose of ethanol 
oxygenation incurs higher marginal costs at the refinery level which increases overall cost of the 
blended fuel, ceteris paribus. For all of these reasons, MTBE became the oxygenate of choice for 
most gasoline suppliers outside of the Corn Belt states (where lower transportation costs of 
ethanol and state ethanol blending mandates – specifically in Minnesota – made ethanol blending 
competitive and prolific). With commencement of the OXY program in 1992 and the RFG 
program in 1995, MTBE production increased from 83,000 barrels per day in 1990 to 266,000 
barrels per day in 1997 (Lidderdale “Motor Gasoline”). 
  Despite the proliferation of MTBE, groundwater contamination concerns eventually 
heralded the chemical’s demise as a fuel oxygenate.
9 In 1999 California became the first state to 
                                                           
9 The necessity of fuel oxygenation in general was questioned when the state of California, subject to both EPA and 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) reformulated gasoline standards, effectively demonstrated that it could 
produce a fuel meeting the RFG program’s strict vehicle emissions requirements without the use of oxygenate 17 
 
pass legislation banning the use of MTBE, and by 2005 twenty four other states had either 
banned or severely limited its use (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “State Actions”). In 
these states, gasoline which was previously oxygenated using MTBE became ethanol-blended. 
As previously mentioned, the RFG oxygenation requirement was eventually repealed (effective 
May 5, 2006) by the 2005 Energy Policy Act. 
  However, the ethanol boom that was fueled by state MTBE bans was not hindered by the 
Energy Policy Act; on the contrary, the ethanol market was vastly enlarged. In the 2005 
legislation, Congress established the first incarnation of the “Renewable Fuel Standards” (RFS) 
which then mandated that 7.5 billion gallons of renewable (bio)fuels be blended into the 
domestic gasoline supply by year 2012 (Energy Policy Act of 2005). The 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act increased the RFS mandates for total renewable fuel blending to 
15.2 billion gallons by 2012 and 36 billion gallons by 2022 (Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007). These two pieces of legislation resulted in an enormous increase in the availability 
and sales of E10 ethanol-blended gasoline at retail outlets as suppliers strove to fulfill the RFS 
volumetric mandates. In states with a pre-existing ethanol mandate (i.e. Minnesota) or already 
high market penetration of ethanol-blended fuel (e.g. Iowa), the RFS had little impact on average 
gasoline formulation. However, in states with no or little previous ethanol blending, the RFS 
resulted in vast increases of E10. For example, between 2007 and 2009 alone, E10 fuel as a share 
of total gasoline sales increased from 0% to 60% in Maine and from 2% to 80% in Florida (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency “Regulation to Mitigate” 68066).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
blending; however, petitions for a state exemption from the oxygenation requirement were rejected twice by the 
EPA in 2001 and in 2005 (Al Center). 18 
 
CHAPTER 3 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
  Noteworthy economic studies of environmental fuel regulations have only taken place 
within the previous half decade or so as sizeable time-series of data have become available, 
allowing researchers to analyze the longer-term effects of these policies. Attempts to quantify the 
price impacts of federal motor fuel regulations have taken three broad approaches: the simple, 
the structural, and the reduced-form. In this chapter, I discuss the major previous research efforts 
from each methodological category. I then discuss how features of my own research build upon 
and compare against previous efforts. 
 
Simple Approach 
The simple approach is the most basic of the three methods because it does not utilize 
advanced econometrics or mathematical modeling.  In its most basic form, arithmetic means of 
fuel prices are calculated for each sample city or region.  Samples are differentiated by fuel type 
(regulated or unregulated), and are ranked by mean price.  These ranked summary statistics may 
allow a researcher to make very simple inferences based on the observed pattern of average 
prices and regulations across cities.  Standard deviation of prices may also be calculated and 
compared across regulated and unregulated cities to estimate the effect of regulations on price 
volatility. 
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) utilized a similarly simple 
method in one of the initial attempts to measure the marginal price impacts of different gasoline 
regulations.  In a 2005 report to Congress “Gasoline Markets: Special Gasoline Blends Reduce 
Emissions and Improve Air Quality, but Complicate Supply and Contribute to Higher Prices,” 19 
 
GAO examined weekly wholesale gasoline price data for 100 U.S. cities from December 2000 to 
October 2004 (U.S. Government Accountability Office). Instead of calculating simple arithmetic 
means for each city over the given time period, GAO first subtracted the weekly price of West 
Texas Intermediate crude oil from each price sample. This differencing was intended to remove 
the component of variation due to fluctuation in oil prices. GAO then ranked the means of these 
price differentials from highest to lowest and inferred empirical results from these normalized 
data. The use of price differentials was an important attempt to control for the city-invariant time 
effects which are correlated with fuel prices. However, underlying this method was the tenuous 
assumption that the baseline supply of crude for each city’s market came from the same source 
and had the same costs. This model also failed to account for effects which may vary across city. 
In albeit crude fashion, the GAO report recognized that fuel price time trends must be accounted 
for in order to properly evaluate regulation impacts. 
The results of the GAO study provided a good starting point for further research into the 
impacts of specific regulations. The GAO report examined broad trends in prices related to the 
incidence of one or more of 11 different “special blends” of fuel, but in general it did not try to 
isolate the effects of individual regulations. GAO found that “of the 100 cities we examined, 
most of the 20 cities with the highest prices used special blends of gasoline…[and] among the 20 
cities with the lowest prices, 8 used conventional gasoline – the most widely available gasoline 
blend – and 9 used 7.8 reid vapor pressure” (p. 6). These findings suggest that low-RVP fuel may 
be correlated with lower fuel prices. As acknowledged by the authors, this finding could be 
indicative of the fact that low vapor pressure fuel is heavily used in Gulf Coast states which have 
lower average fuel prices due to close proximity to major refineries. Implicitly, this recognition 20 
 
suggests that there exist unobserved city-specific effects which may be related to transportation 
costs. 
The GAO research also examined price patterns related to oxygenate blending and 
interestingly noted that “average prices for conventional gasoline with ethanol were about 4 
cents per gallon higher than conventional without ethanol over the time period we analyzed” and 
“over the period 2001-2004, the average summer price for federal reformulated gasoline with 
ethanol was between about 6 and 13 cents per gallon more than for federal reformulated gasoline 
with MTBE.” These apparently significant effects of ethanol blending warrant further 
consideration when specifying an econometric model of the price effects of regulation. If the 
presence of ethanol blending is not perfectly correlated with time or place, annual and city fixed 
effects will not be effective in removing this variation. 
 
Structural Approach 
Structural econometric modeling
10 has also been employed to ascertain the price effects 
of certain motor fuel regulations. Structural studies of gasoline markets typically examine price 
changes by modeling the behavior of profit-maximizing petroleum refiners and using spatial or 
temporal variation within the data to estimate marginal impacts by comparison of simulated 
results to counterfactuals. 
For example, Erich Muehlegger created a model to determine the degree to which price 
spikes in three states could be attributable to regulatory differentiation (Muehlegger). Using 
monthly wholesale price and quantity data at the state-level, along with refinery capacity and 
                                                           
10 “In structural econometric models, economic theory is used to develop mathematical statements about how a 
set of observable ‘endogenous’ variables, y, are related to another set of observable ‘explanatory’ variables, x… 
economic and statistical assumptions define an empirical model that is capable of rationalizing all possible 
observable outcomes” (Reiss and Wolak 4282). 21 
 
outage data, he constructed a three-step game in which refiners maximize expected profits by 
changing production of different regulated fuels subject to changing information about refinery 
outages.
11 Muehlegger used this model to estimate the marginal price impacts of using California 
Air Resource Board gasoline (CARB) and ethanol-blended RFG as opposed to using federal 
RFG blended with MTBE. He found price increases due to CARB and ethanol-blended RFG of 
4.5 and approximately 3 cents per gallon, respectively. These estimates were contingent upon 
normal refinery operation and represented the increased production costs of these regulated fuels. 
Muehlegger also estimated price increases when local refineries were not operational: these he 
interpreted to be the effects of regulation due to fuel incompatibilities between regulated and 
unregulated areas.
12 
The structural approach was suitable for Muehlegger because sufficient price and 
quantity data existed at the appropriate spatial and temporal scale of the fuel regulations he 
examined. However, this approach is effectively limited to the study of certain regulations. The 
city-specific nature of RVP and RFG regulations is better suited to data with a finer spatial 
granularity than the state-level.  The seasonality of RVP lends itself to data at the daily or weekly 
level, as opposed to the monthly level.  A significant drawback of the structural approach is the 
necessity of obtaining fuel quantity data.  Publicly available data on gasoline quantity exists only 
at the state-month level, making it ineffective for the study of many fuel regulations, and thereby 
limiting the usefulness of structural modeling. While I am unaware of other structural economic 
                                                           
11 “In the first step, refineries commit to quantities of light petroleum products without knowing outages. In the 
second step, outages are realized and observed by all refineries. In the final step, refineries allocate production 
across different geographic areas in response to the outage” (p. 11). 
 
12 The separation of price effects by different causes is an important theme that recurs in the Brown et al. (pp. 1-
19) reduced-form study.  While my own research does not explicitly attempt to measure the individual causes of 
observed price differentiation due to regulation, the policy implications of such an approach may be quite 
powerful. 22 
 
models which have estimated price effects of fuel regulations, it is not unlikely that other 
researchers have attempted to use these methodologies to similar ends. Nevertheless, since many 
more studies (including my own) have utilized reduced-form modeling, I discuss this latter 
approach at significantly greater detail in the following section. 
 
Reduced-Form Approach 
By far the most common method used to evaluate the price effects of regulation has been 
the reduced-form, or econometric, approach.
13 This is the general method which I use in this 
paper, and at least four previous studies have utilized similar reduced-form models (Brown et al. 
1-19; Chouinard and Perloff 1-26; Walls and Rusco 145-164; Chakravorty, Nauges and Thomas 
106-122). Reduced-form models typically have used panel data to regress fuel prices in various 
regions at different dates against explanatory variables that capture the effects of regulations and 
other sources of variation. Researchers have used reduced-form models to study the effects of a 
range of fuel content controls (including RFG, RVP, CARB fuel, ethanol blending and 
oxygenation requirements). They have employed creative techniques to model these regulations 
(including dummy variables and population-based proxy variables) and have included 
explanatory variables ranging from federal taxes, personal income, the risk-free interest rate and 
population density (Chouinard and Perloff 1-26) to refinery capacity per capita (Chakravorty, 
Nauges and Thomas 106-122). 
                                                           
13 “Although the term reduced form is used frequently, the underlying definition has evolved over time. The 
traditional econometrics textbook definition of reduced form refers to simultaneous equations, where the system 
of equations is solved to eliminate all endogenous variables. The reduced-form model links the dependent variable 
solely to exogenous variables, which, by definition, are not influenced through feedback loops of the system… The 
emphasis is on eliminating endogenous variables, whereas a structural setup would model and estimate the effect 
of such variables directly. Modeling such endogenous variables usually requires structural assumptions to identify 
these variables of interest as well as suitable instruments. The goal of a reduced-form model is to avoid as many 
structural assumptions as possible” (Timmins and Schlenker 365-366). 23 
 
These econometric papers on motor fuel regulations are primarily differentiated by data 
source, the modeling of the regulatory variables, the choice of other explanatory variables, and 
(to a lesser extent) estimation technique. These differences are examined more thoroughly 
throughout the following discussion of the four reduced-form fuel regulation studies and their 
relationship to my research. 
Chouinard and Perloff specified and estimated a large econometric model to explain 
gasoline price as a function of numerous market characteristics, including consumer 
demographics, supply disruptions, taxes, weather and content regulations (Chouinard and Perloff 
1-26). Using monthly retail and wholesale prices at the state level for the years 1989 to 1997, the 
authors found that most of the variance in gasoline prices could be explained by changes in crude 
oil prices. However, the study also concluded that “areas with federal reformulated requirements 
may face average [per gallon] prices nearly 1¢ higher than those without the law, and the 
oxygenated areas have prices nearly 5¢ higher” (p. 21). These estimates must be taken with a 
dose of skepticism, however, because of the coarse spatial granularity of their data
14 and the 
increased risk for multicolinearity problems introduced by the inclusion of a large number of 
related explanatory variables. 
Chakravorty, Nauges and Thomas (Chakravorty, Nauges and Thomas 106-122) examined 
the effects of RFG and OXY fuel using state-level data for the years 1995 to 2002. Similar to the 
Chouinard and Perloff study (Chouinard and Perloff 1-26), the authors included a large number 
of explanatory variables comprised of both gasoline market characteristics and state-specific 
                                                           
14 Except for a few small Mid-Atlantic and New England states, most states with RFG counties also contain areas 
using conventional gasoline. Aggregation of price data at the state level is inconsistent with the observed pattern 
of fuel regulations in most states. Use of this spatially coarse price data eliminates the ability to explicitly model 
the presence of fuel regulations. To compensate for this limitation, the authors (and also Chakravorty, Nauges and 
Thomas 106-122) had to utilize less-direct population-based proxy variables. 24 
 
demographics. The authors treated all gasoline market variables (e.g. refinery capacity, average 
distance to refinery, etc.) as endogenously co-determined with regulation due to the possibility of 
effective lobbying efforts from regulated fuel suppliers. The authors also included time fixed 
effects and state fixed effects. Instead of explicitly modeling regulations using dummy variables, 
the authors constructed proxy variables based upon the percentage of population using special 
fuels in each state at each time, as well as the relative differences of these measures between 
adjoining states. 
The study concluded that RFG and OXY programs increased fuel prices both by 
increasing refining costs and by increasing supplier market power through market segmentation. 
Chakravorty et al. estimated the model using three-stage least squares regression (3SLS) to 
account for the endogeneity problem, and the authors found regulation price effect estimates that 
were consistently higher than similar regression using ordinary least squares (OLS). The use of 
proxy market size variables to account for RFG and OXY regulations was a creative approach to 
the problems of coarse data granularity. However, this method provided a quite indirect measure 
of the actual fuel price effects of regulation,
15 and there was a large mismatch in the spatial and 
temporal scales of the price and regulations data (i.e. RFG and OXY are implemented on a city – 
not state – basis; the OXY program is implemented only during winter months).  
Walls and Rusco (Walls and Rusco 145-164) used data from the simple Government 
Accountability Office study (U.S. Government Accountability Office) to construct a “panel data 
regression model to explain fuel prices as a function of fuel attributes, the price of crude oil, and 
                                                           
15 The authors did not explicitly model the presence of regulations in their research, but instead used population 
percentages as independent variables. After regressing gasoline prices on these percentage variables, they then 
estimated fuel prices in states for which with 0% and 100% of the population used regulated fuels. The authors 
interpreted this difference to be the per-gallon price effect of each respective regulation. Using this methodology, 
Chakravorty et al. estimated that “the price of gasoline would increase by 16 percent if a state with no regulation 
would impose either RFG or OXY regulation to the whole population.” 25 
 
seasonal and city-market-specific effects” (p. 146). The researchers analyzed weekly wholesale 
price data from 99 cities for the time period between December 2000 and October 2004. The 
study estimated price effect coefficients for RVP, RFG, ethanol blending, low-sulfur 
requirements, CARB and other fuel regulations. To remove time effects, the study included as 
explanatory variables both the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil and seasonal dummies. 
To remove city effects, Walls and Rusco estimated their model using four different 
specifications: common intercept, fixed effects, random effects, and AR1 serially auto-correlated 
fixed effects. They also included a variable measuring the distance to the nearest source of a 
substitute (regulated) fuel. 
In accord with the results of the GAO study, Walls and Rusco found no statistically 
significant price effect of RVP 7.8 fuel. The authors also found no significant effect of low-
sulfur fuel. They did, however, find significant positive price effects of approximately 4.3 cents 
per gallon for RVP 7.2 fuel and 5.7 cents per gallon for 10% ethanol-blended fuel. Reformulated 
gasoline blended with MTBE had an insignificant positive price effect of between 1.0 and 1.4 
cents per gallon, whereas ethanol-blended RFG had a statistically significant price effect of 6.6 
cents per gallon. This large differential between MTBE- and ethanol-blended RFG price effects 
suggests a large cost of biofuel blending – a subject which warrants further investigation. 
  Brown, Hastings, Mansur and Villas-Boas (Brown et al. 1-19) further explored the 
impacts of geographic segmentation and changes in market power due to regulation. Using city-
aggregated supplier-level wholesale gasoline price data for the years 1994-1998, the researchers 
examined the impact of three motor fuel regulations (RVP, RFG w/ethanol, RFG w/o ethanol) by 
creating dummy variables for each. Recognizing that heterogeneous regulation may cause some 
suppliers to drop out of the market (thus increasing market power and the prices charged by 26 
 
remaining suppliers), Brown et al. included as an explanatory variable the number of wholesale 
fuel suppliers in each city at each time. Since the number of suppliers could be endogenous to the 
price of gasoline, the researchers instrumented
16 for this variable using the number of 
(consistent) refiners serving the city, the regional PADD, the Hirschman Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
and the percentage of state-level gasoline consumption that is reformulated. To remove price-
correlated time effects and regional effects, Brown et al. used a treatment and control approach 
whereby the authors included as additional explanatory variables the average conventional 
gasoline prices in neighboring unregulated cities.  
This approach differed significantly from other models, many of which had accounted for 
time and regional effects using an average (city-inspecific) price of crude oil, a proxy variable 
representation of fuel regulations, and many explanatory variables including city characteristics 
(e.g. population, vehicles per capita, average income, etc.) or supplier/market factors (e.g. 
distance to refinery or substitute supplier, refinery concentration index, relative size of regulated 
market, etc.). The novel use of a treatment and control method in Brown et al. allowed estimation 
of the regulation effects without the selection of additional and seemingly contrived explanatory 
variables. However the selection of which control cites to use remained a matter of researcher 
discretion, and the treatment and control method risked introduction of high levels of colinearity 
if fuel prices behaved highly regionally. The authors estimated the model using both fixed and 
random city effects, after correcting for AR1 serial autocorrelation. To measure the effects of 
geographic segmentation, they also estimated the model with the inclusion of two additional 
                                                           
16 An explanatory variable correlated with the error term may bias regression coefficient estimates. To correct this 
problem and produce unbiased estimates, an “instrumental variable” (IV) that is both uncorrelated with the error 
term and partially correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable may be used as a proxy variable in place of 
the endogenous variable. The use of IVs, a common practice in applied econometrics, “provides a general solution 
to the problem of an endogenous explanatory variable” (Wooldridge “Econometric Analysis” 83-84). 27 
 
explanatory variables based upon the average distance to (aka “Proximity Measure”) and total 
number of (aka “Potential Partner Count Measure”) all other cities with fungible fuel types. As 
with the distance variable in the Walls and Rusco paper, these variables aimed to capture the 
specific effect of geographic market segmentation due to fuel regulation. 
After instrumenting for number of suppliers, Brown et al. concluded that RVP regulations 
increased fuel prices (relative to conventional RVP 9.0 gasoline) by approximately 1.1 cents per 
gallon, whereas MTBE-blended and ethanol-blended RFG increased prices by 2.7 and 4.1 cents 
per gallon, respectively. These price estimates varied by approximately 8 cents across different 
cities. The authors also found a significant coefficient for the number of fuel suppliers (-0.4 cents 
per gallon per wholesaler), a significant coefficient for the Proximity Measure, but an 
insignificant coefficient for the Potential Partner Count Measure. These results implied that price 
increases in regulated cities were due to within-city changes in supplier market power as well as 
geographic isolation caused by market segmentation. 
   
How Does My Study Compare?  
A handful of previous economic studies have estimated the marginal costs to consumers 
of various gasoline content regulations, including RVP and RFG. However, many of these 
studies have carried potentially serious data and multicolinearity concerns. Additionally, no 
study has employed its regulation price effect estimates in a conceptual or analytical discussion 
of welfare impacts. 
My reduced-form regression model is similar to Brown et al. in that it uses an 
unambiguous dummy variable specification to measure directly the price impacts of regulations, 
instead of using population-based proxy variables (as have Chakravorty et al. and others). This 28 
 
specification is possible because of the availability of city- and week- level price and regulations 
data. 
My research differentiates itself from previous studies through its use of a longer time-
series of weekly city-level price and regulation data. Additionally, its use of retail price data is 
almost unprecedented in the existing literature – despite the fact that retail prices may provide 
more robust and interpretable results. By utilizing retail price data, fewer variables and an 
explicit dummy variable representation of regulations, my models generate price effect estimates 
with lower risks of multicolinearity and which may capture more accurately the impact of the 
regulation on consumers. 
My presentation of a conceptual welfare framework is unique in the fuel regulations 
literature. This research builds upon the existing literature by being the first such study to use 
price effect estimates to infer aggregate consumer cost changes. While previous research efforts 
have ended with the estimation of price impacts from regulation, this paper uses these estimates 
as parameter inputs to the estimation of a welfare analysis model. Consumer cost impacts and 
other welfare measures, although admittedly subject to greater uncertainty than price estimates, 
may have far greater relevance for policy evaluation and decision-making.29 
 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
 
The primary analytical methodology of my research consists of several multivariate 
statistical models: a “Basic Model” and two variations of a “Monthly Time Trend Model.” These 
models differ in their specification of unobservable time effects, as well as in the seasonality of 
their data. To test whether regulation price effects remain constant over time, I estimated all 
models for all years (1992 – 2010) as well as for two subsets of date ranges (1992-2000 and 
2001-2010). Additionally, I conducted two specification tests to determine if very-low state RVP 
standards have had disproportionate marginal price impacts (“Multiple RVP Regulations 
Model”), and to estimate city-specific price effects (“City-Specific Price Effects Model”). This 
chapter exhaustively details the methodology of these econometric models. 
 
Basic Model 
  All regression models presented in this chapter are simply variations of the basic model 
presented below. Consequently, I describe the basic model in quite some detail. The basic 
methodology used to estimate the price impacts of RVP and RFG regulation is a panel data
17 
fixed effects
18 regression model of the following specification: 
 
                                                           
17 Panel data “consist of repeated observations on the same cross section of, say, individuals, households, firms, or 
cities, over time” (Wooldridge “Econometric Analysis” 6). 
18 Greene (pp. 193-194) writes that “the fixed effects model arises from the assumption that the omitted effects ci, 
in the general model, yit = x’itβ + ci + εit, are correlated with the included variables.” If Var*ci|Xi] is constant, the 
model may be written as yit = x’itβ + αi + εit, where each αi is uncorrelated with the error term and “is treated as an 
unknown parameter to be estimated.” 30 
 
Pi,t = RVPi,t + RFGi,t + αi + βyear + εi,t 
 
The dependent variable Pi,t is the real ex-tax retail price of gasoline in city i measured at 
time t, where t is measured by the number of weeks elapsed since January 1, 1992. RVPi,t and 
RFGi,t are dummy variables indicating respectively the presence (in city i and time t) of gasoline 
reid vapor pressure restrictions equal to or less than 7.8 psi, and federal reformulated gasoline 
regulations. The αi term is a matrix of time-invariant city fixed effects, and βyear is a matrix of 
city-invariant year fixed effects. The city-and-time-specific error term is denoted by εi,t. Data 
were subsetted by summer month only, and models were estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression.  
 
Price Variable 
  I obtained price data from the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) online research center.
19 
Because the states of California and Arizona have adopted significantly different and more 
stringent fuel regulations than the rest of the country, I excluded data from four cities in these 
states. My final dataset consisted of 38 cities. All nominal prices were converted to real May 
2010 dollars using monthly values for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index 
for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). 
Ex-tax prices were used to eliminate potential bias in the city fixed effects variables that 
could arise from heterogeneous changes over time of state fuel taxes. The federal gasoline tax 
                                                           
19 Average retail gasoline prices in 42 U.S. cities have been published weekly by OGJ since January 1986 and 
composite spreadsheets of the entire dataset were downloaded in June 2010. I obtained price series for actual 
retail prices as well as retail prices less state and federal taxes. OGJ’s reported retail price data reflect average 
prices of 2-3 randomly sampled gas stations in each city at each time period. According to an OGJ representative, 
these “prices and trends have compared favorably” to the more extensive (and expensive) Lundberg Survey. 31 
 
impacts could have been removed through the use of time fixed effects alone, but the use of ex-
tax pricing also achieved this goal. 
If retail gasoline sales margins are correlated with prices – as would maximize profit in a 
Nash-Bertrand game (Hastings 16) – wholesale prices and retail prices will not move equally 
with cost changes. Additionally, an extensive body of research (including but by no means 
limited to: Karrenbrock 19-29; Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert 305-339; Noel 324-334) has 
suggested that retail gasoline prices move asymmetrically
20 with changes in wholesale prices. 
Under either of these possible pricing regimes, the use of wholesale price data could bias the 
estimation of the retail price effects actually experienced by consumers. Since retail prices 
provide a more accurate measure than do wholesale prices of the economic conditions faced by 
consumers, since consumer price and welfare impacts have greater interpretive value and are 
more relevant to policymakers, and since the use of wholesale prices could result in inaccurate 
results, I chose to examine retail prices. 
Conversion of nominal price data to real (May 2010) terms sought to eliminate price 
variation due to inflation.
21 
                                                           
20  Asymmetric price movement is the idea that retail prices typically rise faster than they fall for an identical (i.e. 
“symmetric”) rise and fall in wholesale prices. 
21 Use of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ nationally aggregated CPI-U carries the dual assumptions that gasoline 
price inflation occurred at a similar rate to a representative basket of other economic goods, and that gasoline 
price inflation was constant across all cities. I believe that these assumptions are appropriate for a few reasons. 
First, gasoline prices are highly correlated to the price of crude oil, which represents an economically systemic cost 
underlying the production of many economic goods measured by the CPI-U. Thus, if nominal oil prices are 
correlated to the nominal prices of these goods, gasoline prices should also be correlated. Second, in large part 
due to correlation with crude oil prices, gasoline prices across the country have historically trended closely 
together. While this phenomenon may introduce its own problems of colinearity to the data, it also reduces the 
possibility of geographic heterogeneity in price inflation. Additionally, if fuel price inflation varied significantly 
across cities one might expect there to be very different long-term consumption trends of gasoline exhibited in the 
composition of city vehicular fleets, ceteris paribus; this effect does not seem evident in then data. Fuel price 
arbitrage opportunities likely eliminate these differences. Finally, the CPI-U is a generally accepted inflation index 
which is used frequently in most economic literature. 32 
 
Regulation Variables 
A dummy variable representation of the RVP and RFG programs was chosen to provide a 
simple and unambiguous measure of the presence of regulation in each city at each time period. 
This methodology was possible because the spatial aggregation and frequency of the price data 
was consistent with implementation of the two regulations. Unlike the method used for the more 
granular dataset in Chakravorty et al. (Chakravorty, Nauges and Thomas 106-122), the dummy 
variable method allowed direct modeling of the regulations. Consequently, the price effects 
attributable to the regulation dummies should better reflect the direct economic impacts of the 
regulations themselves, instead of inferring impacts from less-direct population-based proxies. 
For every city/date observation, the RVP and RFG
22 variables were assigned a value of 
“1” if the respective fuel regulation was present and a value of “0” if said fuel regulation was not 
present. Fuel regulation data were constructed from EPA online sources and published 
announcements in the Federal Register.
23 
Of the cities in my dataset, nineteen were subject at any point in time to a volatility 
restriction of RVP 7.8, one (Kansas City) to a limit of RVP 7.2, and five (Atlanta, Birmingham, 
Detroit, Kansas City, Saint Louis) to a limit of RVP 7.0. I considered the creation of four 
separate dummy variables to model the presence of the following low volatility regulations: RVP 
                                                           
22 As with the originally-proposed RVP program, the RFG program technically has separate summertime volatility 
restrictions for states in the “North” and “South.” However, I chose to combine both groups into one overarching 
RFG variable. Since the program’s regional differences  are quite small, it is probably safe to ignore this regulatory 
variation. By combining two potential variables into one, I significantly increased the statistical power of my model 
without significantly biasing my results. 
23 To construct data on RVP program regulations, I scoured backlogs of the Federal Register for EPA rulemakings 
pertaining to the approval of State Implementation Plan changes relevant to the cities within my dataset. The 
effective EPA approval dates of state RVP changes were noted and used to create dummy variables for each level 
of volatility regulation. Data for the reformulated gasoline program were somewhat simpler to compile. I 
constructed a single dummy variable for the presence of federal RFG regulation using the EPA’s “Reformulated 
Gas: Where You Live” document (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). 33 
 
9.0, RVP 7.8, RVP 7.2 and RVP 7.0. However, due to the limited number of sample cities and 
time periods in which RVP limits less than 7.8 psi were implemented, I chose to measure the 
price effect of average RVP regulation. Thus, the basic model included just a single, 
comprehensive low volatility dummy variable that indicated if and when each sample city 
imposed regulations with RVP limits ≤ 7.8 psi. In a later specification test, I tested for the 
possibility that lower-than-federal RVP limits had different marginal price effects. This test (in 
which I created two RVP dummies) is discussed in the upcoming Multiple RVP Regulations 
Model section of this chapter. 
Specification of the RVP dummy variable also required a few carefully considered 
assumptions about the start dates of the program. Since the EPA-effective date of initial RVP 
program implementation in many cities did not coincide with the effective date of state 
implementation,
24 it was unclear which dates to use. I believe that use of the EPA approval date 
provided the best and most consistent representation of regulatory changes for two reasons. First, 
changes to SIPs that have not been approved by EPA are not legally binding in federal court. 
Fuel suppliers thus had no incentive to comply with state RVP regulations until the regulations 
were approved by EPA. Second, the EPA approval date provided a concrete and definitive 
compliance deadline. Due to the multitude of state legislative and regulatory requirements, it 
would have been extremely difficult to determine for each regulatory change when the effective 
(however not legally binding at the federal level) state regulatory implementation date occured. 
A second timing issue arose in modeling the annual start of the summer RVP season 
since wholesalers and retailers are subject to different start dates for annual regulatory 
                                                           
24 For instance, a state regulator could approve a lower RVP limit and submit a revised SIP for EPA approval. If EPA 
delayed ruling on this proposed SIP change for period of time during which the state regulator enforced the 
(unapproved) change, the EPA approval date may have varied from the actual implementation date of the 
regulation. 34 
 
compliance. Because my data consist of retail prices, I chose to use the retail supplier regulatory 
enforcement deadline of June 1 (as opposed to the May 1 deadline for upstream supplier). It is 
important to note that higher retail prices may have occurred prior to June 1 due to anticipation 
of volatility restrictions, early transition of fuel types, or the pass-through of costs by vertically-
integrated, oligopolistic suppliers. However, the basic regression model eliminated this issue of 
fuzzy regulatory discontinuity by examining only a subset of the summer months. 
  A total of 13 cities in my sample had implemented the RFG program, 12 of which joined 
at the onset of the program in 1995, and one of which (Saint Louis) joined in 1999. Admittedly, 
since reformulated gasoline regulation takes effect year-round, the RFG variable may suffer 
slightly from a lack of within-city variation and from the fact that this variation occurred at the 
same point in time for nearly all sample cities.
25 
An additional challenge of the RFG dummy is that it did not account for the more 
stringent volatility limitations imposed on reformulated gasoline during summer months. 
However, the basic model eliminated this problem by using a data subset of summer months 
only. This subset (discussed in-depth in a following section) eliminated within-year variation in 
RFG, and also generated a price effect estimate that reflected the slightly more stringent 
summertime (volatility-controlled) formulation. If the RFG price effect was lower during non-
summer months, my use of a summer subset may have produced coefficients which 
overestimated the actual price effect as measured on an annually averaged basis. Because I 
                                                           
25 Since the RFG program is implemented all year, the only within-city variation present in each city occurred from 
the one-time initial implementation of the program. Because all but one (i.e. Saint Louis) RFG-implementing city 
entered the program on January 1, 1995, there was also virtually no variation over time of this start date. 
Therefore, it is difficult to say with certainty that the RFG coefficient captured the full price effect of the RFG 
program without accidentally measuring time-correlated price trends or price differentials due to city-specific 
attributes that are strong indicators of RFG presence (e.g. highly urban demographics or East Coast geography). 
The use of fixed effects helps to substantially mitigate these concerns but cannot eliminate them entirely. 35 
 
examined only data from the summer months (which may have exhibited larger price increases 
than other times of the year), my RFG price effect parameters could potentially bias upward my 
subsequent consumer cost welfare analysis (which is based upon annual fuel consumption). 
There are two reasons I was not initially concerned about this problem. First, volatility 
regulations for non-RFG fuels (i.e. the RVP program) were found to be significantly 
insignificant. Second, compliance with winter-month RFG requirements usually resulted in a 
lower baseline fuel volatility than conventional fuel, so the marginal costs to the refiner of 
further (summertime) volatility reductions were likely smaller than for the RVP program. 
Nevertheless, I estimated an additional model (using full-year data) as a specification test to 
check for possible seasonal variations in the RFG effect. This model is described in the Monthly 
Time Trend Model section.
26 
As mentioned previously, until 2006 RFG fuel was oxygenate-blended with either MTBE 
or ethanol. While the constraints of my data do not allow direct precise determination of the 
oxygenate used in each city during each time period, I attempted an empirical test determine the 
marginal impacts of ethanol blending. This specification test is explained in depth in Ethanol 
Blending and State MTBE Bans section of the Results chapter. 
                                                           
26 An additional form of unaccounted-for variation in the RFG variable occurred temporally with the 
commencement of “Phase 2” regulations in year 2000. According to EPA, the second phase of the RFG program 
was designed to cut VOC, NOx, and toxic pollutant emissions to respectively 27%, 7%, and 22% below levels 
produced by conventional gasoline (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). These requirements appear 
significantly more stringent than the 17%, 2%, 17% reductions under Phase 1, and it is very likely that fuel prices 
reflect these differences. EPA predicted that the second phase regulations could increase fuel refining costs by one 
to two cents per gallon (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “Phase II”). Inclusion of a “millennial” dummy 
variable interacted with RFG could be one possible way to indicate this change and measure the incremental 
effects of Phase 2 requirements. 36 
 
The modeling of RFG impacts was somewhat complicated by the fact that the regulatory 
program generally does not set specific fuel content mandates.
27 However, regional variations in 
price due to different RFG composition or production methodologies should have been captured 
by city fixed effects. 
Finally, the exclusion of oxygenated fuel regulations from the price effects model was a 
very intentional decision. There are a few reasons why I did not attempt to model this variable. 
First, because states are solely responsible for implementing winter oxygenated fuels programs, 
enforcement of these programs is likely to vary significantly. If enforcement is incomplete, 
observed fuel prices may not actually represent regulated fuels; here, regulation dummy 
variables would inaccurately identify the fuel type. This is a potential problem with estimates of 
any fuel regulation when price data are not specifically attached to a fuel-type.
28 However, it can 
be reasonably assumed that enforcement at the federal (EPA) level – even if imperfect – will be 
at least more consistent than enforcement by various separately-administered and separately-
funded state environmental agencies. Second, implementation of oxygenated fuel requirements 
differ significantly between locations, with some state (or local) regulators mandating that 
gasoline contain 3.5% oxygen by weight while others require only 1.5%. Although 2% may not 
seem like a large difference, it is equivalent to an increase in total fuel ethanol content of 5.7% or 
an increase in MTBE content of approximately 11%.
29 This large variation between local and 
                                                           
27 Since RFG fuel is certified by a predictive model which forecasts typical vehicular outputs (i.e. emissions of VOCs, 
NOx, and air toxics), the inputs (i.e. fuel contents) are allowed to vary so long as regulatory requirements are met. 
As exemplified by the state of California’s demonstration that RFG-certified fuel can be produced without 
oxygenation, the refining processes (and chemical composition) of RFG may vary widely. 
28 See the section A Data Limitation in the Results chapter for further discussion about this problem. 
29 “Ethanol…contains 35 percent oxygen by weight, twice the oxygen content of MTBE.” MTBE & Ethanol, 11/17 
2010 <http://www.seco.cpa.state.tx.us/re_ethanol_mtbe.htm>. 37 
 
state requirements for fuel oxygenation, in addition to discrepancies in state enforcement 
practices, makes estimation of winter OXY effects unsuitable for the basic dummy variable 
model. Finally, my use of a summer-subsetted basic model actually precluded the modeling of 
most oxygenation regulations, since the majority of affected cities only required fuel 
oxygenation during winter months. 
 
Summer Subset and Fuel Baselines 
The data were subsetted to include only summer months and dates after 1992 so that RVP 
9.0 gasoline could be used as a baseline.
30 The widespread use of this fuel type made it an 
appropriate baseline against which to test more stringent fuel regulations. Since there is no 
baseline fuel volatility regulation for non-summer months, inclusion of prices from other seasons 
would have resulted in a less easily interpretable measure of marginal regulatory impacts. 
Because of the huge amount of RVP 9.0 fuel supplied and consumed each year, any good 
estimate of the overall economic impacts of the volatility program should account for the price 
effects of RVP 9.0 above and beyond a baseline of no fuel regulation at all. Previous studies 
have found negligible impacts of RVP 9.0 on the per-gallon price of gasoline. Since my basic 
model selects RVP 9.0 as a baseline fuel, all measured price effects are relative to the price of 
this volatility-controlled gasoline. If implementation of RVP 9.0 indeed increased prices relative 
to unregulated fuel, my estimates for RVP and RFG variables may have underestimated the 
actual impacts of these regulations. 
 
 
                                                           
30 Phase 2 of the federal RVP fuel program required that summer gasoline in all 48 contiguous states meet RVP 9.0 
restrictions. 38 
 
Fixed Effects 
The specification of fixed effects variables was crucial to the design of my price effect 
models, and use of these variables required certain assumptions. Theory predicts that retail fuel 
prices should differ across cities due to factors including, but not limited to: petroleum supply 
market factors such as transportation-related costs, demographic factors such as real household 
income, and gasoline demand factors such as vehicular fleet composition and per-capita vehicle 
miles travelled. Indeed, summary statistics of my dataset show a wide variation in mean fuel 
prices between different cities (see Table 1). While some previous studies have attempted to 
include many or all of the above variables in complex regression models, I modeled most as 
unobservable city fixed effects. This specification relied upon the assumption that the average 
effects of these unobserved variables varied across cities, but were consistent over time in any 
given city. 
Time-invariant city effects may be viewed as a bold and dangerous assumption; however, 
I believe it is not an unreasonable one. First, the physical infrastructure of the petroleum supply 
chain has changed little in the past 18 years. As of late 2007, no new petroleum refineries had 
been built in the United States in almost 30 years (Shurtleff and Burnett). Additionally, since 
1992 there have been few major alterations to the interstate highway system or the petroleum 
pipeline system that could have led to large and differential supply cost changes between cities.
31 
Second, while changes in U.S. city demographics and gasoline demand attributes could 
theoretically have affected fuel prices, the magnitudes of any actual differences between cities 
have likely been small – and their effects small – relative to swings in the price of crude oil. In 
                                                           
31 The vast shipments of Albertan and North Dakotan crudes via recently constructed pipelines are beginning to 
change this. 39 
 
short, I believe it is safe to assume that unobservable city-level variables have remained 
generally constant during the timeframe of my dataset. 
The city-level variables which of course have changed over time are gasoline fuel 
regulations. As Brown et al. determined, the imposition of these regulations may have impacted 
some unobserved variables related to wholesaler market power and the average distance to fuel 
suppliers. While these endogenous variables have the potential to bias estimation results, any 
price effect due to them is a direct impact of RVP and RFG programs and should rightly be 
included in the price effect estimate of the respective regulatory variable. 
  To account for observed time trends in the national average real price of gasoline (see 
Figure 3), I included a city-invariant year effects term βyear. I chose to model time effects at the 
annual level because monthly or seasonal time effects might introduce problems of 
multicolinearity with the summer-only RVP regulation. Also, year effects seemed to 
appropriately balance the tradeoff between model flexibility and statistical significance (as 
considered by the number of explanatory variables). Modeling time effects as city-invariant also 
reduced the required number of power-depleting dummy variables. However, this specification 
required the assumption that all unobserved time-correlated variables were constant across cities. 
This assumption certainly did not hold when refinery outages or natural disasters (such as 
hurricanes along the Gulf Coast) caused regional or city price shocks. However, most regional or 
city price shocks occurred temporarily (for a period of days or weeks) and thus are not likely to 
have significantly affected the mean annual price of gasoline in a given location. The use of 
annual time effects obviates the potential problem of short-term price shocks. Annual time 40 
 
effects also eliminate the need to explicitly model fuel regulations which were phased in 
nationally and which affected all cities equally – such as the detergent additive regulations.
32 
 
Error Term and Estimation 
Recognizing that some cities may have correlated residuals, I clustered
33 the error terms 
by state. This choice attempted to account for both political and geographical unobservables. 
Metropolitan areas may be defined both by locally-specific regulatory, demographic and market 
factors as well as by state-specific factors. The regulatory dummies and city fixed effects should 
remove most variation in local factors, but several time-correlated state-level unobservables 
could still remain. Variables that are likely to be constant across cities within a given state (but 
vary between states and over time) may include political and governmental characteristics (e.g. 
state taxes on income and consumption, state business taxes and investment) and any other state-
level consumer demographics correlated with fuel prices (e.g. household income, average vehicle 
fleet, etc.). One could argue that the impacts of state government on fuel prices are small 
compared to demographic or market effects and that it would be more appropriate to cluster error 
                                                           
32 Low-sulfur and ethanol-blended (E10) gasolines were decidedly not phased in equally across cities, however. 
This fact presents a potential problem for my model. Both low-sulfur and renewable fuel standard regulations set 
fuel content mandates at the producer level. Refiners were assigned a minimum production quota for regulated 
fuels but could otherwise choose in which market(s) to sell and/or distribute said fuels. Thus, the distribution of 
E10 and low-sulfur fuels (during the regulation phase-in years) might not have occurred equally at the retail level 
across cities. If this was so, annual fixed effects would not remove the price impacts of these regulations and RVP 
and RFG variables could be biased if the effects of low-sulfur and ethanol-blended fuels are significant. At least one 
previous study (Walls and Rusco 145-164) found no significant price effect related to low-sulfur gasoline. However, 
a few previous studies have found relatively large and statistically significant impacts of ethanol blending on RFG 
fuel (Brown et al. 1-19; U.S. Government Accountability Office ; Muehlegger ; Walls and Rusco 145-164). For this 
reason, I conducted the additional specification test discussed in the Ethanol Blending and State MTBE Bans 
section. 
33 See Wooldridge (“Cluster Sample Methods” 133-138) for a concise yet analytically thorough explanation of 
clustering theory. 41 
 
terms by geographic region. I do not refute the presumption that in some cases this specification 
may be appropriate and perhaps preferable to state-level clustering (e.g. certainly, geographic 
residuals should be more highly correlated between Baltimore and Washington, DC than 
between Buffalo and New York City). However, geographic clustering alone neglects the effect 
of all non-gasoline
34 state taxes and political factors. Moreover, geographic or regional error-
clustering is subject to a large amount of researcher discretion when defining the boundaries of 
each cluster.
35 State-clustering, while imperfect, utilizes clearly-defined boundaries and rests 
upon a solid theoretical underpinning. Relative to no clustering, state-clustering of residuals will 
not alter estimated variable coefficients using OLS regression; however, clustering will result in 
larger – but more believable – standard errors. 
 
Monthly Time Trend Model 
Because RVP regulation is almost perfectly correlated with the summer season, any 
seasonal price effects are indistinguishable from regulatory price effects. Additionally, 
summertime volatility controls of RFG are difficult to quantify using the basic model. I 
considered the use of city-invariant month dummy variables (i.e. January, February, March, 
etc.) as a means to correct these problems but rejected this idea for use in the basic model 
because of the aforementioned multicolinearity concerns. Instead, I opted for a model which 
included monthly time trends. Using sample cities as groups, this model estimated separate time 
fixed effects for each month/year combination. By treating each city individually and by utilizing 
within-year regulatory and price variation, this model specification better differentiates RVP 
                                                           
34 Recall, gasoline tax was previously subtracted from the data; here I am referring to other state taxes. 
35 For example, if Baltimore and Washington, DC are clustered, should Philadelphia be included also? What about 
Newark, NJ or Norfolk, VA? 42 
 
effects from seasonal time effects than does the basic model. However, use of month effects 
increased flexibility at the expense of statistical power. Error terms were clustered by city 
because there were insufficient observations to cluster by state. I estimated two versions of the 
monthly time trend model: one using only summertime data, and the other using full-year data. 
The summer-subsetted version of the monthly time trend model is quite similar to the 
basic model, since it did not utilize any additional seasonal variation. This model provided a 
useful specification test for my use of year fixed effects in the basic model. A large difference in 
price effect estimates between the basic model and the summer-subsetted monthly time trend 
model could indicate the presence of unobserved within-summer price variations due to 
regulations. While not predicted by any theory, such a phenomenon could have rendered the 
basic model’s use of year fixed effects inappropriate. Fortunately, the results of the summer-
subsetted monthly time trend model appear consistent with the basic model estimates, 
reaffirming the appropriateness of the latter’s specification. 
A primary purpose of the monthly time trend model was to take advantage of additional 
seasonal (within-year) variation in the data. By using twelve months of data, rather than three, 
the full-year version of this model might better remove the effects of naturally-occurring 
seasonal price fluctuations
36 and provide more accurate annual average estimates of the marginal 
impacts of reformulated gasoline regulation.
37 Perversely, however, the full-year model could 
                                                           
36 Due to demand increases (e.g., increased driving due to vacation travel), supply shocks (e.g., increased 
prevalence of hurricanes), and other factors, motor fuel prices tend to rise during the summer months. If prices of 
unregulated gasoline and low volatility gasoline rise by the same cent per gallon amounts, then the basic model’s 
price effect estimates should be unbiased by seasonal price fluctuations. However, if regulated and unregulated 
fuel prices change separately (or if a price differential already exists between fuels, and summer prices rise by a 
constant percentage), then the basic model could produce biased results. 
37 As discussed previously in the Regulation Variables section, the use of full-year data can reduce potential bias in 
RFG price effect estimates. This is because RFG may actually cost more during the summer (when it is subject to 43 
 
also lead to a downward bias in RVP coefficient estimates.
38 The lesson of this is that there is no 
one perfect model for estimating the price effects of motor fuel regulations – each specification 
has its own advantages and limitations. While the results of different models might not be 
directly comparable from a purely theoretical perspective, reasonable consistency of their 
estimates would reinforce my Basic Model methodology and conclusions. 
 
Multiple RVP Regulations Model 
  Some states have chosen to enact summertime low volatility gasoline standards more 
stringent than the federal standards. As mentioned earlier, several sample cities were subject to 
gasoline RVP limits of 7.2 psi and 7.0 psi. Since lowering fuel volatility requires additional 
refining processes (to remove very light hydrocarbon molecules from gasoline), economic theory 
predicts that these processes incur marginal costs to producers, who then pass along some of the 
costs to consumers. These marginal refining costs (along with additional marginal price effects 
from changes in market power, geographic isolation, etc.) should be reflected in higher retail fuel 
prices. These marginal price effects could likely differ between different stringencies of volatility 
limits. While my small sample size of “very low” RVP cities prohibited inclusion of multiple 
RVP variables in the basic model, I did  however conduct a specification test which separated 
summertime low volatility regulations into two categories: RVP = 7.8 and RVP ≤ 7.2. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
stricter volatility controls), and because the basic model’s use of a summer subset may lead to an overestimate of 
the annual-average RFG price effect. 
38 While not an issue for summer-subsetted data, the fact that low RVP fuel supplies are likely phased in gradually 
throughout the month of May creates a problem when using full-year data. Because the dummy variable method 
can only model a discrete regulatory change, and because the summertime RVP transition is not discrete but 
occurs throughout the month of May, my regressions which used full-year data may have underestimated the real 
magnitude of RVP regulation impacts. 44 
 
model was identical to the basic model, except that there were two separate RVP variables to 
reflect the two regulatory categories. This model is shown below in equation form: 
 
Pi,t = RVP78i,t + RVP72i,t + RFGi,t + αi + βyear + εi,t 
 
City-Specific Price Effects Model 
My price effect model provided single-value RFG and RVP coefficients under the 
assumption that regulatory price impacts stayed the same over each year and in each city. These 
calculated coefficient estimates represented only average values for all cities and time periods 
and ignored the possibility that fuel regulations could have differential impacts across cities and 
throughout time. Perhaps some cities experienced larger price impacts due to fuel regulations 
than others. Perhaps average price effects declined over time due to improved production 
efficiencies or economies of scale as regulations became more widespread. One publication 
found that RFG price effects varied by up to eight cents between sample cities (Brown et al. 1-
19). The same study also observed a slight decrease in the average RFG price effect when using 
data that included a more recent date range. 
To test by what extent RFG and RVP price effects varied across cities, I estimated an 
additional model which interacted each regulation with the cities implementing that regulation. 
This model took the following form: 
 
Pi,t = (RVP)i,t x(city)i,t + (RFG)i,t x(city)i,t + αi + βyear + εi,t 
 45 
 
This specification produced city-specific price effect estimates which I used in some of the 
welfare analysis calculations explained in the Discussion section. As discussed earlier, to test for 
changes in price effects over time, the main regression models each utilized three different date 
ranges. 46 
 
CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
  This chapter begins by explaining the results from the three regressions estimated using 
the Basic Model. It then discusses the six regressions from the Monthly Time Trend Model and 
the one regression from the Multiple RVP Regulations Model. All of these regression estimates 
are summarized in Table 2 and are displayed completely in the Appendix. The results from the 
City-Specific Price Effects Model (presented in Table 4 and the Appendix) are also presented 
here. I explain an additional specification test to assess the impacts of ethanol blending, and I 
also discuss an important feature of my data which constrained my ability to estimate certain 
price effects. 
 
Basic Model 
  Statistical results from the basic model and full date range are shown in column (I) of 
Table 2. Based on data for the entire sample (1992-2010) for the summer months, I found that 
the presence of RFG regulation was associated with a 5.96 cent per gallon (cpg) increase in the 
average retail price of gasoline in affected cities. Similarly, gasoline volatility regulations more 
stringent than the nationwide summer-month RVP 9.0 baseline increased fuel prices by 0.67 cpg. 
Clustering standard errors at the state level, the RFG estimate was significant at the α = 0.05 
significance level, while the RVP estimate was insignificant. These findings are consistent with 
the results of previous literature: Walls and Rusco found a significant price increase of 6.6 cpg 
for ethanol-blended RFG fuel and an insignificant price increase of 0.48 cpg for RVP 7.8 fuel 
(Walls and Rusco 145-164). Brown et al. found a slightly lower effect for ethanol-blended RFG 
of 4.1 cpg and a slightly higher – yet insignificant – effect of 1.1 cpg for low-RVP gasoline. 47 
 
  The basic model results from years 1992-2000 and 2001-2010 are presented, 
respectively, in columns (II) and (III) of Table 2. On the surface, these results indicate that the 
average costs to the consumer of RFG regulation remained fairly consistent (slightly less than six 
and one half cents per gallon) between the first six years and latter nine and a half years of the 
fuel program. However, it is important to note that there is absolutely no within-city variation in 
reformulated gasoline regulation during the latter time period, so the RFG dummy may 
accidentally capture some city-specific effects unrelated to fuel content. If this is the case, the 
estimated RFG price effect may be an overestimate. 
The RVP estimates are more perplexing. For the first half of the years since Phase 2 of 
the program was first implemented, RVP regulations less than or equal to 7.8 psi appear to have 
had a positive but statistically insignificant price effect of over one cent per gallon. However, for 
the latter range of years RVP regulation appears associated with a highly significant 4.00 cpg 
decrease in fuel prices. This unexpected result disagrees with theoretical predictions that 
volatility restrictions should increase consumer prices, and may indicate a problem of 
multicolinearity. 
Additionally, the fixed effects estimated from regression model (II) appear to decrease in 
magnitude for most cities when the later date range of regression model (III) is used (see Table 
3). At the same time, the estimated intercept (error) term is nearly twice as large in the model 
which used the later date range. This may imply that during later years (i.e. the 2000s) omitted 
variables accounted for a greater proportion of overall variation. The low-sulfur gasoline 
program and ethanol blending (due to both state MTBE bans and the 2005 EPAct / 2007 EISA 
renewable fuel standards) are two possible omitted variables which could have influenced these 
results.  48 
 
Monthly Time Trend Model 
Price effect estimates using the summer-subsetted monthly time trend model are shown in 
columns (IV), (V) and (VI) of Table 2, for the entire dataset, the years 1992-2000 and the years 
2001-2010, respectively. The results of the former two regressions appear quite consistent with 
the original model results, however the RVP estimate for years 1992-2000 is now statistically 
significant at the α = 0.05 level. Unfortunately, regression (VI) did not produce a valid estimate 
of the RFG effect because the variable was dropped by the computer due to multicolinearity 
issues. Additionally, the RVP estimate from regression (VI) remained a perplexing and 
statistically significant negative 4.00 cpg.  
  The results from the full-year monthly time trend model are shown in columns (VII), 
(VIII) and (IX) of Table 2. RFG variable estimates decreased in magnitude by over 2.0 cpg in all 
cases. This suggests that reformulated gasoline price effects may have been significantly greater 
during the summer (volatility-controlled) season and that use of summer-subsetted data may 
have resulted in an overestimate of price effects. RVP estimates also decreased in magnitude and 
were statistically insignificant. The unusual negative RVP estimate for years 2001-2010 
decreased in magnitude to negative 0.27 cpg and became statistically insignificant from zero. 
   
Multiple RVP Regulations Model 
When the original model was specified with two RVP variables to account for the 
observed differences in city summertime gasoline volatility limits, the more stringent of the fuel 
regulations had large and significant price effects. As shown in column (X) of Table 2, RVP fuel 
restricted to 7.8 psi was associated with an insignificant price effect of only 0.55 cpg; however, 
gasoline with an RVP limit equal to or less than 7.2 psi had an average price increase of 8.02 cpg 49 
 
– larger even than the RFG estimate of 7.38 cpg. This result was significant at the α = 0.01 level. 
The large magnitude and high level of significance for this estimate suggests that state volatility 
restrictions which are more stringent than the federal (RVP 7.8) low vapor pressure requirements 
may impose very high costs on consumers (even though the federal regulations may not). 
 
City-Specific Price Effects Model 
  As discussed in the Methods section, I interacted regulation and city dummies to test 
whether the effects of RVP and RFG programs varied across cities. Regression results from this 
separate model are displayed in Table 4. These results indicated the presence of a wide range of 
different price effects across regulated cities. While the national mean RVP effect was close to 
zero and insignificant, RVP effects in individual cities varied from approximately negative 6 cpg 
in Houston to positive 25 cpg in Portland.  
This wide range in price effects may be explained by the absence of within-city 
regulatory variation in many sample cities. Since Portland implemented RVP 7.8 every year 
from 1992 onwards, and since the data is subsetted to include summer months only, there are no 
baseline gasoline price data for non-regulated fuel in Portland. The lack of within-city variation 
produces RVP regulatory dummies that exhibit perfect within-city correlation with the city-
specific fixed effect dummies. This results in city-specific price effect estimates which may 
accidentally capture much of the unobserved city-specific effects. Unfortunately, this is a 
problem for multiple cities in the dataset.  
City-specific reformulated gasoline price estimates also displayed a wide range of values: 
in New York, RFG had a negative 11 cpg effect while in Chicago the regulation had a positive 50 
 
19 cpg effect.  In all RFG locations, there exists some within-city regulatory variation simply due 
to the fact that RFG did not exist before 1995 while the dataset begins in 1992. 
 
Ethanol Blending and State MTBE Bans 
Although previous studies have found large and statistically significant differential price 
effects due to ethanol blending, my primary models did not account for ethanol. This omission 
was due to data constraints that made it impossible to precisely determine whether oxygenated 
fuel contained MTBE or ethanol. Nevertheless, it was important to try to measure the marginal 
impacts of ethanol blending, so I conducted an additional, rather crude, specification test 
utilizing state-level MTBE bans as a source of variation. Recognizing that an MTBE ban could 
indicate a transition from MTBE blending to ethanol blending, I ran a regression of the following 
specification: 
 
Pi,t = RVPi,t + RFGi,t + MTBEi,t+ αi + βyear + εi,t 
 
Here, the variable MTBE i,t is a dummy that indicated the presence of a state-wide MTBE 
ban in city i at time t. For all dates prior to the effective implementation of the ban, this variable 
assumed the value of “0” and for all dates after the ban it equaled “1”. To minimize variation due 
to complicating non-MTBE factors, I subsetted the data to include only the dates between 
January 1, 2000 and May 5, 2006. During this timeframe, the majority of state MTBE bans took 
effect and the federal renewable fuel standards had yet to achieve large-scale implementation. To 
avoid the complicating effects of the 2005 EPAct regulatory changes, I chose the latter date to 
coincide with the end of the federal requirement that RFG fuel be oxygenated. Because of the 51 
 
relatively short timeframe of data and because RVP estimates
39 were not the goal of this 
specification test, I utilized full-year data. 
To elicit the marginal price effect of ethanol relative to MTBE, the MTBE ban date 
would ideally represent a discrete change in fuel type from MTBE to ethanol; however, this did 
not necessarily occur. If a city used ethanol prior to an MTBE ban there would be no real effect 
of the ban and inclusion of such a city would bias downward the marginal price effect of ethanol 
blending. As opposed to the Midwestern states, many of which predominately blended ethanol 
prior to enactment of MTBE bans, the East Coast states had historically oxygenated gasoline 
using MTBE. I planned to further subset the data to include only PADD 1 (East Coast) cities so 
as to reduce the possibility of downward bias due to previous ethanol blending. 
Unfortunately only two eastern states within my sample dataset – New York and New 
Jersey – had actually enacted an MTBE ban (and only the former had done so during my selected 
date range), so this geographically-subsetted specification was not possible. Instead, I used all 15 
sample cities which had implemented an MTBE ban during the given time period (see Table 5 
for a complete list of affected sample cities and their MTBE ban implementation dates).
40 
Because of the implicit downward bias due to the inclusion of sample cities which likely blended 
                                                           
39 It is important to note that there currently exists a 1.0 psi waiver granted to low RVP gasoline blended with 
between 9-10% ethanol (i.e. E10 fuel). In these RVP-regulated areas, E10 fuel is allowed a higher summertime 
volatility limit of either 8.8 psi or 10.0 psi. This waiver allowance further complicates the measurement of RVP 
price effects and the elicitation of ethanol blending impacts, and may partially explain why my RVP coefficient 
estimates decreased during the 2000s. In theory, as more ethanol was blended into gasoline due to the renewable 
fuel standards, and E10 comprised a larger percentage of total fuel consumption, more fuel was granted a 1.0 psi 
RVP allowance and average volatility restrictions likely became less stringent. However, this would also imply that 
average RVP price effects had exceeded average ethanol blending price effects, a situation which does not appear 
to have been true. 
40 To create this list, I adapted to my sample cities EPA’s “State Actions Banning MTBE (Statewide)” document. 52 
 
some amount of ethanol all along, my estimated MTBE coefficient represented a lower-bound 
estimate for the marginal price effect of ethanol blending versus MTBE blending. 
The results of this specification test – although still statistically inconclusive – did not 
soundly reject the hypothesis that ethanol blending impacted fuel prices the same as MTBE 
blending. The regression yielded a positive MTBE ban price effect that was equal to 5.5 cents 
per gallon; however this was only significant at the α = 0.11 level. 
Oddly, at 11.3 and 11.4 cents per gallon respectively, RFG and RVP estimates were 
much larger in magnitude and more significant than previous regressions had found. While the 
more than five cent per gallon MTBE effect seemed consistent at face value with previous 
ethanol blending cost estimates (i.e. Brown et al.’s 4.1 cpg estimate or Walls & Rusco’s 5.7 cpg 
estimate), I am cautious to read too much into my result due to the fact that it is statistically 
insignificant and nominally only half as large as the regression’s estimate for RVP effect. If the 
MTBE effect were half as large as the (insignificant) RVP effect determined from the main 
model specification, then its magnitude would not be much different than zero. 
On the other hand, it is important to reiterate that this MTBE effect provides a lower-
bound estimate for the true ethanol blending effect due to the fact that some included sample 
cities likely blended ethanol before enactment of state MTBE bans.
41 While it is certainly 
possible that ethanol blending could have had a significant impact on fuels prices and that 
exclusion of this variable biased my results (in particular for regressions using the 2001-2010 
                                                           
41 Additionally, direct comparison of ethanol blending estimates from different studies is complicated by the fact 
the previous researchers have used different specifications and baseline fuel types. For instance, Brown et al.’s 4.1 
cpg estimate appears relative to fuel produced with no oxygenate blending rather than relative to MTBE-blended 
fuel; consequently, my (nominal) results could imply an ethanol blending price effect that is significantly larger 
than the Brown et al. estimate. 53 
 
date range), I am nevertheless hesitant to draw too many conclusions from this rough and 
imperfect specification test. 
 
A Data Limitation 
While it was impossible for me to accurately determine the price impacts of ethanol 
blending, my ambiguous results were largely due to inadequate data. My raw price data 
contained only three dimensions: date, city and price. All fuel attributes, connected to a given 
price data point, were inferred from knowledge of federal and state regulatory requirements. 
Consequently, where fuel attributes were not determined by city-and-date-specific mandates (as 
in the case of ethanol-blended, MTBE-blended and low sulfur gasoline), there was no reliable 
way to determine what fuel attributes were actually reflected in the price data. Even in the cases 
where city-and-date-specific regulations did exist, imperfect enforcement, the presence of fuel 
arbitrage between cities, and non-discrete regulatory phase-in periods prevented fuel attributes 
from being known with 100% certainty. Thus, there was no perfect guarantee that gasoline prices 
in an RFG or RVP city actually represented RFG or RVP fuel.  
It is possible that these problems could be easily (although not inexpensively) solved 
through the use of price data that differentiates between specific fuel attributes. With accurate 
knowledge of whether oxygenated fuel was blended with MTBE or ethanol (and to what 
percentage level), and with confidence that observed prices reflected sales of specific fuel types, 
it would have been possible to determine much more credible estimates for the price effects of 
ethanol blending. It is fairly easy to find datasets which differentiate between conventional and 
reformulated gasoline types (EIA supplies such price data for free at the weekly, city-level; 
nevertheless, there were too few cities in this dataset for the purposes of my research). However, 54 
 
it is much more difficult to find weekly city-level data which contains RVP, sulfur, MTBE or 
ethanol attributes. For-profit petroleum data companies – such as the Oil Price Information 
Service (OPIS) – may differentiate gasoline fuel prices by some of the above-listed attributes; 
however proprietary, purchase-only datasets can be prohibitively expensive for many researchers 
and were so for this project. Regardless, future research projects could benefit greatly from 
knowing exactly what fuel types are represented by their price data.55 
 
CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the significance of my findings regarding both low volatility 
gasoline and reformulated gasoline. I discuss the implications of a recent study which has 
assessed the air quality benefits of federal RVP, and I present a conceptual welfare framework 
which I then use to estimate the total consumer costs of the RFG program. I use these cost 
changes, in conjunction with estimated health benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 
to qualitatively assess the cost-effectiveness of this program. 
 
Low Volatility Gasoline 
  Besides a couple of inconsistent (and likely erroneous) strongly negative coefficient 
results from the 2001-2010 data regressions, the federal (7.8 psi) RVP program exhibited no 
significant impacts on retail prices when either the basic model or the monthly time trend model 
with yearly data was estimated. Because of the RVP program’s low price effect coefficient 
(between 0 and 0.8 cents per gallon) and the high statistical uncertainty surrounding its 
estimation, I did not model welfare changes for this regulation. Changes in consumer costs and 
gasoline demand – if existent at all – are likely to be small in magnitude. However, RVP price 
effects may vary significantly by city. As my regulatory interaction specification test found a 
range of city-specific price effects from negative 6 cpg up to approximately 25 cpg,
42 it is 
                                                           
42 This excludes the specification test’s finding of a 25 cent per gallon impact of RVP regulation in Portland, Oregon. 
I disregarded this outlier result because its value seemed unreasonably high – a possible indication that the 
regulatory coefficient captured some city-specific effects related higher PADD V fuel prices. 56 
 
possible that while average RVP effects were insignificant, individual RVP counties may have 
indeed experienced significant price increases. 
Perhaps the most meaningful finding regarding the RVP program came from the Multiple 
RVP Regulations Model. If the results of this regression are believable, then RVP restrictions 
that are more demanding than the federal limit (i.e. RVP ≤ 7.2 psi) increase retail fuel prices by 
an average of over 8.0 cents per gallon. This result vastly exceeds the analogous Walls and 
Rusco (Walls and Rusco 145-164) estimate of 4.3 cents per gallon, and it even exceeds my 
estimated RFG price effect. 
The difference with the Walls and Rusco study could be due in part to my use of retail 
price data. It could also arise from the application of different estimation techniques (for 
instance, Walls and Rusco corrected their data for serial autocorrelation, whereas I did not). If 
these were the sole explanations however, large differences should also arise between the two 
studies’ estimates of other regulatory price effects. This is not apparent for RVP 7.8 regulations 
or for ethanol blending impacts; however, it may be so for RFG (remember, Walls and Rusco 
found no significant effect of MTBE-blended reformulated gasoline). Regardless of which study 
is correct, the high costs of more stringent, state-imposed RVP limits cannot be denied.  
Determination of exactly why very low RVP fuel is so much more expensive is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, as Brown et al. (Brown et al. 1-19) has suggested, increased 
geographic isolation and supplier market power may contribute significant incremental price 
effects to any already increased producer costs. 
As of 2010, five sample cities had ever implemented RVP limitations of 7.2 psi or less.
43 
These municipalities were subject to ozone State Implementation Plans which sought to impose 
                                                           
43 This does not include cities which have implemented effectively even lower volatility limits through RFG program 
VOC reductions. 57 
 
stricter limits than the federal standard for nonattainment areas. While the per-gallon price effect 
of these stricter volatility controls likely exceeds the per-gallon RFG price effect, annual per-
capita city-level consumer costs are probably lower for consumers of very low RVP (than for 
RFG consumers) fuel due to the fact that RVP regulations are not implemented year-round. 
Since far fewer cities require very low volatility gasoline than reformulated gasoline, nationally-
aggregated consumer costs should also be lower than RFG consumer costs. 
  The benefits of RVP fuel regulations have been recently challenged by academics. 
Forthcoming research in the American Economic Review by Auffhammer and Kellogg 
(Auffhammer and Kellogg) suggests that ozone regulation broadly targeting motor fuel volatility 
does not substantially reduce ambient ozone concentrations. Their research regressed a panel of 
daily ozone concentration data from over 720 monitoring locations between years 1989 and 2003 
against explanatory variables that controlled for region- and time-specific effects, weather 
effects, and demographic effects including county-level personal income. After estimating both 
difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity models, Auffhammer and Kellogg 
concluded that traditional RVP controls led to statistically insignificant reductions in peak 
ground-level ozone of little more than 1% in most places.
44 This result, if credible, implies that 
the prolific summertime RVP fuel controls required by EPA and implemented by many state 
regulators may not provide substantial direct positive benefits related to ozone reductions. 
Fortunately, my findings suggest that most RVP areas have not incurred large 
incremental costs of regulation. This result might seem to imply that total economic impacts of 
                                                           
44 The California Air Resources Board’s unique volatility program was found to reduce ambient ozone 
concentrations. In suburban locations, reductions averaged around 10% and were statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The authors attribute this phenomenon to the fact that California specifies which (typically, the most ozone-
formative) gasoline components must be removed to achieve low vapor pressure mandates, whereas the federal 
program does not specify. 58 
 
RVP regulation have been neutral. However, there may exist unobserved administrative, 
regulatory compliance, or enforcement costs that are not captured by my price effect estimates. 
Moreover, the few areas implementing very low (i.e. ≤ 7.2 psi) RVP requirements have likely 
realized significantly negative total economic impacts due to the high price effects and consumer 
costs of these volatility regulations. Nevertheless, due to the uncertainty of my estimates, the 
relative recentness of the Auffhammer and Kellogg article and the lack of additional RVP benefit 
studies to substantiate their findings, I am hesitant to draw any definitive conclusions about the 
overall economic cost-effectiveness of gasoline volatility regulations. 
 
Reformulated Gasoline 
The finding that RFG regulation significantly increased retail gasoline prices in regulated 
cities by approximately 3.4 to 6.0 cents per gallon is consistent with multiple previous studies 
which utilized shorter time series of data. While lack of variation made it difficult to assess 
whether the price impacts of the RFG program have evolved over time, the fact that my average 
estimates (based on over 18 years of data) were nearly identical to earlier estimates (based on 
much shorter sets of data from years closer to the initial implementation date of the program) 
suggests that reformulated gasoline has had real, lasting effects on consumer pump prices. Future 
researchers and policymakers should be aware of the potentially large impacts of ethanol 
blending as well as the possibility of large variations in RFG price effects between cities. 
Since a loss of economic welfare due to higher prices from regulation may be partially 
offset by a decrease in external damages resulting from lower demand for fuel and driving, 
welfare changes due to regulation are quite complex. Although I cannot estimate the complete 
welfare impacts of fuel regulations using my reduced-form price effect model, I can still gain 59 
 
valuable and policy-relevant information through some basic calculations. In the following 
section, I present the conceptual framework and results from a simple, “welfare analysis” model 
for fuel-based regulations, specifically the RFG program.
45 
 
Welfare Analysis 
This section begins with the presentation of a conceptual welfare framework for motor 
fuel regulations. I then estimate aggregate incremental consumer costs resulting from 
reformulated gasoline regulation. This calculation utilizes my estimated city-specific regulation 
price effect coefficients as parameters. Due to the absence of fine-grained, fuel-specific quantity 
data, it is impossible to confidently estimate changes in demand or net economic surpluses (i.e. 
consumer, producer, or total). Nevertheless, under a set of quite restrictive assumptions, I do 
calculate and present a crude estimate of the change in quantity demanded for gasoline. Given 
my consumer cost estimates, I back-calculate one estimate of health-related benefits that might 
be necessary for RFG to be deemed cost-effective. 
 
Conceptual Welfare Framework 
  The welfare impacts of motor fuel regulations can be simply conceptualized as costs and 
benefits affecting two different markets. Fuel regulation costs occur within the market for 
gasoline, whereas the benefits of these regulations occur within a “market”
46 for air quality. 
                                                           
45 Effects of RVP regulation could be modeled using identical methodology. However, I did not include these 
calculations because the regression price effect estimates of RVP regulation were insignificant from zero. 
46 Air quality, the “market” equilibrium of which is defined by the intersection of society’s marginal benefits of 
clean air and marginal costs of pollution abatement curves, is a classic example of a non-market good – a core 
theme of numerous environmental economics textbooks. See (Perman et al.) for examples and the theoretical 
framework of this concept. 60 
 
Gasoline market costs may result from increased production costs (including administrative and 
regulatory compliance costs) at the petroleum refinery or oxygenate blender. In the long-run, the 
majority of these costs are passed onto consumers. Air quality benefits of fuel-based regulations 
accrue from the direct reductions in health and environmental damages attributable to air 
pollution. Changes in societal welfare from fuel-based regulations can be regarded as the 
summation of welfare changes in the market for air quality and the gasoline market. 
  Welfare changes in the air quality market are difficult to monetize, and it can be equally 
difficult to attribute causality for these changes to the impacts of specific fuel-based 
regulations.
47 While I do not attempt to thoroughly quantify or monetize air quality benefits, one 
could possibly do so using a model that expresses benefits from changes in air quality as the 
multiplicative combination of various environmental and health parameters (e.g. reduced 
pollution emission levels or ambient concentrations, human and environmental exposure rates, 
dose-response rates and mitigation costs). Very similar “regulatory risk assessment models” have 
been used to conceptualize and study optimal environmental regulation for decades (Crouch and 
Wilson 47-57; Lichtenberg and Zilberman 167-178). In this paper, I choose to qualitatively 
assess the aggregate air quality benefits of reformulated gasoline using non-monetized EPA 
health benefits estimates for the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments in aggregate. This procedure 
is admittedly incomplete and does not support a true cost-benefit analysis; however, the main 
focus of my research was to assess the costs of regulation, not the benefits. 
                                                           
47 The air quality market actually consists of multiple sub-markets and may be disaggregated by individual 
pollutants (ozone, NOx, air toxics, etc.). This creates a potential problem for reduced-form estimation, as these 
sub-markets may not be separable into the strictly exogenous variables required for linear regression. The 
marginal benefits of air quality improvements may be highly uncertain, as they are determined by complex or 
unobservable human and environmental health variables such as exposure levels and dose-response rates. The 
marginal costs of air quality improvements may also depend upon proprietary industry abatement cost 
information, making them difficult to ascertain for policymakers. 61 
 
Welfare changes in the gasoline market are more easily quantifiable and monetized than 
are the benefits that accrue in the air quality market. When fuel-based regulations are imposed, 
these content controls may incur higher production costs to the refiner (or blender, in the case of 
oxygenation). These marginal costs are reflected in higher prices for wholesalers, retailers and 
consumers. While a few studies have acknowledged the existence of incomplete (and 
asymmetric) price pass-through in wholesale and retail markets in the short-term (Karrenbrock 
19-29; Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert 305-339), most of these studies also have found a high-
level of pass-through in the long-term.
48 
Since my welfare analysis focuses on the long-term, aggregate impacts of fuel 
regulations, I assume that any changes in refiner or blender costs are completely passed-through 
to the retail prices paid by consumers.
49 I also assume that the retail gasoline market is perfectly 
competitive with a perfectly elastic supply curve. This assumption seems reasonable given the 
large number of small sellers and the fact that gasoline is a largely homogeneous product. With a 
downward-sloping demand curve for gasoline and a positive and constant cent-per-gallon price 
effect for fuel regulation, I define the incremental consumer costs to be the observed quantity of 
                                                           
48 For instance, Karrenbrock found that a 10 cpg increase in the wholesale price for premium gasoline resulted in a 
6.4 cpg increase in the retail price during the first month, and a 3.1-3.5 cpg increase during the second month. 
Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert found that a 10 cpg increase in the price of crude raised retail prices by 6.7 cpg 
after four weeks and 8.1 cpg beyond ten weeks. 
49 A caveat to my welfare analysis is that the simple examination of price differentials between regulated and 
unregulated fuels may not in fact capture the entire costs of regulation. Fuel regulatory programs may very likely 
incur added administrative costs to regulators as well as industry-wide producer compliance costs that are not 
specifically reflected in regulated fuel prices. Additionally, any added production costs related to RVP or RFG may 
be allocated across the costs (and pump prices) of unregulated fuel. If this occurs, relative fuel prices may not 
appropriately reflect the incremental costs of regulation and my model is likely to underestimate actual economic 
impacts. Since my price effect model measures only the incremental costs of regulated fuels relative to 
unregulated fuels, it implicitly assumes that the prices of unregulated fuels are unaffected by regulation. However, 
if market impacts of the RVP or RFG programs have led to increases in the prices of unregulated fuels, then my 
price effect estimates and welfare analysis results will understate the true economic impacts of these regulations. 62 
 
regulated gasoline consumption multiplied by the estimated price effect.
50 This area is shown in 
Figure 4 as the green-shaded rectangle, where MPC1 is the pre-regulation marginal private cost 
curve (i.e. supply curve) of retail gasoline and MPC2 is the post-regulation marginal private cost 
curve. 
Gasoline consumption incurs external costs related to the climate change impacts of 
carbon dioxide, the effects of local air pollution (i.e. tropospheric ozone, NOx, VOCs and air 
toxics) on human health and environmental quality, and – arguably – vehicular accidents and 
congestion.
51 Assuming that marginal external costs are constant on a per-gallon basis, the pre- 
and post-regulation marginal social cost curves for the retail gasoline market are represented in 
Figure 4 by MSC1 and MSC2, respectively. Because of the presence of these external costs, the 
measurement of consumer costs alone overstates the magnitude of actual welfare change in the 
gasoline market. Given the existence of external costs, the actual change in welfare is denoted as 
the blue-shaded area in Figure 4. This area may be approximated using the parameters of 
gasoline demand elasticity, marginal external cost, gasoline consumption and the price effect of 
regulation. However, due to the high levels of uncertainty regarding these parameters, I do not 
attempt to calculate actual welfare changes in the following section. Instead, I estimate the 
rectangle of incremental consumer costs. 
 
 
                                                           
50 Because consumer demand is not perfectly inelastic, a rise in price will reduce the quantity of gasoline 
demanded. Hence, because equilibrium quantity changes, this measurement of incremental “consumer costs” is 
not exactly equal to the actual change in consumer expenditures on gasoline (which in fact will be somewhat 
lower).  
51 Economists Ian Parry and Kenneth Small have argued that to internalize external costs (including, to a large 
extent, congestion costs) the optimal tax for gasoline in the United States should be just over one dollar per gallon 
(Parry and Small 1276-1289). 63 
 
Methods 
To estimate consumer costs, I first created a model of yearly city-level gasoline 
consumption. Gasoline quantity data is difficult to obtain at the city-level, so this model relied on 
the interpretation of various other data, such as average vehicle age, fuel efficiency, and total 
vehicle miles travelled per year. These data were collected and interpolated from the Federal 
Highway Administration’s 1995, 2001 and 2009 National Household Transportation Surveys. To 
begin, I created a data matrix, VMTi,year, consisting of total vehicle miles travelled in each of the 
eleven statistical sample area (CMSA or MSA)
 52 corresponding to my sample RFG cities for 
years 1995 through 2009: 
 
 
 
Here, each VMTi, year term represents the total annual vehicle miles travelled in CMSA/MSA “i” 
during year “year”. 
I estimated the average vehicular fuel efficiency (in each area at each year) by relating a 
similar matrix of the average age of new vehicles in each area and year, AGEi,year, to a matrix of 
nationally-averaged new vehicle fuel efficiencies in each year, MPGyear. Mathematically, these 
matrices are denoted as follows: 
 
                                                           
52 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) are “geographic 
entit[ies] defined by the federal Office of Management and Budget for use by federal statistical agencies” (U.S. 
Census Bureau). 
See Figure 4 for a map of MSAs and CMSAs, as of 1996. 64 
 
 
 
 
 
The MPGyear matrix represents a weighted average of car and light truck miles-per-gallon 
estimates for each year from 1980 through 2009.
53 I transformed the vehicle age matrix, by 
subtracting the age value from the sample year, to display the year that the average vehicle in 
each area was new. This transformed age matrix, DATENEWi,year, is shown below: 
 
 
 
After rounding to the nearest whole year, I combined the values of the DATENEWi,year matrix 
with the vehicle fuel efficiency matrix to produce an area- and year-specific fuel efficiency 
matrix, MILEAGEi,year: 
 
 
                                                           
53 The ratio of cars to light trucks is assumed to remain constant across cities and time, and this ratio is modeled as 
a variable for all welfare analyses. If the variable takes a value of “0” this implies that all vehicles are light trucks 
(which have lower average efficiencies); a value of “1” implies that all vehicles are cars.  Because there is likely 
larger variance in fuel efficiency between cars and light trucks than there is variance in the car/light truck ratio 
over time or between cities, I believe that the use of a time and city-invariant ratio can be justified as long as it is 
supported by sensitivity analysis performed using the extreme ratio values. 65 
 
Dividing each term of the vehicle miles travelled matrix, VMTi,year, by the corresponding 
term of the area- and year-specific fuel efficiency matrix, MILEAGEi,year, I generated a matrix of 
estimated fuel consumed in each area during each year, Qi,year: 
 
 
 
The quantity estimates generated above were for the CMSA and MSA spatial areas 
sampled in the National Household Transportation Survey; however, these areas did not always 
perfectly coincide with my city sample locations or with the spatial boundaries of RFG fuel 
regulations (see Figures 5 and 6). This presented a potential complication to the determination of 
national welfare impacts. To account for this source of error, as well as uncertainty related to my 
price effect estimates, I specified and estimated two different models to provide a range of likely 
consumer cost changes. 
  To calculate a lower-bound estimate for total consumer costs due to RFG regulation, I 
aggregated each CMSA/MSA’s fuel consumption data (as given in the Qi , year matrix) over the 
years of its RFG implementation, then multiplied the resultant fuel quantities by the 
corresponding city-specific RFG price effects determined from my price effect regression model. 
The resultant city-specific consumer costs are given by the following equation: 
 
         
year
year i i i Q P Cost ,
 66 
 
Here,  year i Q , denotes elements of the fuel consumption matrix by city and year, and  i P  denotes 
terms of a city-specific RFG price effects vector. The  i Cost   term denotes the calculated city-
specific consumer costs due to regulation. Summing these elements over all cities provides a 
nationally-aggregated estimate of total changes in consumer costs: 
 
       
i
i TOTAL Cost Cost
 
This lower-bound model included only sample cities for which price estimates were 
available from my price effect regression. Since my price effect model excluded the entire state 
of California (which is an enormous consumer of federal RFG fuel and its more stringent 
California Air Resources Board formulation) as well as a few other locations with regulated 
gasoline requirements, this model under-represents national RFG consumption. To further 
promote conservativeness in my final estimates, I deemphasized gasoline demand by modeling 
each city’s fleet as if it were composed of 100% cars and 0% trucks. I ran the lower-bound 
model using city-specific price effects determined by interacting cities with the presence of RFG 
fuel regulation.
54 Where two sample cities fell within the same CMSA/MSA area (i.e. Baltimore 
& Washington DC, and Newark & New York City), I omitted one city (lest I double-count fuel 
consumption data) and used the unweighted average price effect estimate of the two cities. 
The upper-bound consumer cost model utilized a similar specification but required 
simpler data inputs. Instead of using city-specific RFG consumption and price-effect data, I used 
nationally-aggregated RFG quantity data (from EIA’s “Petroleum Supply Annual”) and my 
national average price effect estimate. Since I used aggregated national-level data and did not 
                                                           
54 Specification and estimation of the City-Specific Price Effects Model is presented in the Methods chapter. The 
estimated coefficient s are displayed in Table 4 and are discussed in the Results chapter. 67 
 
model city-level gasoline consumption for this upper-bound estimate, the car/truck ratio was 
irrelevant. 
In addition to direct changes in consumer costs, I also roughly estimated the changes in 
gasoline consumption that resulted from imposition of fuel regulations. These calculations 
utilized the basic economic relationship between demand elasticity and changes in price and 
quantity: 
P
P
Q
Q


 
 
 
Rearranging this equation to solve for ΔQ allowed me to estimate the changes in gasoline 
consumption in each city during each year: 
 
year i
i year i
year i P
P Q
Q
,
,
,
) )( ( 
 

 
 
Here, the  year i P, values are annual average prices for each sample RFG city, calculated from my 
Oil and Gas Journal price dataset. The Qi,year values are taken from my estimated fuel 
consumption matrix. The elasticity parameter   is a city- and time-invariant scalar value from 
Molly Espey’s meta-analysis study (Espey 273-296).
55 After analyzing hundreds of different 
economic studies, Espey found that short-term and long-term gasoline price elasticities of 
demand averaged -0.23 and -0.43, respectively. 
                                                           
55 For another good meta-analysis of gasoline demand elasticities, see Dahl and Sterner (Dahl and Sterner 203-
210). 68 
 
The above equation requires a few qualifications, and it likely would be unacceptable for 
any serious calculation of welfare impacts. First, it presumes that gasoline elasticity   is 
constant over time and space – an assumption which does not likely hold in reality. To be 
theoretically accurate, the equation also requires the overly-restrictive assumptions of a perfectly 
elastic supply curve and a constant elasticity demand curve. While my methodology for 
calculating demand changes may not be too accurate in a real-world scenario, I believe it is still 
instructional for demonstrating changes in demand for regulated fuel. 
Summing the values of  year i Q ,  over all cities and years provides a lower-bound aggregate 
change in consumption resulting from RFG regulation. I ran the same model using a national-
average RFG price effect estimate of 6.00 cpg with annual unweighted average fuel prices from 
across the RFG cities in my OGJ price dataset. This model specification provided an upper-
bound estimate of the change in gasoline consumption, and it is given below in equation form: 
 
year
year
year P
P Q
Q
) )( ( 
 

 
 
Results 
Summary results from the welfare analysis model are displayed in Table 6. I present 
lower and upper bound model results for both consumer cost changes and changes in gasoline 
consumption. Because the choice of gasoline demand elasticity can strongly influence results, 
and because elasticity tends to differ widely with the time frame of interest,
56 I have presented 
                                                           
56 Gasoline demand elasticity is larger in magnitude in the long-term than the short-term. This is because, in the 
short-term, consumers can only effectively reduce demand by driving less. However, in the long-term, consumers 
can also purchase more fuel-efficient vehicles and reduce fuel demand by a much larger amount. 69 
 
demand change estimates for both Espey’s short-term (-0.23) and long-term (-0.43) median 
elasticity values. Detailed estimates for city-specific and aggregate consumer costs, as well as 
actual and modeled RFG consumption, are presented in Table 7. 
  As is evident in the tables, there exists a wide range of results between the lower and 
upper bound estimates for consumer costs and changes in quantity demanded. Reformulated 
gasoline regulations have cost consumers anywhere between $15.1 billion and $39.0 billion since 
initial implementation of the program in 1995. These numbers are calculated in real May 2010 
dollars. The higher fuel prices directly attributable to the RFG program may have reduced 
domestic fuel consumption by between 2.3 billion gallons and 11.5 billion gallons. This latter 
number represents more than eight percent of all gasoline motor fuel consumed by the United 
States in year 2009; however, it must be taken with a grain of salt given the previous 
methodological concerns with my calculated demand changes. 
Using the mean regulatory consumer cost value of $27.1 billion, the RFG program has 
incurred annualized incremental retail costs of over $1.7 billion during its approximately fifteen-
and-a-half-year existence. Put another way, a 6.00 cpg increase in gasoline prices costs a 
hypothetical consumer, driving 12,500 miles per year in a 25 mpg vehicle, approximately $30 
annually. This is no small amount. 
  It is important to recognize that these numbers only indicate direct changes in consumer 
costs. They do not represent total changes in either consumer surplus or net economic surplus, 
nor should the results be construed in any way as an indictment of the reformulated gasoline 
program. My price effect estimates and welfare calculations are based upon changes in the 
observed retail pump prices of gasoline, and these changes are only one effect of the RFG 70 
 
program. Most importantly, however, these numbers ignore the health and environmental 
benefits of the program. 
 
Discussion 
Unfortunately, the direct benefits of individual air quality compliance regulations are 
exceedingly difficult to measure and quantify with much certainty. Consequently, I am not aware 
of any benefit analyses that provide estimates for RFG specifically. However, I can conduct a 
simple break-even analysis to determine what benefits would be necessary for RFG to be 
economically advantageous from a cost-benefit perspective. Using EPA’s recent estimate of $7.9 
million per statistical life (Borenstein) and my annualized consumer cost estimate of $1.7 billion, 
the RFG program would need to prevent the equivalent of 215 deaths per year to be deemed 
worthwhile. 
A recent EPA report (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency “The Benefits and 
Costs…Summary” 13) estimated that in aggregate the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
prevented 1,400 ozone-related deaths in the year 2000 and approximately 4,300 deaths in 2010. 
Additionally, the report estimated that in 2010 these ozone reductions prevented 3.2 million lost 
school days and contributed (along with particulate matter reductions) towards 86,000 fewer 
emergency room visits and 41,000 fewer hospital visits for respiratory-related problems. While 
the EPA report counted aggregate ozone benefits (which are attributable to a combination of 
regulatory programs and not only RFG), it seems not unreasonable that the RFG program could 
be the mechanism behind a significant fraction of these benefits. If just ten percent of the annual 
ozone reductions attributable to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments were due to the RFG 
program, then the program would be economically beneficial. Because this estimate does not 71 
 
account for any environmental benefits from ozone mitigation, or human health benefits from the 
RFG program’s reductions in air toxics, reformulated gasoline may be substantially more cost 
effective than these results imply. 
Of course, the previous conclusions only hold true if use of RFG fuel actually results in 
reductions of air toxics and ozone. The former is clearly true since heavy metals and other 
hazardous pollutants are physically removed from the fuel during the refining process, and 
resultant tailpipe emissions show measurable decreases in these toxic species (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency “Phase II”). However, since vehicles emit only precursor 
pollutants (and not ozone itself), it is difficult say for certain that reduced emission levels of 
VOCs and NOx precursors will automatically reduce the production (and consequently, ambient 
concentration) of ozone. Factors such as sunlight and temperature play a large role in driving the 
chemical reaction behind ozone formation, and other determinants such as time of day, location 
and weather patterns can affect the resultant concentrations of this capricious and short-lived 
criteria pollutant.72 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
  This study has examined the economic impacts of gasoline content regulations designed 
to improve air quality. Using an innovative fixed effects econometric model with a lengthy panel 
of weekly retail data from 38 cities and over 18 years, I estimated the effects that both low 
volatility gasoline and federal reformulated gasoline programs have had on retail fuel prices.  
Having concluded (as a few previous researchers have) that RFG regulation significantly 
increased consumer prices whereas average RVP regulation did not, I ran additional tests to 
evaluate both the price effects of different low volatility regulations as well as city-specific 
regulatory price effects. The latter test discovered a potentially large variability in the impacts of 
fuel regulations across cities. The former test found that states which have implemented gasoline 
volatility limits more stringent than the federal standard may incur very high incremental 
consumer costs. This second finding is broadly consistent with the results of previous studies, but 
is far greater in magnitude than most. This significant result warrants researchers and 
policymakers to carefully reevaluate many “boutique” RVP regulations. 
Having estimated the effects of RVP and RFG programs on fuel prices, I then defined a 
fuel regulation welfare framework and attempted to estimate a few components of it. Modeling 
annual fuel consumption in sample metropolitan areas, I was able to estimate the total 
incremental consumer costs attributable to the RFG program. While information about the 
economic benefits of both fuel regulatory programs was somewhat uncertain, I was able to 
conduct a simple qualitative analysis to assess the cost-effectiveness of the RFG program. 
Due to the low magnitude and insignificance of RVP regulation price effect estimates, I 
did not explicitly model the welfare implications of low volatility gasoline restrictions. However, 73 
 
I was able to draw a few simple conclusions about the cost-effectiveness of low volatility 
gasoline controls, based on the findings of a recent peer-reviewed study of the program’s air 
quality benefits. 
My conclusions reinforce the need for additional research on the benefits of fuel 
regulatory programs, the economic impacts of ethanol blending, and the spatial heterogeneity of 
fuel regulation price effects. In these efforts, future econometric studies should be mindful of 
(and attempt to avoid) the modeling problems created by the near-perfect correlation between the 
presence of volatility regulation (in affected cities) and the summer season. They should also be 
aware of the influences of seasonal price fluctuations and the limitations associated with the use 
of dummy variables to represent fuel regulations. 
 Policymakers in states which have imposed volatility limitations more stringent than the 
federal (7.8 psi) standard should carefully weigh the costs and purported benefits of these 
programs, consider transitioning to alternative fuel types (RVP 7.8, component-specific RVP 
akin to California’s low volatility fuel requirements, RFG, or conventional gasoline). They 
should also consider the use of more cost-effective methods of mitigating tropospheric ozone 
formation from both mobile and stationary sources. EPA should allow for and incentivize the 
adoption of alternative ozone mitigation measures in State Implementation Plans. 
While any model by definition is an imperfect representation of reality, the general 
agreement of my estimates with those from the existing literature hopefully adds credence to my 
price effect results. While it is true that high levels of uncertainty surround the calculation of the 
total costs and benefits of individual fuel programs, it is crucial to consider the societal and 
economic implications related to various implementations of the Clean Air Act and other 
environmental administrative actions. I am optimistic that my humble attempt to broaden the 74 
 
existing scope of air quality regulatory analysis will draw greater attention to this important area 
of environmental policy and will contribute towards more informed and increasingly beneficial 
decision-making.75 
 
APPENDIX 
EXPANDED REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Basic Model, 1992-2010 (Table 2, Column I) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   10373 
                                                       F( 19,    31) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9659 
                                                       Root MSE      =   12.86 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 32 clusters in state) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |   5.964229   2.260375     2.64   0.013     1.354163     10.5743 
         _78 |   .6691421   1.689832     0.40   0.695    -2.777294    4.115578 
 place_dum_1 |   15.24339   2.979447     5.12   0.000     9.166766    21.32001 
 place_dum_2 |   7.601198   1.887168     4.03   0.000     3.752294     11.4501 
 place_dum_3 |   4.880941   1.411289     3.46   0.002     2.002599    7.759283 
 place_dum_4 |   6.199492   1.887786     3.28   0.003     2.349327    10.04966 
 place_dum_5 |   12.77352   1.689832     7.56   0.000     9.327085    16.21996 
 place_dum_6 |   12.55947   2.979447     4.22   0.000     6.482846    18.63609 
 place_dum_7 |   17.16634   2.979447     5.76   0.000     11.08971    23.24296 
 place_dum_8 |   30.20767   1.689832    17.88   0.000     26.76123     33.6541 
 place_dum_9 |   10.48455   2.979447     3.52   0.001     4.407931    16.56118 
place_dum_10 |   3.524158   2.07e-10        .   0.000     3.524158    3.524158 
place_dum_11 |   18.11834   2.534891     7.15   0.000      12.9484    23.28829 
place_dum_12 |   7.477151   2.979447     2.51   0.018     1.400528    13.55377 
place_dum_13 |   6.873708   2.072889     3.32   0.002     2.646024    11.10139 
place_dum_14 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_15 |   6.536439   2.979447     2.19   0.036     .4598157    12.61306 
place_dum_16 |   7.212912   1.887786     3.82   0.001     3.362747    11.06308 
place_dum_17 |   5.925688   2.979447     1.99   0.056    -.1509353    12.00231 
place_dum_18 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_19 |     12.524   1.689832     7.41   0.000     9.077561    15.97043 
place_dum_20 |   4.445643   1.887786     2.35   0.025     .5954776    8.295808 
place_dum_21 |   14.58673   1.887786     7.73   0.000     10.73656    18.43689 
place_dum_22 |   5.016911   1.689832     2.97   0.006     1.570475    8.463347 
place_dum_23 |   10.96624   2.979447     3.68   0.001     4.889621    17.04287 
place_dum_24 |   7.917943   1.887786     4.19   0.000     4.067778    11.76811 
place_dum_25 |    15.6771   1.689832     9.28   0.000     12.23067    19.12354 
place_dum_26 |   13.76645   1.689832     8.15   0.000     10.32001    17.21289 
place_dum_27 |   4.976155   1.411289     3.53   0.001     2.097813    7.854497 
place_dum_28 |   2.605824   2.979447     0.87   0.389    -3.470799    8.682447 
place_dum_29 |   8.291075   2.979447     2.78   0.009     2.214452     14.3677 
place_dum_30 |   6.529522   1.689832     3.86   0.001     3.083086    9.975958 
place_dum_31 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_32 |   7.266588   2.190327     3.32   0.002     2.799386    11.73379 
place_dum_33 |   28.32679   1.887786    15.01   0.000     24.47663    32.17696 
place_dum_34 |   14.55209   1.887786     7.71   0.000     10.70193    18.40226 
place_dum_35 |   3.825866   2.340391     1.63   0.112    -.9473931    8.599125 
place_dum_36 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_37 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_38 |   27.91825   2.979447     9.37   0.000     21.84163    33.99487 
place_dum_39 |    6.13127   1.313854     4.67   0.000     3.451647    8.810892 
place_dum_40 |    1.16882   2.340391     0.50   0.621    -3.604439    5.942079 
place_dum_41 |   17.12188   1.411289    12.13   0.000     14.24354    20.00022 
place_dum_42 |   4.053306   2.979447     1.36   0.184    -2.023317    10.12993 
  year_dum_1 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_2 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_3 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_4 |  (dropped) 76 
 
  year_dum_5 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_6 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_7 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_8 |  -12.31599    .800785   -15.38   0.000     -13.9492   -10.68278 
  year_dum_9 |  -16.98669   1.654132   -10.27   0.000    -20.36032   -13.61307 
 year_dum_10 |  -18.95333   1.281697   -14.79   0.000    -21.56737   -16.33929 
 year_dum_11 |  -12.59769   1.520902    -8.28   0.000    -15.69959   -9.495794 
 year_dum_12 |  -17.50677   1.823562    -9.60   0.000    -21.22595   -13.78759 
 year_dum_13 |  -41.80469   1.567493   -26.67   0.000    -45.00161   -38.60777 
 year_dum_14 |  -29.99696   1.893024   -15.85   0.000     -33.8578   -26.13611 
 year_dum_15 |   16.17054   1.557783    10.38   0.000     12.99342    19.34766 
 year_dum_16 |   2.547885   1.497143     1.70   0.099    -.5055584    5.601328 
 year_dum_17 |   -12.1353   1.800339    -6.74   0.000    -15.80711   -8.463483 
 year_dum_18 |   9.184791   1.710517     5.37   0.000     5.696168    12.67341 
 year_dum_19 |   42.53969   1.608884    26.44   0.000     39.25835    45.82103 
 year_dum_20 |   83.19843    1.89345    43.94   0.000     79.33671    87.06015 
 year_dum_21 |   132.8144   2.185629    60.77   0.000     128.3568     137.272 
 year_dum_22 |   130.1076   2.562584    50.77   0.000     124.8812     135.334 
 year_dum_23 |   211.4113   1.980195   106.76   0.000     207.3727      215.45 
 year_dum_24 |   81.30099   2.178395    37.32   0.000     76.85812    85.74386 
 year_dum_25 |   93.87688   2.180766    43.05   0.000     89.42918    98.32458 
       _cons |   117.4867   3.213342    36.56   0.000      110.933    124.0403 
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Basic Model, 1992-2000 (Table 2, Column II) 
 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    5129 
                                                       F(  9,    31) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7924 
                                                       Root MSE      =  8.8651 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 32 clusters in state) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |   6.492564   2.459743     2.64   0.013     1.475884    11.50924 
         _78 |   1.115716   2.903807     0.38   0.703    -4.806638    7.038069 
 place_dum_1 |   16.38363   4.031736     4.06   0.000     8.160851    24.60641 
 place_dum_2 |    3.70045   1.638159     2.26   0.031     .3594038    7.041497 
 place_dum_3 |   3.753465   1.935871     1.94   0.062    -.1947705    7.701701 
 place_dum_4 |   6.461978   1.639829     3.94   0.000     3.117525    9.806431 
 place_dum_5 |   14.21178   2.903807     4.89   0.000     8.289424    20.13413 
 place_dum_6 |   18.43529   4.031736     4.57   0.000     10.21251    26.65807 
 place_dum_7 |   20.19184   4.031736     5.01   0.000     11.96906    28.41462 
 place_dum_8 |    30.1606   2.903807    10.39   0.000     24.23825    36.08295 
 place_dum_9 |   11.87673   4.031736     2.95   0.006     3.653945    20.09951 
place_dum_10 |    5.08954   1.13e-10        .   0.000      5.08954     5.08954 
place_dum_11 |   15.96044   4.031736     3.96   0.000      7.73766    24.18322 
place_dum_12 |   7.934422   4.031736     1.97   0.058    -.2883585     16.1572 
place_dum_13 |   6.620759   2.649133     2.50   0.018     1.217817     12.0237 
place_dum_14 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_15 |   8.305667   4.031736     2.06   0.048     .0828866    16.52845 
place_dum_16 |   8.304121   1.639829     5.06   0.000     4.959668    11.64857 
place_dum_17 |   6.853788   4.031736     1.70   0.099    -1.368992    15.07657 
place_dum_18 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_19 |   13.95325   2.903807     4.81   0.000     8.030896     19.8756 
place_dum_20 |   6.237105   1.639829     3.80   0.001     2.892652    9.581558 
place_dum_21 |   18.71789   1.639829    11.41   0.000     15.37344    22.06234 
place_dum_22 |    7.14755   2.903807     2.46   0.020     1.225196     13.0699 
place_dum_23 |   13.90236   4.031736     3.45   0.002     5.679583    22.12514 
place_dum_24 |   10.05264   1.639829     6.13   0.000     6.708191     13.3971 
place_dum_25 |    24.1996   2.903807     8.33   0.000     18.27725    30.12195 
place_dum_26 |   15.93832   2.903807     5.49   0.000     10.01597    21.86067 
place_dum_27 |   7.037068   1.935871     3.64   0.001     3.088833     10.9853 
place_dum_28 |   3.403972   4.031736     0.84   0.405    -4.818809    11.62675 
place_dum_29 |     12.341   4.031736     3.06   0.005      4.11822    20.56378 
place_dum_30 |   6.859798   2.903807     2.36   0.025     .9374449    12.78215 
place_dum_31 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_32 |    10.3925   3.275816     3.17   0.003     3.711429    17.07357 
place_dum_33 |    30.6761   1.639829    18.71   0.000     27.33164    34.02055 
place_dum_34 |   16.18646   1.639829     9.87   0.000     12.84201    19.53092 
place_dum_35 |   5.657757   4.031736     1.40   0.170    -2.565024    13.88054 
place_dum_36 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_37 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_38 |   27.90439   4.031736     6.92   0.000     19.68161    36.12717 
place_dum_39 |    8.53152   1.540158     5.54   0.000     5.390348    11.67269 
place_dum_40 |   3.515331   4.031736     0.87   0.390    -4.707449    11.73811 
place_dum_41 |   14.34286   1.935871     7.41   0.000     10.39462     18.2911 
place_dum_42 |   7.593768   4.031736     1.88   0.069    -.6290121    15.81655 
  year_dum_1 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_2 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_3 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_4 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_5 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_6 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_7 |   12.31599   .8022666    15.35   0.000     10.67976    13.95222 
  year_dum_8 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_9 |  -4.670706    1.79869    -2.60   0.014    -8.339158   -1.002254 
 year_dum_10 |  -6.768926   1.436594    -4.71   0.000    -9.698878   -3.838973 
 year_dum_11 |    -.42191   1.799966    -0.23   0.816    -4.092965    3.249145 
 year_dum_12 |  -5.334122   2.063955    -2.58   0.015    -9.543585   -1.124658 78 
 
 year_dum_13 |  -29.64763   1.754113   -16.90   0.000    -33.22517   -26.07009 
 year_dum_14 |  -17.83821   2.133018    -8.36   0.000    -22.18853   -13.48789 
 year_dum_15 |   28.32928     1.9048    14.87   0.000     24.44442    32.21415 
 year_dum_16 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_17 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_18 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_19 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_20 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_21 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_22 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_23 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_24 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_25 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   103.4698   4.391044    23.56   0.000     94.51417    112.4254 
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Basic Model, 2001-2010 (Table 2, Column III) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    5244 
                                                       F(  8,    31) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9522 
                                                       Root MSE      =  15.567 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 32 clusters in state) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |   6.309478   3.04e-11        .   0.000     6.309478    6.309478 
         _78 |  -4.000499   1.262861    -3.17   0.003    -6.576122   -1.424876 
 place_dum_1 |   10.58497   1.262861     8.38   0.000     8.009351     13.1606 
 place_dum_2 |   12.06845   1.89e-11        .   0.000     12.06845    12.06845 
 place_dum_3 |    1.60551   1.262861     1.27   0.213    -.9701132    4.181132 
 place_dum_4 |   6.632527   1.87e-11        .   0.000     6.632527    6.632527 
 place_dum_5 |   7.133754   1.262861     5.65   0.000     4.558132    9.709377 
 place_dum_6 |   3.268419   1.262861     2.59   0.015     .6927964    5.844042 
 place_dum_7 |   10.66365   1.262861     8.44   0.000     8.088023    13.23927 
 place_dum_8 |   26.02093   1.262861    20.60   0.000     23.44531    28.59656 
 place_dum_9 |   5.579686   1.262861     4.42   0.000     3.004064    8.155309 
place_dum_10 |   1.992806   2.62e-11        .   0.000     1.992806    1.992806 
place_dum_11 |   19.83331   .4118026    48.16   0.000     18.99343    20.67319 
place_dum_12 |    3.48686   1.262861     2.76   0.010      .911237    6.062483 
place_dum_13 |    8.01808   1.87e-11        .   0.000      8.01808     8.01808 
place_dum_14 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_15 |   1.262711   1.262861     1.00   0.325    -1.312911    3.838334 
place_dum_16 |    6.83524   1.87e-11        .   0.000      6.83524     6.83524 
place_dum_17 |   1.474803   1.262861     1.17   0.252     -1.10082    4.050426 
place_dum_18 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_19 |    6.89304   1.262861     5.46   0.000     4.317417    9.468663 
place_dum_20 |   3.382941   1.86e-11        .   0.000     3.382941    3.382941 
place_dum_21 |   11.23519   1.87e-11        .   0.000     11.23519    11.23519 
place_dum_22 |  -1.300185   1.262861    -1.03   0.311    -3.875808    1.275438 
place_dum_23 |   4.550993   1.262861     3.60   0.001     1.975371    7.126616 
place_dum_24 |   6.519464   1.86e-11        .   0.000     6.519464    6.519464 
place_dum_25 |   3.107101   1.262861     2.46   0.020     .5314785    5.682724 
place_dum_26 |   7.409021   1.262861     5.87   0.000     4.833399    9.984644 
place_dum_27 |  -1.418353   1.262861    -1.12   0.270    -3.993976    1.157269 
place_dum_28 |  -1.717933   1.262861    -1.36   0.184    -4.293556    .8576896 
place_dum_29 |   .7862304   1.262861     0.62   0.538    -1.789392    3.361853 
place_dum_30 |   1.973651   1.262861     1.56   0.128    -.6019721    4.549273 
place_dum_31 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_32 |   5.212342   1.86e-11        .   0.000     5.212342    5.212342 
place_dum_33 |   26.71838   1.86e-11        .   0.000     26.71838    26.71838 
place_dum_34 |   13.64307   1.86e-11        .   0.000     13.64307    13.64307 
place_dum_35 |   3.160479   1.86e-11        .   0.000     3.160479    3.160479 
place_dum_36 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_37 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_38 |   24.38884   1.262861    19.31   0.000     21.81322    26.96447 
place_dum_39 |  -.5596504   1.262861    -0.44   0.661    -3.135273    2.015972 
place_dum_40 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_41 |   15.46209   1.262861    12.24   0.000     12.88647    18.03772 
place_dum_42 |   -2.95315   1.262861    -2.34   0.026    -5.528772   -.3775269 
  year_dum_1 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_2 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_3 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_4 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_5 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_6 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_7 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_8 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_9 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_10 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_11 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_12 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_13 |  (dropped) 80 
 
 year_dum_14 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_15 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_16 |  -91.45188    2.42187   -37.76   0.000    -96.39132   -86.51245 
 year_dum_17 |  -106.1351    1.52805   -69.46   0.000    -109.2515   -103.0186 
 year_dum_18 |  -84.81498   1.961878   -43.23   0.000    -88.81625    -80.8137 
 year_dum_19 |  -51.33719   1.827703   -28.09   0.000    -55.06482   -47.60957 
 year_dum_20 |  -10.67845    1.51449    -7.05   0.000    -13.76727   -7.589631 
 year_dum_21 |   38.93749   1.369217    28.44   0.000     36.14495    41.73003 
 year_dum_22 |   36.23074   1.731736    20.92   0.000     32.69884    39.76264 
 year_dum_23 |   117.5345   .9575348   122.75   0.000     115.5816    119.4874 
 year_dum_24 |  -12.57589   1.295451    -9.71   0.000    -15.21798   -9.933802 
 year_dum_25 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   216.7071   2.139168   101.30   0.000     212.3442    221.0699 81 
 
Monthly Time Trend Model (Summer Only), 1992-2010 (Table 2, Column IV) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =     10373 
Group variable: place_id                        Number of groups   =        38 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9806                         Obs per group: min =       272 
       between = 0.0811                                        avg =     273.0 
       overall = 0.9703                                        max =       273 
 
                                                F(74,10261)        =   7015.30 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0007                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |    6.00511   .5681404    10.57   0.000     4.891444    7.118776 
         _78 |   .7522806   .4910526     1.53   0.126    -.2102784     1.71484 
 time_dum_78 |   14.28129   1.358239    10.51   0.000     11.61888    16.94371 
 time_dum_79 |   12.66994   1.312184     9.66   0.000      10.0978    15.24208 
 time_dum_80 |    9.82346   1.358239     7.23   0.000     7.161046    12.48587 
 time_dum_81 |   9.497308   1.568359     6.06   0.000     6.423017     12.5716 
 time_dum_90 |   .5643202   1.358239     0.42   0.678    -2.098094    3.226734 
 time_dum_91 |   .3453518   1.312184     0.26   0.792    -2.226784    2.917488 
 time_dum_92 |   .3972856   1.358239     0.29   0.770    -2.265128    3.059699 
 time_dum_93 |  -5.774845   1.568359    -3.68   0.000    -8.849136   -2.700555 
time_dum_102 |  -11.51423   1.358239    -8.48   0.000    -14.17665   -8.851819 
time_dum_103 |  -6.372066   1.312184    -4.86   0.000    -8.944202    -3.79993 
time_dum_104 |     .47004   1.358239     0.35   0.729    -2.192374    3.132454 
time_dum_114 |  -1.302142   1.368419    -0.95   0.341    -3.984511    1.380227 
time_dum_115 |  -5.810182   1.322718    -4.39   0.000    -8.402968   -3.217396 
time_dum_116 |  -11.15555   1.368419    -8.15   0.000    -13.83792   -8.473182 
time_dum_117 |  -13.37505   1.577184    -8.48   0.000    -16.46664   -10.28347 
time_dum_126 |   4.315637   1.368419     3.15   0.002     1.633268    6.998006 
time_dum_127 |  -.7138506    1.32315    -0.54   0.590    -3.307484    1.879782 
time_dum_128 |  -3.890125   1.368837    -2.84   0.004    -6.573313   -1.206938 
time_dum_129 |   -4.22707   1.577546    -2.68   0.007    -7.319369   -1.134771 
time_dum_138 |  -5.701458   1.368837    -4.17   0.000    -8.384645    -3.01827 
time_dum_139 |  -9.107927    1.32315    -6.88   0.000    -11.70156   -6.514294 
time_dum_140 |  -3.402898   1.368837    -2.49   0.013    -6.086085   -.7197101 
time_dum_141 |  -1.004605   1.577546    -0.64   0.524    -4.096904    2.087694 
time_dum_150 |  -27.96159   1.368837   -20.43   0.000    -30.64478   -25.27841 
time_dum_151 |  -28.40202   1.324355   -21.45   0.000    -30.99802   -25.80603 
time_dum_152 |  -31.42049   1.369376   -22.95   0.000    -34.10474   -28.73625 
time_dum_153 |  -34.43729   1.578014   -21.82   0.000    -37.53051   -31.34408 
time_dum_162 |  -24.05391   1.370756   -17.55   0.000    -26.74086   -21.36696 
time_dum_163 |  -17.60544   1.325136   -13.29   0.000    -20.20296   -15.00791 
time_dum_164 |  -15.22292   1.370756   -11.11   0.000    -17.90987   -12.53597 
time_dum_165 |  -13.10032   1.579212    -8.30   0.000    -16.19588   -10.00475 
time_dum_174 |   37.11303   1.370756    27.07   0.000     34.42608    39.79998 
time_dum_175 |   27.08972   1.325136    20.44   0.000      24.4922    29.68725 
time_dum_176 |   20.71803   1.370756    15.11   0.000     18.03108    23.40498 
time_dum_177 |   27.20219   1.579212    17.23   0.000     24.10663    30.29776 
time_dum_186 |   27.95493   1.372075    20.37   0.000      25.2654    30.64447 
time_dum_187 |   4.755011     1.3265     3.58   0.000     2.154811    7.355211 
time_dum_188 |   10.99171   1.372075     8.01   0.000     8.302178    13.68125 
time_dum_189 |   18.60508   1.580357    11.77   0.000     15.50727    21.70289 
time_dum_198 |  -2.814273   1.372075    -2.05   0.040    -5.503809   -.1247375 
time_dum_199 |  -1.897359     1.3265    -1.43   0.153    -4.497558    .7028411 
time_dum_200 |   2.202977   1.372075     1.61   0.108    -.4865582    4.892513 
time_dum_201 |   4.228018   1.580357     2.68   0.007     1.130209    7.325826 
time_dum_210 |   9.194752   1.372075     6.70   0.000     6.505217    11.88429 
time_dum_211 |   20.07171     1.3265    15.13   0.000     17.47151    22.67191 82 
 
time_dum_212 |    26.1831   1.372075    19.08   0.000     23.49356    28.87263 
time_dum_213 |   37.22773   1.580357    23.56   0.000     34.12992    40.32554 
time_dum_222 |   57.83253   1.372917    42.12   0.000     55.14135    60.52372 
time_dum_223 |   54.20931   1.327371    40.84   0.000      51.6074    56.81122 
time_dum_224 |   54.81346   1.372917    39.92   0.000     52.12227    57.50464 
time_dum_225 |   47.49279   1.581088    30.04   0.000     44.39355    50.59203 
time_dum_234 |   75.28681   1.372917    54.84   0.000     72.59563      77.978 
time_dum_235 |   81.38702   1.327371    61.31   0.000     78.78511    83.98892 
time_dum_236 |   107.7795   1.372917    78.50   0.000     105.0884    110.4707 
time_dum_237 |   143.6483   1.581088    90.85   0.000     140.5491    146.7476 
time_dum_246 |   139.2847   1.372917   101.45   0.000     136.5935    141.9758 
time_dum_247 |   147.0724   1.327371   110.80   0.000     144.4705    149.6743 
time_dum_248 |   153.2544   1.372917   111.63   0.000     150.5632    155.9456 
time_dum_249 |   132.6091   1.581088    83.87   0.000     129.5099    135.7083 
time_dum_258 |   159.1462   1.372917   115.92   0.000     156.4551    161.8374 
time_dum_259 |   144.1774   1.327371   108.62   0.000     141.5755    146.7793 
time_dum_260 |   127.6876   1.372917    93.00   0.000     124.9964    130.3788 
time_dum_261 |   130.9563   1.581088    82.83   0.000     127.8571    134.0556 
time_dum_270 |   240.1052   1.372917   174.89   0.000      237.414    242.7964 
time_dum_271 |   232.3077   1.327371   175.01   0.000     229.7058    234.9097 
time_dum_272 |   206.0588   1.372917   150.09   0.000     203.3676      208.75 
time_dum_273 |   201.7482   1.581088   127.60   0.000     198.6489    204.8474 
time_dum_282 |   100.5023   1.372917    73.20   0.000     97.81115    103.1935 
time_dum_283 |    85.6698   1.327371    64.54   0.000     83.06789     88.2717 
time_dum_284 |   95.05293   1.372917    69.23   0.000     92.36174    97.74411 
time_dum_285 |   93.73276   1.581088    59.28   0.000     90.63352      96.832 
time_dum_294 |   105.7783   1.445642    73.17   0.000     102.9445     108.612 
       _cons |   115.8138   1.123653   103.07   0.000     113.6112    118.0164 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  7.2426102 
     sigma_e |   9.668017 
         rho |  .35946589   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(37, 10261) =   148.99           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Monthly Time Trend Model (Summer Only), 1992-2000 (Table 2, Column V) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      5129 
Group variable: place_id                        Number of groups   =        38 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7987                         Obs per group: min =       134 
       between = 0.0438                                        avg =     135.0 
       overall = 0.6812                                        max =       135 
 
                                                F(37,5054)         =    541.95 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0077                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |   6.574803   .5524058    11.90   0.000     5.491848    7.657758 
         _78 |   1.350208   .6865111     1.97   0.049     .0043484    2.696067 
 time_dum_78 |   14.28129   1.130279    12.64   0.000     12.06546    16.49713 
 time_dum_79 |   12.66994   1.091953    11.60   0.000     10.52924    14.81064 
 time_dum_80 |    9.82346   1.130279     8.69   0.000     7.607623     12.0393 
 time_dum_81 |   9.497308   1.305134     7.28   0.000      6.93868    12.05594 
 time_dum_90 |   .5643202   1.130279     0.50   0.618    -1.651517    2.780157 
 time_dum_91 |   .3453518   1.091953     0.32   0.752     -1.79535    2.486054 
 time_dum_92 |   .3972856   1.130279     0.35   0.725    -1.818551    2.613122 
 time_dum_93 |  -5.774845   1.305134    -4.42   0.000    -8.333473   -3.216217 
time_dum_102 |  -11.51423   1.130279   -10.19   0.000    -13.73007   -9.298396 
time_dum_103 |  -6.372066   1.091953    -5.84   0.000    -8.512768   -4.231364 
time_dum_104 |     .47004   1.130279     0.42   0.678    -1.745797    2.685877 
time_dum_114 |   -1.43484   1.141315    -1.26   0.209    -3.672313    .8026332 
time_dum_115 |   -5.94288   1.103373    -5.39   0.000     -8.10597   -3.779791 
time_dum_116 |  -11.28825   1.141315    -9.89   0.000    -13.52572   -9.050776 
time_dum_117 |  -13.50775   1.314703   -10.27   0.000    -16.08514   -10.93036 
time_dum_126 |   4.182939   1.141315     3.67   0.000     1.945466    6.420412 
time_dum_127 |  -.8622836   1.103887    -0.78   0.435     -3.02638    1.301813 
time_dum_128 |  -4.038558   1.141812    -3.54   0.000    -6.277005   -1.800111 
time_dum_129 |  -4.375503   1.315134    -3.33   0.001    -6.953736   -1.797269 
time_dum_138 |  -5.849891   1.141812    -5.12   0.000    -8.088338   -3.611444 
time_dum_139 |   -9.25636   1.103887    -8.39   0.000    -11.42046   -7.092263 
time_dum_140 |  -3.551331   1.141812    -3.11   0.002    -5.789777   -1.312884 
time_dum_141 |  -1.153038   1.315134    -0.88   0.381    -3.731272    1.425196 
time_dum_150 |  -28.11003   1.141812   -24.62   0.000    -30.34847   -25.87158 
time_dum_151 |  -28.58482   1.105039   -25.87   0.000    -30.75118   -26.41847 
time_dum_152 |  -31.58466   1.142594   -27.64   0.000    -33.82464   -29.34468 
time_dum_153 |  -34.60146   1.315814   -26.30   0.000    -37.18103    -32.0219 
time_dum_162 |  -24.21733   1.143922   -21.17   0.000    -26.45992   -21.97475 
time_dum_163 |  -17.76886   1.106069   -16.06   0.000    -19.93724   -15.60049 
time_dum_164 |  -15.38635   1.143922   -13.45   0.000    -17.62893   -13.14377 
time_dum_165 |  -13.26374   1.316966   -10.07   0.000    -15.84557   -10.68192 
time_dum_174 |    36.9496   1.143922    32.30   0.000     34.70702    39.19219 
time_dum_175 |    26.9263   1.106069    24.34   0.000     24.75792    29.09467 
time_dum_176 |   20.55461   1.143922    17.97   0.000     18.31203    22.79719 
time_dum_177 |   27.03877   1.316966    20.53   0.000     24.45694    29.62059 
       _cons |   115.5949   .9568794   120.80   0.000      113.719    117.4708 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  7.5682948 
     sigma_e |  8.0453852 
         rho |  .46947258   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(37, 5054) =   115.61            Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Monthly Time Trend Model (Summer Only), 2001-2010 (Table 2, Column VI) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      5244 
Group variable: place_id                        Number of groups   =        38 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9775                         Obs per group: min =       138 
       between = 0.0527                                        avg =     138.0 
       overall = 0.9660                                        max =       138 
 
                                                F(37,5169)         =   6071.46 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0004                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |  (omitted) 
         _78 |  -4.000499   1.957118    -2.04   0.041    -7.837278   -.1637206 
time_dum_186 |   9.349854   1.494077     6.26   0.000     6.420831    12.27888 
time_dum_187 |  -13.85007   1.443416    -9.60   0.000    -16.67977   -11.02036 
time_dum_188 |  -7.613367   1.494077    -5.10   0.000    -10.54239   -4.684344 
time_dum_198 |  -21.41935   1.494077   -14.34   0.000    -24.34838   -18.49033 
time_dum_199 |  -20.50244   1.443416   -14.20   0.000    -23.33214   -17.67273 
time_dum_200 |   -16.4021   1.494077   -10.98   0.000    -19.33113   -13.47308 
time_dum_201 |  -14.37706   1.725212    -8.33   0.000    -17.75921   -10.99492 
time_dum_210 |  -9.410328   1.494077    -6.30   0.000    -12.33935   -6.481305 
time_dum_211 |    1.46663   1.443416     1.02   0.310    -1.363075    4.296335 
time_dum_212 |   7.578015   1.494077     5.07   0.000     4.648992    10.50704 
time_dum_213 |   18.62265   1.725212    10.79   0.000      15.2405    22.00479 
time_dum_222 |   39.35252   1.494965    26.32   0.000     36.42176    42.28329 
time_dum_223 |    35.7293   1.444334    24.74   0.000      32.8978    38.56081 
time_dum_224 |   36.33345   1.494965    24.30   0.000     33.40269    39.26421 
time_dum_225 |   29.01278    1.72598    16.81   0.000     25.62913    32.39644 
time_dum_234 |    56.8068   1.494965    38.00   0.000     53.87604    59.73757 
time_dum_235 |   62.90701   1.444334    43.55   0.000      60.0755    65.73851 
time_dum_236 |   89.29953   1.494965    59.73   0.000     86.36877    92.23029 
time_dum_237 |   125.1683    1.72598    72.52   0.000     121.7847     128.552 
time_dum_246 |   120.8047   1.494965    80.81   0.000     117.8739    123.7354 
time_dum_247 |   128.5924   1.444334    89.03   0.000     125.7609    131.4239 
time_dum_248 |   134.7744   1.494965    90.15   0.000     131.8436    137.7051 
time_dum_249 |   114.1291    1.72598    66.12   0.000     110.7454    117.5127 
time_dum_258 |   140.6662   1.494965    94.09   0.000     137.7355     143.597 
time_dum_259 |   125.6974   1.444334    87.03   0.000     122.8659    128.5289 
time_dum_260 |   109.2076   1.494965    73.05   0.000     106.2769    112.1384 
time_dum_261 |   112.4763    1.72598    65.17   0.000     109.0927      115.86 
time_dum_270 |   221.6252   1.494965   148.25   0.000     218.6944    224.5559 
time_dum_271 |   213.8277   1.444334   148.05   0.000     210.9962    216.6592 
time_dum_272 |   187.5788   1.494965   125.47   0.000      184.648    190.5095 
time_dum_273 |   183.2681    1.72598   106.18   0.000     179.8845    186.6518 
time_dum_282 |   82.02233   1.494965    54.87   0.000     79.09157    84.95309 
time_dum_283 |   67.18979   1.444334    46.52   0.000     64.35828     70.0213 
time_dum_284 |   76.57292   1.494965    51.22   0.000     73.64215    79.50368 
time_dum_285 |   75.25276    1.72598    43.60   0.000      71.8691    78.63641 
time_dum_294 |   87.29826   1.575737    55.40   0.000     84.20914    90.38737 
       _cons |   138.2241   1.417068    97.54   0.000      135.446    141.0021 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  7.7859499 
     sigma_e |  10.634919 
         rho |  .34895313   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(37, 5169) =    68.15            Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Monthly Time Trend Model (Full Year), 1992-2010 (Table 2, Column VII) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =     36700 
Group variable: place_id                        Number of groups   =        38 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9747                         Obs per group: min =       959 
       between = 0.1006                                        avg =     965.8 
       overall = 0.9623                                        max =       966 
 
                                                F(223,36439)       =   6286.27 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0031                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |   3.411477   .2773987    12.30   0.000     2.867767    3.955186 
         _78 |   -.003267   .2210198    -0.01   0.988    -.4364722    .4299383 
 time_dum_73 |  -107.6781   1.161246   -92.73   0.000    -109.9542   -105.4021 
 time_dum_74 |  -105.5117   1.213749   -86.93   0.000    -107.8907   -103.1327 
 time_dum_75 |  -104.9928   1.213749   -86.50   0.000    -107.3718   -102.6138 
 time_dum_76 |  -106.7585   1.161246   -91.93   0.000    -109.0346   -104.4825 
 time_dum_77 |  -97.79499   1.213749   -80.57   0.000     -100.174     -95.416 
 time_dum_78 |  -92.40415    1.20993   -76.37   0.000    -94.77565   -90.03265 
 time_dum_79 |   -94.0155   1.157254   -81.24   0.000    -96.28375   -91.74725 
 time_dum_80 |  -96.86198    1.20993   -80.06   0.000    -99.23348   -94.49048 
 time_dum_81 |  -96.04109   1.158964   -82.87   0.000    -98.31269   -93.76948 
 time_dum_82 |  -96.98323   1.213749   -79.90   0.000    -99.36221   -94.60425 
 time_dum_83 |  -97.08436   1.213749   -79.99   0.000    -99.46334   -94.70538 
 time_dum_84 |  -102.8443   1.161246   -88.56   0.000    -105.1204   -100.5682 
 time_dum_85 |  -106.7347   1.161246   -91.91   0.000    -109.0108   -104.4586 
 time_dum_86 |  -104.8313   1.213749   -86.37   0.000    -107.2103   -102.4523 
 time_dum_87 |  -105.1644   1.213749   -86.64   0.000    -107.5434   -102.7854 
 time_dum_88 |  -106.2505   1.161246   -91.50   0.000    -108.5266   -103.9744 
 time_dum_89 |  -103.8797   1.213749   -85.59   0.000    -106.2586   -101.5007 
 time_dum_90 |  -106.1211    1.20993   -87.71   0.000    -108.4926   -103.7496 
 time_dum_91 |  -106.3401   1.157254   -91.89   0.000    -108.6083   -104.0718 
 time_dum_92 |  -106.2882    1.20993   -87.85   0.000    -108.6597   -103.9167 
 time_dum_93 |  -116.1946   1.211157   -95.94   0.000    -118.5685   -113.8207 
 time_dum_94 |  -117.4684   1.161246  -101.16   0.000    -119.7445   -115.1923 
 time_dum_95 |  -117.7157   1.213749   -96.99   0.000    -120.0947   -115.3367 
 time_dum_96 |   -123.732   1.213749  -101.94   0.000     -126.111    -121.353 
 time_dum_97 |  -126.4831   1.161246  -108.92   0.000    -128.7592    -124.207 
 time_dum_98 |  -127.0051   1.213749  -104.64   0.000    -129.3841   -124.6261 
 time_dum_99 |  -128.4136   1.213749  -105.80   0.000    -130.7926   -126.0346 
time_dum_100 |  -125.8252   1.161246  -108.35   0.000    -128.1013   -123.5491 
time_dum_101 |  -122.6996   1.213749  -101.09   0.000    -125.0786   -120.3206 
time_dum_102 |  -118.1997    1.20993   -97.69   0.000    -120.5712   -115.8282 
time_dum_103 |  -113.0575   1.157254   -97.69   0.000    -115.3258   -110.7893 
time_dum_104 |  -106.2154    1.20993   -87.79   0.000    -108.5869   -103.8439 
time_dum_105 |  -108.0466   1.211157   -89.21   0.000    -110.4205   -105.6727 
time_dum_106 |   -112.331   1.161246   -96.73   0.000    -114.6071    -110.055 
time_dum_107 |  -112.6781   1.213749   -92.83   0.000    -115.0571   -110.2991 
time_dum_108 |  -115.7081   1.213749   -95.33   0.000    -118.0871   -113.3291 
time_dum_109 |  -117.1449   1.156667  -101.28   0.000     -119.412   -114.8778 
time_dum_110 |  -120.2218   1.209369   -99.41   0.000    -122.5922   -117.8514 
time_dum_111 |  -121.5488   1.209369  -100.51   0.000    -123.9192   -119.1784 
time_dum_112 |   -115.797   1.156667  -100.11   0.000    -118.0641   -113.5299 
time_dum_113 |  -108.6846   1.209369   -89.87   0.000     -111.055   -106.3142 
time_dum_114 |  -107.2282   1.206401   -88.88   0.000    -109.5928   -104.8636 
time_dum_115 |  -111.7362   1.153563   -96.86   0.000    -113.9972   -109.4752 
time_dum_116 |  -117.0816   1.206401   -97.05   0.000    -119.4462    -114.717 
time_dum_117 |  -119.8337   1.207462   -99.24   0.000    -122.2003    -117.467 86 
 
time_dum_118 |  -122.9688   1.156667  -106.31   0.000    -125.2359   -120.7017 
time_dum_119 |  -126.6516   1.209369  -104.73   0.000     -129.022   -124.2812 
time_dum_120 |  -126.2447   1.209369  -104.39   0.000    -128.6151   -123.8743 
time_dum_121 |  -123.7863   1.156667  -107.02   0.000    -126.0534   -121.5192 
time_dum_122 |  -123.3632   1.209369  -102.01   0.000    -125.7336   -120.9928 
time_dum_123 |  -118.1607   1.209369   -97.70   0.000    -120.5311   -115.7903 
time_dum_124 |  -106.8813   1.156667   -92.40   0.000    -109.1484   -104.6142 
time_dum_125 |  -99.58235   1.209369   -82.34   0.000    -101.9528   -97.21195 
time_dum_126 |  -101.6104   1.206401   -84.23   0.000     -103.975   -99.24583 
time_dum_127 |    -106.62   1.153456   -92.44   0.000    -108.8808   -104.3592 
time_dum_128 |  -109.7963   1.206299   -91.02   0.000    -112.1607   -107.4319 
time_dum_129 |  -109.8624   1.154878   -95.13   0.000     -112.126   -107.5988 
time_dum_130 |  -109.9513   1.209369   -90.92   0.000    -112.3217   -107.5809 
time_dum_131 |  -105.9226   1.209369   -87.58   0.000     -108.293   -103.5522 
time_dum_132 |  -105.0608   1.209369   -86.87   0.000    -107.4312   -102.6904 
time_dum_133 |  -105.6802   1.156667   -91.37   0.000    -107.9473   -103.4131 
time_dum_134 |  -107.3178   1.209369   -88.74   0.000    -109.6882   -104.9474 
time_dum_135 |   -111.414   1.209369   -92.13   0.000    -113.7844   -109.0436 
time_dum_136 |  -114.0188   1.156667   -98.58   0.000    -116.2859   -111.7517 
time_dum_137 |  -113.3016   1.209369   -93.69   0.000     -115.672   -110.9312 
time_dum_138 |  -111.6076   1.206299   -92.52   0.000     -113.972   -109.2432 
time_dum_139 |  -115.0141   1.153456   -99.71   0.000    -117.2749   -112.7533 
time_dum_140 |  -109.3091   1.206299   -90.62   0.000    -111.6734   -106.9447 
time_dum_141 |  -107.7241   1.207331   -89.22   0.000    -110.0905   -105.3577 
time_dum_142 |  -113.0425   1.156667   -97.73   0.000    -115.3096   -110.7754 
time_dum_143 |  -116.6876   1.209369   -96.49   0.000     -119.058   -114.3172 
time_dum_144 |  -121.3124   1.156667  -104.88   0.000    -123.5795   -119.0453 
time_dum_145 |  -129.3913   1.156667  -111.87   0.000    -131.6584   -127.1242 
time_dum_146 |  -134.9864   1.209369  -111.62   0.000    -137.3568    -132.616 
time_dum_147 |  -137.8807   1.209369  -114.01   0.000    -140.2511   -135.5103 
time_dum_148 |  -136.3041   1.156667  -117.84   0.000    -138.5712    -134.037 
time_dum_149 |  -133.7651   1.209369  -110.61   0.000    -136.1355   -131.3947 
time_dum_150 |  -133.8678   1.206299  -110.97   0.000    -136.2321   -131.5034 
time_dum_151 |   -134.292   1.154574  -116.31   0.000     -136.555    -132.029 
time_dum_152 |  -137.3068   1.206225  -113.83   0.000     -139.671   -134.9425 
time_dum_153 |  -140.2311   1.207206  -116.16   0.000    -142.5973    -137.865 
time_dum_154 |  -140.3246   1.156667  -121.32   0.000    -142.5917   -138.0575 
time_dum_155 |  -143.4448   1.209369  -118.61   0.000    -145.8152   -141.0744 
time_dum_156 |  -148.0379   1.209369  -122.41   0.000    -150.4083   -145.6675 
time_dum_157 |   -149.519   1.156667  -129.27   0.000    -151.7861   -147.2519 
time_dum_158 |  -152.1614   1.209369  -125.82   0.000    -154.5318    -149.791 
time_dum_159 |  -143.3393   1.209369  -118.52   0.000    -145.7097    -140.969 
time_dum_160 |  -130.5852   1.156667  -112.90   0.000    -132.8523   -128.3181 
time_dum_161 |  -126.8996   1.209369  -104.93   0.000      -129.27   -124.5292 
time_dum_162 |  -129.8918   1.206265  -107.68   0.000    -132.2561   -127.5275 
time_dum_163 |  -123.4434   1.153421  -107.02   0.000    -125.7041   -121.1826 
time_dum_164 |  -121.0608   1.206265  -100.36   0.000    -123.4251   -118.6965 
time_dum_165 |  -118.4163   1.207274   -98.09   0.000    -120.7826     -116.05 
time_dum_166 |  -111.9871   1.156585   -96.83   0.000    -114.2541   -109.7202 
time_dum_167 |  -111.1322    1.20929   -91.90   0.000    -113.5024   -108.7619 
time_dum_168 |  -99.21976    1.20929   -82.05   0.000      -101.59   -96.84952 
time_dum_169 |  -103.3171   1.156585   -89.33   0.000    -105.5841   -101.0502 
time_dum_170 |  -94.27029    1.20929   -77.96   0.000    -96.64054   -91.90005 
time_dum_171 |  -84.44866    1.20929   -69.83   0.000    -86.81891   -82.07842 
time_dum_172 |  -92.65322   1.156585   -80.11   0.000    -94.92015   -90.38628 
time_dum_173 |  -81.14643    1.20929   -67.10   0.000    -83.51668   -78.77619 
time_dum_174 |  -68.72488   1.206265   -56.97   0.000     -71.0892   -66.36057 
time_dum_175 |  -78.74819   1.153421   -68.27   0.000    -81.00893   -76.48745 
time_dum_176 |  -85.11988   1.206265   -70.56   0.000    -87.48419   -82.75556 
time_dum_177 |  -79.40324   1.154814   -68.76   0.000    -81.66671   -77.13977 
time_dum_178 |  -80.68364    1.20929   -66.72   0.000    -83.05388    -78.3134 
time_dum_179 |  -88.08018    1.20929   -72.84   0.000    -90.45043   -85.70994 87 
 
time_dum_180 |  -89.76477    1.20929   -74.23   0.000    -92.13502   -87.39453 
time_dum_181 |     -91.92   1.156585   -79.48   0.000    -94.18694   -89.65306 
time_dum_182 |  -94.36786    1.20929   -78.04   0.000    -96.73811   -91.99762 
time_dum_183 |  -98.52574    1.20929   -81.47   0.000     -100.896   -96.15549 
time_dum_184 |  -80.31046   1.156585   -69.44   0.000     -82.5774   -78.04352 
time_dum_185 |  -66.19437    1.20929   -54.74   0.000    -68.56461   -63.82413 
time_dum_186 |  -77.84321   1.206153   -64.54   0.000    -80.20731   -75.47912 
time_dum_187 |  -101.0431   1.153304   -87.61   0.000    -103.3036   -98.78263 
time_dum_188 |  -94.80643   1.206153   -78.60   0.000    -97.17053   -92.44234 
time_dum_189 |   -86.6146   1.206731   -71.78   0.000    -88.97983   -84.24937 
time_dum_190 |  -104.8502   1.156327   -90.68   0.000    -107.1166   -102.5837 
time_dum_191 |  -126.6782    1.20929  -104.75   0.000    -129.0484   -124.3079 
time_dum_192 |  -138.6561    1.20929  -114.66   0.000    -141.0263   -136.2858 
time_dum_193 |  -135.0513   1.156585  -116.77   0.000    -137.3183   -132.7844 
time_dum_194 |  -137.4019    1.20929  -113.62   0.000    -139.7722   -135.0317 
time_dum_195 |   -124.035    1.20929  -102.57   0.000    -126.4052   -121.6647 
time_dum_196 |   -110.066   1.156585   -95.16   0.000     -112.333   -107.7991 
time_dum_197 |  -105.7589    1.20929   -87.46   0.000    -108.1291   -103.3886 
time_dum_198 |  -108.6124   1.206153   -90.05   0.000    -110.9765   -106.2483 
time_dum_199 |  -107.6955   1.153304   -93.38   0.000     -109.956    -105.435 
time_dum_200 |  -103.5952   1.206153   -85.89   0.000    -105.9593   -101.2311 
time_dum_201 |  -100.6791   1.206731   -83.43   0.000    -103.0443   -98.31385 
time_dum_202 |  -94.94454   1.156327   -82.11   0.000    -97.21098   -92.67811 
time_dum_203 |  -98.49523    1.20929   -81.45   0.000    -100.8655   -96.12499 
time_dum_204 |   -106.402    1.20929   -87.99   0.000    -108.7722   -104.0318 
time_dum_205 |  -99.14419   1.156585   -85.72   0.000    -101.4111   -96.87725 
time_dum_206 |   -82.9718    1.20929   -68.61   0.000    -85.34204   -80.60155 
time_dum_207 |  -73.70131    1.20929   -60.95   0.000    -76.07155   -71.33107 
time_dum_208 |  -81.47944   1.156585   -70.45   0.000    -83.74638    -79.2125 
time_dum_209 |  -91.59748    1.20929   -75.74   0.000    -93.96772   -89.22724 
time_dum_210 |  -96.60339   1.206153   -80.09   0.000    -98.96749    -94.2393 
time_dum_211 |  -85.72644   1.153304   -74.33   0.000    -87.98695   -83.46593 
time_dum_212 |  -79.61505   1.206153   -66.01   0.000    -81.97915   -77.25096 
time_dum_213 |  -70.52892   1.206731   -58.45   0.000    -72.89415   -68.16369 
time_dum_214 |  -90.47007   1.156327   -78.24   0.000     -92.7365   -88.20364 
time_dum_215 |  -93.13737    1.20929   -77.02   0.000    -95.50761   -90.76712 
time_dum_216 |  -96.74357    1.20929   -80.00   0.000    -99.11382   -94.37333 
time_dum_217 |   -90.2016   1.156585   -77.99   0.000    -92.46854   -87.93466 
time_dum_218 |  -80.74285    1.20929   -66.77   0.000    -83.11309    -78.3726 
time_dum_219 |  -73.34324    1.20929   -60.65   0.000    -75.71348   -70.97299 
time_dum_220 |  -66.01367   1.156585   -57.08   0.000    -68.28061   -63.74673 
time_dum_221 |  -51.17126    1.20929   -42.32   0.000     -53.5415   -48.80102 
time_dum_222 |  -47.94573   1.206139   -39.75   0.000     -50.3098   -45.58167 
time_dum_223 |  -51.56895   1.153289   -44.71   0.000    -53.82943   -49.30847 
time_dum_224 |   -50.9648   1.206139   -42.25   0.000    -53.32887   -48.60074 
time_dum_225 |  -58.82925   1.154049   -50.98   0.000    -61.09122   -56.56728 
time_dum_226 |  -53.80346    1.20929   -44.49   0.000     -56.1737   -51.43321 
time_dum_227 |   -55.5263    1.20929   -45.92   0.000    -57.89654   -53.15605 
time_dum_228 |  -68.19723   1.156585   -58.96   0.000    -70.46417    -65.9303 
time_dum_229 |  -74.56924   1.156585   -64.47   0.000    -76.83618    -72.3023 
time_dum_230 |  -59.65084    1.20929   -49.33   0.000    -62.02108    -57.2806 
time_dum_231 |  -42.93185    1.20929   -35.50   0.000    -45.30209   -40.56161 
time_dum_232 |  -24.79483   1.156585   -21.44   0.000    -27.06177   -22.52789 
time_dum_233 |  -31.13139    1.20929   -25.74   0.000    -33.50163   -28.76114 
time_dum_234 |  -30.49145   1.206139   -25.28   0.000    -32.85552   -28.12739 
time_dum_235 |  -24.39125   1.153289   -21.15   0.000    -26.65173   -22.13077 
time_dum_236 |   2.001272   1.206139     1.66   0.097    -.3627949     4.36534 
time_dum_237 |   39.49348   1.210055    32.64   0.000     37.12173    41.86522 
time_dum_238 |    23.9743   1.162084    20.63   0.000     21.69658    26.25202 
time_dum_239 |  -15.71172    1.20929   -12.99   0.000    -18.08196   -13.34147 
time_dum_240 |   -32.1476    1.20929   -26.58   0.000    -34.51784   -29.77735 
time_dum_241 |  -22.55019   1.156585   -19.50   0.000    -24.81713   -20.28325 88 
 
time_dum_242 |   -19.5345    1.20929   -16.15   0.000    -21.90474   -17.16425 
time_dum_243 |  -17.10544    1.20929   -14.15   0.000    -19.47568   -14.73519 
time_dum_244 |   16.24267   1.156585    14.04   0.000     13.97573    18.50961 
time_dum_245 |   36.76086    1.20929    30.40   0.000     34.39061     39.1311 
time_dum_246 |    33.5064   1.206139    27.78   0.000     31.14233    35.87047 
time_dum_247 |   41.29412   1.153289    35.81   0.000     39.03363     43.5546 
time_dum_248 |   47.47612   1.206139    39.36   0.000     45.11205    49.84019 
time_dum_249 |   12.41102   1.206644    10.29   0.000     10.04596    14.77608 
time_dum_250 |  -25.47028   1.156327   -22.03   0.000    -27.73672   -23.20385 
time_dum_251 |  -30.97227    1.20929   -25.61   0.000    -33.34252   -28.60203 
time_dum_252 |  -26.23587   1.156585   -22.68   0.000     -28.5028   -23.96893 
time_dum_253 |  -30.91165   1.156585   -26.73   0.000    -33.17859   -28.64471 
time_dum_254 |   -29.3451    1.20929   -24.27   0.000    -31.71535   -26.97486 
time_dum_255 |  -4.723606    1.20929    -3.91   0.000     -7.09385   -2.353363 
time_dum_256 |   23.55089   1.156585    20.36   0.000     21.28395    25.81783 
time_dum_257 |   53.64562    1.20929    44.36   0.000     51.27538    56.01587 
time_dum_258 |   53.36798   1.206139    44.25   0.000     51.00392    55.73205 
time_dum_259 |   38.39911   1.153289    33.30   0.000     36.13863     40.6596 
time_dum_260 |   21.90936   1.206139    18.16   0.000     19.54529    24.27343 
time_dum_261 |   24.33625   1.206644    20.17   0.000     21.97119    26.70131 
time_dum_262 |   22.59644   1.156327    19.54   0.000        20.33    24.86287 
time_dum_263 |    48.6379    1.20929    40.22   0.000     46.26765    51.00814 
time_dum_264 |   41.61803   1.156585    35.98   0.000     39.35109    43.88497 
time_dum_265 |   43.92947   1.156585    37.98   0.000     41.66254    46.19641 
time_dum_266 |   46.89211    1.20929    38.78   0.000     44.52186    49.26235 
time_dum_267 |   59.42599    1.20929    49.14   0.000     57.05575    61.79624 
time_dum_268 |   82.16321   1.156585    71.04   0.000     79.89627    84.43015 
time_dum_269 |   115.7434    1.20929    95.71   0.000     113.3732    118.1137 
time_dum_270 |   134.3269   1.206139   111.37   0.000     131.9629     136.691 
time_dum_271 |   126.5295   1.153289   109.71   0.000      124.269      128.79 
time_dum_272 |   100.2805   1.206139    83.14   0.000     97.91644    102.6446 
time_dum_273 |    93.1534   1.154049    80.72   0.000     90.89142    95.41537 
time_dum_274 |   6.211824    1.20929     5.14   0.000      3.84158    8.582068 
time_dum_275 |  -64.22401    1.20929   -53.11   0.000    -66.59426   -61.85377 
time_dum_276 |  -97.53195    1.20929   -80.65   0.000     -99.9022   -95.16171 
time_dum_277 |  -86.58067   1.156585   -74.86   0.000    -88.84761   -84.31373 
time_dum_278 |  -75.83382    1.20929   -62.71   0.000    -78.20406   -73.46357 
time_dum_279 |  -71.37818    1.20929   -59.02   0.000    -73.74842   -69.00793 
time_dum_280 |  -62.83199   1.156585   -54.33   0.000    -65.09893   -60.56505 
time_dum_281 |  -29.39209    1.20929   -24.31   0.000    -31.76233   -27.02184 
time_dum_282 |  -5.275926   1.206139    -4.37   0.000    -7.639994   -2.911859 
time_dum_283 |  -20.10847   1.153289   -17.44   0.000    -22.36895   -17.84799 
time_dum_284 |  -10.72534   1.206139    -8.89   0.000    -13.08941   -8.361271 
time_dum_285 |   -15.1498   1.206644   -12.56   0.000    -17.51486   -12.78475 
time_dum_286 |  -13.29034   1.156327   -11.49   0.000    -15.55677    -11.0239 
time_dum_287 |  -6.269727    1.20929    -5.18   0.000    -8.639971   -3.899483 
time_dum_288 |  -9.153384    1.20929    -7.57   0.000    -11.52363    -6.78314 
time_dum_289 |    .495521   1.156585     0.43   0.668    -1.771418     2.76246 
time_dum_290 |  -2.925442    1.20929    -2.42   0.016    -5.295686   -.5551987 
time_dum_291 |   7.513631    1.20929     6.21   0.000     5.143387    9.883875 
time_dum_292 |    15.0402   1.156585    13.00   0.000     12.77326    17.30714 
time_dum_293 |   12.15948    1.20929    10.06   0.000     9.789237    14.52972 
time_dum_294 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   222.7775   .9217996   241.68   0.000     220.9708    224.5843 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  7.0085083 
     sigma_e |  9.7348823 
         rho |  .34137307   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(37, 36439) =   490.93           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Monthly Time Trend Model (Full Year), 1992-2000 (Table 2, Column VIII) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =     17859 
Group variable: place_id                        Number of groups   =        38 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8125                         Obs per group: min =       469 
       between = 0.1019                                        avg =     470.0 
       overall = 0.6966                                        max =       470 
 
                                                F(109,17712)       =    704.23 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0126                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |    4.38425   .2572682    17.04   0.000     3.879979    4.888521 
         _78 |   .1296661    .258798     0.50   0.616    -.3776033    .6369355 
 time_dum_73 |  -22.18348   .8483702   -26.15   0.000    -23.84637   -20.52059 
 time_dum_74 |  -20.01704   .8932749   -22.41   0.000    -21.76795   -18.26613 
 time_dum_75 |  -19.49817   .8932749   -21.83   0.000    -21.24908   -17.74727 
 time_dum_76 |  -21.26389   .8483702   -25.06   0.000    -22.92678     -19.601 
 time_dum_77 |  -12.30034   .8932749   -13.77   0.000    -14.05124   -10.54943 
 time_dum_78 |  -6.958475   .8886915    -7.83   0.000    -8.700398   -5.216553 
 time_dum_79 |   -8.56983   .8435429   -10.16   0.000    -10.22326   -6.916403 
 time_dum_80 |  -11.41631   .8886915   -12.85   0.000    -13.15823   -9.674387 
 time_dum_81 |  -10.56603   .8451528   -12.50   0.000    -12.22261   -8.909447 
 time_dum_82 |  -11.48858   .8932749   -12.86   0.000    -13.23949   -9.737675 
 time_dum_83 |  -11.58971   .8932749   -12.97   0.000    -13.34062   -9.838804 
 time_dum_84 |  -17.34967   .8483702   -20.45   0.000    -19.01256   -15.68678 
 time_dum_85 |  -21.24003   .8483702   -25.04   0.000    -22.90292   -19.57714 
 time_dum_86 |  -19.33662   .8932749   -21.65   0.000    -21.08753   -17.58571 
 time_dum_87 |  -19.66975   .8932749   -22.02   0.000    -21.42066   -17.91885 
 time_dum_88 |  -20.75587   .8483702   -24.47   0.000    -22.41876   -19.09298 
 time_dum_89 |  -18.38501   .8932749   -20.58   0.000    -20.13592   -16.63411 
 time_dum_90 |  -20.67545   .8886915   -23.27   0.000    -22.41737   -18.93353 
 time_dum_91 |  -20.89442   .8435429   -24.77   0.000    -22.54784   -19.24099 
 time_dum_92 |  -20.84248   .8886915   -23.45   0.000    -22.58441   -19.10056 
 time_dum_93 |  -30.72441   .8897098   -34.53   0.000    -32.46833   -28.98049 
 time_dum_94 |  -31.97375   .8483702   -37.69   0.000    -33.63664   -30.31087 
 time_dum_95 |  -32.22107   .8932749   -36.07   0.000    -33.97198   -30.47016 
 time_dum_96 |  -38.23736   .8932749   -42.81   0.000    -39.98826   -36.48645 
 time_dum_97 |  -40.98845   .8483702   -48.31   0.000    -42.65134   -39.32556 
 time_dum_98 |  -41.51046   .8932749   -46.47   0.000    -43.26137   -39.75955 
 time_dum_99 |  -42.91895   .8932749   -48.05   0.000    -44.66986   -41.16805 
time_dum_100 |  -40.33056   .8483702   -47.54   0.000    -41.99345   -38.66767 
time_dum_101 |  -37.20498   .8932749   -41.65   0.000    -38.95588   -35.45407 
time_dum_102 |    -32.754   .8886915   -36.86   0.000    -34.49592   -31.01208 
time_dum_103 |  -27.61183   .8435429   -32.73   0.000    -29.26526   -25.95841 
time_dum_104 |  -20.76973   .8886915   -23.37   0.000    -22.51165   -19.02781 
time_dum_105 |  -22.57643   .8897098   -25.38   0.000    -24.32035   -20.83252 
time_dum_106 |  -26.83639   .8483702   -31.63   0.000    -28.49928    -25.1735 
time_dum_107 |  -27.18348   .8932749   -30.43   0.000    -28.93439   -25.43257 
time_dum_108 |  -30.21344   .8932749   -33.82   0.000    -31.96434   -28.46253 
time_dum_109 |  -31.95746   .8430345   -37.91   0.000    -33.60989   -30.30503 
time_dum_110 |  -35.03437    .888209   -39.44   0.000    -36.77534   -33.29339 
time_dum_111 |   -36.3613    .888209   -40.94   0.000    -38.10228   -34.62032 
time_dum_112 |  -30.60954   .8430345   -36.31   0.000    -32.26197   -28.95711 
time_dum_113 |  -23.49715    .888209   -26.45   0.000    -25.23812   -21.75617 
time_dum_114 |  -22.07921   .8844102   -24.96   0.000    -23.81274   -20.34568 
time_dum_115 |  -26.58725   .8390312   -31.69   0.000    -28.23184   -24.94267 
time_dum_116 |  -31.93262   .8844102   -36.11   0.000    -33.66615   -30.19909 
time_dum_117 |  -34.66544   .8855198   -39.15   0.000    -36.40115   -32.92974 90 
 
time_dum_118 |   -37.7813   .8430345   -44.82   0.000    -39.43373   -36.12887 
time_dum_119 |  -41.46416    .888209   -46.68   0.000    -43.20514   -39.72319 
time_dum_120 |  -41.05727    .888209   -46.22   0.000    -42.79824   -39.31629 
time_dum_121 |  -38.59885   .8430345   -45.79   0.000    -40.25128   -36.94642 
time_dum_122 |  -38.17577    .888209   -42.98   0.000    -39.91675    -36.4348 
time_dum_123 |  -32.97323    .888209   -37.12   0.000    -34.71421   -31.23226 
time_dum_124 |  -21.69383   .8430345   -25.73   0.000    -23.34626    -20.0414 
time_dum_125 |   -14.3949    .888209   -16.21   0.000    -16.13587   -12.65392 
time_dum_126 |  -16.46144   .8844102   -18.61   0.000    -18.19497    -14.7279 
time_dum_127 |  -21.47454   .8389981   -25.60   0.000    -23.11906   -19.83002 
time_dum_128 |  -24.65081   .8843788   -27.87   0.000    -26.38428   -22.91734 
time_dum_129 |  -24.69176   .8404692   -29.38   0.000    -26.33916   -23.04436 
time_dum_130 |  -24.76386    .888209   -27.88   0.000    -26.50483   -23.02288 
time_dum_131 |  -20.73513    .888209   -23.34   0.000     -22.4761   -18.99415 
time_dum_132 |  -19.87336    .888209   -22.37   0.000    -21.61434   -18.13239 
time_dum_133 |  -20.49274   .8430345   -24.31   0.000    -22.14517   -18.84031 
time_dum_134 |  -22.13033    .888209   -24.92   0.000    -23.87131   -20.38936 
time_dum_135 |  -26.22657    .888209   -29.53   0.000    -27.96755   -24.48559 
time_dum_136 |  -28.83135   .8430345   -34.20   0.000    -30.48378   -27.17892 
time_dum_137 |  -28.11418    .888209   -31.65   0.000    -29.85516    -26.3732 
time_dum_138 |  -26.46215   .8843788   -29.92   0.000    -28.19561   -24.72868 
time_dum_139 |  -29.86861   .8389981   -35.60   0.000    -31.51313    -28.2241 
time_dum_140 |  -24.16358   .8843788   -27.32   0.000    -25.89705   -22.43012 
time_dum_141 |  -22.55759   .8853535   -25.48   0.000    -24.29297   -20.82221 
time_dum_142 |  -27.85501   .8430345   -33.04   0.000    -29.50744   -26.20258 
time_dum_143 |  -31.50013    .888209   -35.46   0.000    -33.24111   -29.75915 
time_dum_144 |  -36.12499   .8430345   -42.85   0.000    -37.77742   -34.47256 
time_dum_145 |  -44.20386   .8430345   -52.43   0.000    -45.85629   -42.55143 
time_dum_146 |  -49.79894    .888209   -56.07   0.000    -51.53992   -48.05797 
time_dum_147 |   -52.6932    .888209   -59.33   0.000    -54.43417   -50.95222 
time_dum_148 |  -51.11669   .8430345   -60.63   0.000    -52.76912   -49.46426 
time_dum_149 |  -48.57762    .888209   -54.69   0.000    -50.31859   -46.83664 
time_dum_150 |  -48.72228   .8843788   -55.09   0.000    -50.45575   -46.98881 
time_dum_151 |  -49.17932   .8399858   -58.55   0.000    -50.82577   -47.53286 
time_dum_152 |   -52.1648   .8843998   -58.98   0.000    -53.89831   -50.43129 
time_dum_153 |  -55.06642   .8852002   -62.21   0.000     -56.8015   -53.33134 
time_dum_154 |  -55.13716   .8430345   -65.40   0.000    -56.78959   -53.48473 
time_dum_155 |  -58.25736    .888209   -65.59   0.000    -59.99833   -56.51638 
time_dum_156 |   -62.8504    .888209   -70.76   0.000    -64.59137   -61.10942 
time_dum_157 |  -64.33154   .8430345   -76.31   0.000    -65.98397   -62.67911 
time_dum_158 |  -66.97397    .888209   -75.40   0.000    -68.71494   -65.23299 
time_dum_159 |  -58.15189    .888209   -65.47   0.000    -59.89287   -56.41092 
time_dum_160 |  -45.39777   .8430345   -53.85   0.000     -47.0502   -43.74534 
time_dum_161 |  -41.71219    .888209   -46.96   0.000    -43.45316   -39.97121 
time_dum_162 |  -44.77194   .8843528   -50.63   0.000    -46.50536   -43.03852 
time_dum_163 |  -38.32347   .8389708   -45.68   0.000    -39.96794   -36.67901 
time_dum_164 |  -35.94096   .8843528   -40.64   0.000    -37.67437   -34.20754 
time_dum_165 |  -33.27547   .8852964   -37.59   0.000    -35.01074   -31.54021 
time_dum_166 |  -26.82526   .8429419   -31.82   0.000    -28.47751   -25.17301 
time_dum_167 |  -25.97032   .8881211   -29.24   0.000    -27.71113   -24.22952 
time_dum_168 |  -14.05791   .8881211   -15.83   0.000    -15.79871    -12.3171 
time_dum_169 |  -18.15528   .8429419   -21.54   0.000    -19.80753   -16.50303 
time_dum_170 |  -9.108436   .8881211   -10.26   0.000    -10.84924   -7.367632 
time_dum_171 |   .7131958   .8881211     0.80   0.422    -1.027608       2.454 
time_dum_172 |  -7.491357   .8429419    -8.89   0.000    -9.143606   -5.839108 
time_dum_173 |   4.015426   .8881211     4.52   0.000     2.274622     5.75623 
time_dum_174 |     16.395   .8843528    18.54   0.000     14.66158    18.12841 
time_dum_175 |    6.37169   .8389708     7.59   0.000     4.727225    8.016155 
time_dum_176 |  (omitted) 
time_dum_177 |   5.741828   .8404025     6.83   0.000     4.094557      7.3891 
time_dum_178 |   4.478217   .8881211     5.04   0.000     2.737413    6.219022 
time_dum_179 |  -2.918324   .8881211    -3.29   0.001    -4.659128    -1.17752 91 
 
time_dum_180 |  -4.602914   .8881211    -5.18   0.000    -6.343718   -2.862109 
       _cons |   137.2831   .6378873   215.22   0.000     136.0328    138.5334 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  7.4779156 
     sigma_e |  7.7096093 
         rho |  .48474802   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(37, 17712) =   434.44           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 92 
 
Monthly Time Trend Model (Full Year), 2001-2010 (Table 2, Column IX) 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =     18841 
Group variable: place_id                        Number of groups   =        38 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9697                         Obs per group: min =       489 
       between = 0.0181                                        avg =     495.8 
       overall = 0.9565                                        max =       496 
 
                                                F(114,18689)       =   5250.66 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0003                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |  (omitted) 
         _78 |  -.2721105   .3485569    -0.78   0.435    -.9553137    .4110926 
time_dum_181 |   14.48199   1.188823    12.18   0.000     12.15179     16.8122 
time_dum_182 |   12.03413   1.253129     9.60   0.000     9.577882    14.49038 
time_dum_183 |   7.876259   1.253129     6.29   0.000     5.420011    10.33251 
time_dum_184 |   26.09153   1.188823    21.95   0.000     23.76133    28.42173 
time_dum_185 |   40.20762   1.253129    32.09   0.000     37.75138    42.66387 
time_dum_186 |   28.65783   1.259692    22.75   0.000     26.18872    31.12694 
time_dum_187 |   5.457906   1.195738     4.56   0.000      3.11415    7.801662 
time_dum_188 |   11.69461   1.259692     9.28   0.000     9.225498    14.16372 
time_dum_189 |   19.84753   1.255553    15.81   0.000     17.38653    22.30853 
time_dum_190 |   1.556064   1.188836     1.31   0.191    -.7741618     3.88629 
time_dum_191 |   -20.2762   1.253129   -16.18   0.000    -22.73245   -17.81995 
time_dum_192 |  -32.25407   1.253129   -25.74   0.000    -34.71032   -29.79783 
time_dum_193 |  -28.64935   1.188823   -24.10   0.000    -30.97955   -26.31915 
time_dum_194 |  -30.99994   1.253129   -24.74   0.000    -33.45619   -28.54369 
time_dum_195 |  -17.63299   1.253129   -14.07   0.000    -20.08923   -15.17674 
time_dum_196 |  -3.664032   1.188823    -3.08   0.002    -5.994233   -1.333831 
time_dum_197 |   .6431392   1.253129     0.51   0.608    -1.813108    3.099387 
time_dum_198 |  -2.111378   1.259692    -1.68   0.094    -4.580489    .3577328 
time_dum_199 |  -1.194464   1.195738    -1.00   0.318     -3.53822    1.149293 
time_dum_200 |   2.905872   1.259692     2.31   0.021     .4367615    5.374983 
time_dum_201 |   5.783049   1.255553     4.61   0.000     3.322052    8.244047 
time_dum_202 |   11.46169   1.188836     9.64   0.000     9.131469    13.79192 
time_dum_203 |   7.906759   1.253129     6.31   0.000     5.450512    10.36301 
time_dum_204 |  (omitted) 
time_dum_205 |   7.257809   1.188823     6.11   0.000     4.927608     9.58801 
time_dum_206 |    23.4302   1.253129    18.70   0.000     20.97395    25.88644 
time_dum_207 |   32.70068   1.253129    26.10   0.000     30.24444    35.15693 
time_dum_208 |   24.92256   1.188823    20.96   0.000     22.59236    27.25276 
time_dum_209 |   14.80451   1.253129    11.81   0.000     12.34827    17.26076 
time_dum_210 |   9.897647   1.259692     7.86   0.000     7.428537    12.36676 
time_dum_211 |   20.77461   1.195738    17.37   0.000     18.43085    23.11836 
time_dum_212 |   26.88599   1.259692    21.34   0.000     24.41688     29.3551 
time_dum_213 |   35.93321   1.255553    28.62   0.000     33.47221    38.39421 
time_dum_214 |   15.93617   1.188836    13.40   0.000     13.60594     18.2664 
time_dum_215 |   13.26463   1.253129    10.59   0.000     10.80838    15.72087 
time_dum_216 |   9.658419   1.253129     7.71   0.000     7.202172    12.11467 
time_dum_217 |   16.20039   1.188823    13.63   0.000     13.87019    18.53059 
time_dum_218 |   25.65915   1.253129    20.48   0.000      23.2029     28.1154 
time_dum_219 |   33.05876   1.253129    26.38   0.000     30.60251      35.515 
time_dum_220 |   40.38833   1.188823    33.97   0.000     38.05813    42.71853 
time_dum_221 |   55.23073   1.253129    44.07   0.000     52.77449    57.68698 
time_dum_222 |   58.56238    1.26066    46.45   0.000     56.09138    61.03339 
time_dum_223 |   54.93916   1.196758    45.91   0.000     52.59341    57.28492 
time_dum_224 |   55.54331    1.26066    44.06   0.000      53.0723    58.01432 
time_dum_225 |   47.62793   1.190974    39.99   0.000     45.29351    49.96234 93 
 
time_dum_226 |   52.59854   1.253129    41.97   0.000     50.14229    55.05479 
time_dum_227 |    50.8757   1.253129    40.60   0.000     48.41945    53.33195 
time_dum_228 |   38.20476   1.188823    32.14   0.000     35.87456    40.53496 
time_dum_229 |   31.83275   1.188823    26.78   0.000     29.50255    34.16296 
time_dum_230 |   46.75115   1.253129    37.31   0.000     44.29491     49.2074 
time_dum_231 |   63.47014   1.253129    50.65   0.000      61.0139    65.92639 
time_dum_232 |   81.60716   1.188823    68.65   0.000     79.27696    83.93736 
time_dum_233 |   75.27061   1.253129    60.07   0.000     72.81436    77.72686 
time_dum_234 |   76.01666    1.26066    60.30   0.000     73.54566    78.48767 
time_dum_235 |   82.11687   1.196758    68.62   0.000     79.77111    84.46262 
time_dum_236 |   108.5094    1.26066    86.07   0.000     106.0384    110.9804 
time_dum_237 |   145.9467   1.260149   115.82   0.000     143.4766    148.4167 
time_dum_238 |   130.3536   1.196036   108.99   0.000     128.0093    132.6979 
time_dum_239 |   90.69028   1.253129    72.37   0.000     88.23403    93.14652 
time_dum_240 |    74.2544   1.253129    59.26   0.000     71.79815    76.71065 
time_dum_241 |   83.85181   1.188823    70.53   0.000     81.52161    86.18201 
time_dum_242 |    86.8675   1.253129    69.32   0.000     84.41125    89.32374 
time_dum_243 |   89.29656   1.253129    71.26   0.000     86.84031    91.75281 
time_dum_244 |   122.6447   1.188823   103.16   0.000     120.3145    124.9749 
time_dum_245 |   143.1629   1.253129   114.24   0.000     140.7066    145.6191 
time_dum_246 |   140.0145    1.26066   111.06   0.000     137.5435    142.4855 
time_dum_247 |   147.8022   1.196758   123.50   0.000     145.4565     150.148 
time_dum_248 |   153.9842    1.26066   122.15   0.000     151.5132    156.4552 
time_dum_249 |   118.8767   1.255846    94.66   0.000     116.4151    121.3383 
time_dum_250 |   80.93595   1.188836    68.08   0.000     78.60573    83.26618 
time_dum_251 |   75.42972   1.253129    60.19   0.000     72.97347    77.88597 
time_dum_252 |   80.16613   1.188823    67.43   0.000     77.83593    82.49633 
time_dum_253 |   75.49034   1.188823    63.50   0.000     73.16014    77.82054 
time_dum_254 |   77.05689   1.253129    61.49   0.000     74.60064    79.51314 
time_dum_255 |   101.6784   1.253129    81.14   0.000     99.22214    104.1346 
time_dum_256 |   129.9529   1.188823   109.31   0.000     127.6227    132.2831 
time_dum_257 |   160.0476   1.253129   127.72   0.000     157.5914    162.5039 
time_dum_258 |   159.8761    1.26066   126.82   0.000     157.4051    162.3471 
time_dum_259 |   144.9072   1.196758   121.08   0.000     142.5615     147.253 
time_dum_260 |   128.4175    1.26066   101.87   0.000     125.9465    130.8885 
time_dum_261 |   130.8019   1.255846   104.15   0.000     128.3403    133.2635 
time_dum_262 |   129.0027   1.188836   108.51   0.000     126.6724    131.3329 
time_dum_263 |   155.0399   1.253129   123.72   0.000     152.5836    157.4961 
time_dum_264 |     148.02   1.188823   124.51   0.000     145.6898    150.3502 
time_dum_265 |   150.3315   1.188823   126.45   0.000     148.0013    152.6617 
time_dum_266 |   153.2941   1.253129   122.33   0.000     150.8379    155.7503 
time_dum_267 |    165.828   1.253129   132.33   0.000     163.3717    168.2842 
time_dum_268 |   188.5652   1.188823   158.62   0.000      186.235    190.8954 
time_dum_269 |   222.1454   1.253129   177.27   0.000     219.6892    224.6017 
time_dum_270 |    240.835    1.26066   191.04   0.000      238.364     243.306 
time_dum_271 |   233.0376   1.196758   194.72   0.000     230.6918    235.3834 
time_dum_272 |   206.7886    1.26066   164.03   0.000     204.3176    209.2596 
time_dum_273 |   199.6106   1.190974   167.60   0.000     197.2762     201.945 
time_dum_274 |   112.6138   1.253129    89.87   0.000     110.1576    115.0701 
time_dum_275 |   42.17798   1.253129    33.66   0.000     39.72173    44.63423 
time_dum_276 |   8.870041   1.253129     7.08   0.000     6.413793    11.32629 
time_dum_277 |   19.82132   1.188823    16.67   0.000     17.49112    22.15152 
time_dum_278 |   30.56818   1.253129    24.39   0.000     28.11193    33.02443 
time_dum_279 |   35.02382   1.253129    27.95   0.000     32.56757    37.48006 
time_dum_280 |   43.57001   1.188823    36.65   0.000     41.23981    45.90021 
time_dum_281 |   77.00991   1.253129    61.45   0.000     74.55366    79.46616 
time_dum_282 |   101.2322    1.26066    80.30   0.000     98.76118    103.7032 
time_dum_283 |   86.39965   1.196758    72.19   0.000      84.0539    88.74541 
time_dum_284 |   95.78278    1.26066    75.98   0.000     93.31177    98.25379 
time_dum_285 |   91.31586   1.255846    72.71   0.000     88.85429    93.77744 
time_dum_286 |    93.1159   1.188836    78.33   0.000     90.78568    95.44613 
time_dum_287 |   100.1323   1.253129    79.91   0.000     97.67602    102.5885 94 
 
time_dum_288 |   97.24861   1.253129    77.60   0.000     94.79236    99.70486 
time_dum_289 |   106.8975   1.188823    89.92   0.000     104.5673    109.2277 
time_dum_290 |   103.4766   1.253129    82.57   0.000     101.0203    105.9328 
time_dum_291 |   113.9156   1.253129    90.90   0.000     111.4594    116.3719 
time_dum_292 |   121.4422   1.188823   102.15   0.000      119.112    123.7724 
time_dum_293 |   118.5615   1.253129    94.61   0.000     116.1052    121.0177 
time_dum_294 |   106.5081   1.360509    78.29   0.000     103.8414    109.1748 
       _cons |   117.5435   .8860963   132.65   0.000     115.8067    119.2804 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  7.4531883 
     sigma_e |  10.924529 
         rho |   .3176186   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(37, 18689) =   209.99           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Multiple RVP Regulations Model, 1992-2010 (Table 2, Column X) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   10373 
                                                       F( 20,    31) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9662 
                                                       Root MSE      =  12.808 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 32 clusters in state) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rfg |    7.37854   2.155464     3.42   0.002     2.982443    11.77464 
      rvp_78 |   .5505076   1.594406     0.35   0.732    -2.701305    3.802321 
         _72 |   8.017467   2.389813     3.35   0.002     3.143412    12.89152 
 place_dum_1 |   16.30594   2.914906     5.59   0.000     10.36095    22.25093 
 place_dum_2 |    4.99383   1.850952     2.70   0.011     1.218789    8.768871 
 place_dum_3 |   4.781862   1.331592     3.59   0.001     2.066062    7.497662 
 place_dum_4 |    4.01644   1.827179     2.20   0.036      .289885    7.742996 
 place_dum_5 |   12.65489   1.594406     7.94   0.000     9.403073     15.9067 
 place_dum_6 |   13.62202   2.914906     4.67   0.000     7.677027    19.56701 
 place_dum_7 |   18.22889   2.914906     6.25   0.000      12.2839    24.17388 
 place_dum_8 |   30.08903   1.594406    18.87   0.000     26.83722    33.34084 
 place_dum_9 |    11.5471   2.914906     3.96   0.000     5.602112    17.49209 
place_dum_10 |   3.524158   2.14e-10        .   0.000     3.524158    3.524158 
place_dum_11 |   19.22131   2.476925     7.76   0.000     14.16958    24.27303 
place_dum_12 |   8.539699   2.914906     2.93   0.006     2.594709    14.48469 
place_dum_13 |   6.714208   1.976222     3.40   0.002     2.683675    10.74474 
place_dum_14 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_15 |   7.598987   2.914906     2.61   0.014     1.653997    13.54398 
place_dum_16 |   2.978498   1.981014     1.50   0.143    -1.061808    7.018803 
place_dum_17 |   6.988236   2.914906     2.40   0.023     1.043246    12.93323 
place_dum_18 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_19 |   12.40536   1.594406     7.78   0.000      9.15355    15.65718 
place_dum_20 |   5.626826   1.800167     3.13   0.004      1.95536    9.298291 
place_dum_21 |   15.76791   1.800167     8.76   0.000     12.09644    19.43938 
place_dum_22 |   4.898276   1.594406     3.07   0.004     1.646464    8.150089 
place_dum_23 |   12.02879   2.914906     4.13   0.000     6.083802    17.97378 
place_dum_24 |   9.099126   1.800167     5.05   0.000     5.427661    12.77059 
place_dum_25 |   15.55847   1.594406     9.76   0.000     12.30666    18.81028 
place_dum_26 |   13.64782   1.594406     8.56   0.000       10.396    16.89963 
place_dum_27 |   4.877076   1.331592     3.66   0.001     2.161276    7.592875 
place_dum_28 |   3.668373   2.914906     1.26   0.218    -2.276618    9.613363 
place_dum_29 |   9.353623   2.914906     3.21   0.003     3.408633    15.29861 
place_dum_30 |   6.410888   1.594406     4.02   0.000     3.159075    9.662701 
place_dum_31 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_32 |   8.405619     2.1274     3.95   0.000     4.066758    12.74448 
place_dum_33 |   29.50798   1.800167    16.39   0.000     25.83651    33.17944 
place_dum_34 |   15.73328   1.800167     8.74   0.000     12.06181    19.40474 
place_dum_35 |   4.948383   2.281295     2.17   0.038     .2956525    9.601114 
place_dum_36 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_37 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_38 |    28.9808   2.914906     9.94   0.000     23.03581    34.92579 
place_dum_39 |   4.728011   1.275314     3.71   0.001     2.126991    7.329032 
place_dum_40 |   2.291337   2.281295     1.00   0.323    -2.361394    6.944068 
place_dum_41 |    17.0228   1.331592    12.78   0.000       14.307     19.7386 
place_dum_42 |   5.115855   2.914906     1.76   0.089    -.8291356    11.06085 
  year_dum_1 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_2 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_3 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_4 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_5 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_6 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_7 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_8 |  -12.31599   .8008238   -15.38   0.000    -13.94928    -10.6827 
  year_dum_9 |  -16.98669   1.654212   -10.27   0.000    -20.36048   -13.61291 
 year_dum_10 |  -19.60582   1.251106   -15.67   0.000    -22.15747   -17.05417 
 year_dum_11 |  -13.24789   1.464121    -9.05   0.000    -16.23399    -10.2618 
 year_dum_12 |  -18.35264   1.665816   -11.02   0.000    -21.75009   -14.95518 96 
 
 year_dum_13 |  -42.65562   1.445107   -29.52   0.000    -45.60293    -39.7083 
 year_dum_14 |  -30.68354    1.88243   -16.30   0.000    -34.52278    -26.8443 
 year_dum_15 |   15.48395   1.432337    10.81   0.000     12.56268    18.40522 
 year_dum_16 |   1.671044   1.490665     1.12   0.271    -1.369188    4.711275 
 year_dum_17 |  -13.20864   1.669502    -7.91   0.000    -16.61361   -9.803667 
 year_dum_18 |   8.111451   1.649634     4.92   0.000     4.746999     11.4759 
 year_dum_19 |   41.46947   1.426911    29.06   0.000     38.55927    44.37968 
 year_dum_20 |   82.12821   1.793891    45.78   0.000     78.46955    85.78688 
 year_dum_21 |   131.7442   2.142725    61.48   0.000      127.374    136.1143 
 year_dum_22 |   128.8409   2.395149    53.79   0.000      123.956    133.7258 
 year_dum_23 |   210.1446   1.873785   112.15   0.000      206.323    213.9662 
 year_dum_24 |   80.03427   2.184808    36.63   0.000     75.57833    84.49022 
 year_dum_25 |   92.61017   2.130892    43.46   0.000     88.26418    96.95615 
       _cons |   117.2296   3.174991    36.92   0.000     110.7542    123.7051 
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City-Specific Price Effects Model, 1992-2010 (Table 4) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   10373 
                                                       F( 17,    31) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9666 
                                                       Root MSE      =   12.74 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 32 clusters in state) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
value_EXT~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
rfg_C_Balt~e |   10.69774   1.346945     7.94   0.000     7.950625    13.44485 
rfg_C_Boston |   8.762365   1.346945     6.51   0.000     6.015252    11.50948 
rfg_C_Chic~o |   19.31887   1.346945    14.34   0.000     16.57176    22.06599 
rfg_C_Dallas |   4.667675   1.346945     3.47   0.002     1.920562    7.414789 
rfg_C_Hous~n |   9.210128   1.346945     6.84   0.000     6.463015    11.95724 
rfg_C_Loui~e |   11.16145   1.346945     8.29   0.000     8.414336    13.90856 
rfg_C_Milw~e |   .6719575   1.346945     0.50   0.621    -2.075156    3.419071 
rfg_C_New_~k |  -11.45196   1.346945    -8.50   0.000    -14.19908   -8.704851 
rfg_C_Newark |  -.6226307   1.346945    -0.46   0.647    -3.369744    2.124483 
rfg_C_Norf~k |   5.996799   1.346945     4.45   0.000     3.249685    8.743912 
rfg_C_Phil~a |   5.435525   1.346945     4.04   0.000     2.688411    8.182638 
rfg_C_St_L~s |   2.102438   .9442895     2.23   0.033     .1765472     4.02833 
rfg_C_Wash~n |   16.28946   1.346945    12.09   0.000     13.54235    19.03657 
rvp_C_Atla~a |   4.216518   .0026769  1575.17   0.000     4.211058    4.221977 
rvp_C_Balt~e |  (dropped) 
rvp_C_Birm~m |   2.815328   1.39e-10        .   0.000     2.815328    2.815328 
rvp_C_Dallas |    1.22283   1.124921     1.09   0.285    -1.071463    3.517122 
rvp_C_Denver |   4.438322   1.063788     4.17   0.000     2.268712    6.607933 
rvp_C_Detr~t |   9.744879   1.189899     8.19   0.000     7.318065    12.17169 
rvp_C_Hous~n |  -6.095025   1.124921    -5.42   0.000    -8.389318   -3.800733 
rvp_C_Kans~y |   3.828748   1.39e-10        .   0.000     3.828748    3.828748 
rvp_C_Memp~s |   1.061479   1.39e-10        .   0.000     1.061479    1.061479 
 rvp_C_Miami |   11.20256   1.39e-10        .   0.000     11.20256    11.20256 
rvp_C_New_~s |   4.533779   1.39e-10        .   0.000     4.533779    4.533779 
rvp_C_Norf~k |  (dropped) 
rvp_C_Pitt~h |  -2.226706   .9545282    -2.33   0.026    -4.173479   -.2799326 
rvp_C_Port~d |   24.94263   1.39e-10        .   0.000     24.94263    24.94263 
   rvp_C_SLC |   11.16793   1.39e-10        .   0.000     11.16793    11.16793 
rvp_C_San_~o |   .7346776   .8503763     0.86   0.394    -.9996762    2.469031 
rvp_C_St_L~s |  (dropped) 
 rvp_C_Tulsa |  -.2833764   .8503763    -0.33   0.741     -2.01773    1.450977 
rvp_C_Wash~n |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_1 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_2 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_3 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_4 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_5 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_6 |  (dropped) 
  year_dum_7 |   42.28139   1.507019    28.06   0.000     39.20781    45.35498 
  year_dum_8 |    29.9654   1.687781    17.75   0.000     26.52315    33.40766 
  year_dum_9 |    25.2947      1.539    16.44   0.000     22.15589    28.43351 
 year_dum_10 |    23.0498   1.256693    18.34   0.000     20.48676    25.61284 
 year_dum_11 |   29.23029   .9724822    30.06   0.000      27.2469    31.21368 
 year_dum_12 |   24.25752    .901412    26.91   0.000     22.41908    26.09596 
 year_dum_13 |  (dropped) 
 year_dum_14 |   11.92756   1.167826    10.21   0.000     9.545765    14.30936 
 year_dum_15 |   58.09506   1.329558    43.70   0.000      55.3834    60.80671 
 year_dum_16 |   44.49574   1.627958    27.33   0.000      41.1755    47.81599 
 year_dum_17 |   29.81256    1.29554    23.01   0.000     27.17029    32.45483 
 year_dum_18 |   51.13265   1.170374    43.69   0.000     48.74566    53.51964 
 year_dum_19 |   84.38836   .9116251    92.57   0.000     82.52909    86.24763 
 year_dum_20 |   125.0471    1.26833    98.59   0.000     122.4603    127.6339 
 year_dum_21 |    174.663   1.884776    92.67   0.000      170.819    178.5071 
 year_dum_22 |   171.9563   1.943554    88.48   0.000     167.9924    175.9202 
 year_dum_23 |     253.26   1.495538   169.34   0.000     250.2098    256.3102 
 year_dum_24 |   123.1497   1.661277    74.13   0.000     119.7615    126.5379 
 year_dum_25 |   135.7256   1.761914    77.03   0.000     132.1321     139.319 98 
 
 place_dum_1 |   11.19008   1.39e-10        .   0.000     11.19008    11.19008 
 place_dum_2 |  (dropped) 
 place_dum_3 |  -3.015327   1.124921    -2.68   0.012     -5.30962    -.721035 
 place_dum_4 |  (dropped) 
 place_dum_5 |   6.383309   1.124921     5.67   0.000     4.089017    8.677602 
 place_dum_6 |   8.506162   1.39e-10        .   0.000     8.506162    8.506162 
 place_dum_7 |   13.11303   1.39e-10        .   0.000     13.11303    13.11303 
 place_dum_8 |   15.00103   1.124921    13.34   0.000     12.70674    17.29532 
 place_dum_9 |   6.431248   1.39e-10        .   0.000     6.431248    6.431248 
place_dum_10 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_11 |   12.78103   .3623894    35.27   0.000     12.04193    13.52013 
place_dum_12 |   3.423844   1.39e-10        .   0.000     3.423844    3.423844 
place_dum_13 |   -4.12769    .910948    -4.53   0.000    -5.985581   -2.269799 
place_dum_14 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_15 |   2.483132   1.39e-10        .   0.000     2.483132    2.483132 
place_dum_16 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_17 |   1.872381   1.39e-10        .   0.000     1.872381    1.872381 
place_dum_18 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_19 |   4.130155   1.124921     3.67   0.001     1.835862    6.424447 
place_dum_20 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_21 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_22 |   5.383524   1.124921     4.79   0.000     3.089231    7.677816 
place_dum_23 |   6.912938   1.39e-10        .   0.000     6.912938    6.912938 
place_dum_24 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_25 |   26.16919   1.124921    23.26   0.000      23.8749    28.46348 
place_dum_26 |   15.21426   1.124921    13.52   0.000     12.91997    17.50855 
place_dum_27 |   1.005946   1.124921     0.89   0.378    -1.288347    3.300238 
place_dum_28 |  -1.447482   1.39e-10        .   0.000    -1.447482   -1.447482 
place_dum_29 |   4.237768   1.39e-10        .   0.000     4.237768    4.237768 
place_dum_30 |   2.917771   1.124921     2.59   0.014      .623479    5.212064 
place_dum_31 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_32 |   5.080202   .6153735     8.26   0.000      3.82514    6.335265 
place_dum_33 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_34 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_35 |  -.2605684   .4298605    -0.61   0.549    -1.137275     .616138 
place_dum_36 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_37 |  (dropped) 
place_dum_38 |   23.86494   1.39e-10        .   0.000     23.86494    23.86494 
place_dum_39 |   4.711812   .5811012     8.11   0.000     3.526648    5.896976 
place_dum_40 |  -2.402994   .4298605    -5.59   0.000      -3.2797   -1.526287 
place_dum_41 |   4.555605   1.124921     4.05   0.000     2.261312    6.849897 
place_dum_42 |  (dropped) 
       _cons |   79.59499   .7281074   109.32   0.000        78.11    81.07997 
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